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The Voter Education Project (VEP) was a discreet civil rights agency that funded African 
American registration campaigns throughout Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. Formed in 1961 by 
civil rights leaders, U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) officials, and philanthropists, the VEP 
operated within the Southern Regional Council (SRC) to finance local movements and collect 
data on black disfranchisement. Headquartered in Atlanta, the VEP solicited grants from 
foundations—including the Taconic Foundation, the Field Foundation, the Stern Family Fund, 
and the Ford Foundation—and disbursed the money to activists conducting registration drives 
across the American South. The VEP supported the “Big Five”—the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC), and the National Urban League (NUL)—as well as independent grassroots 
organizations. The VEP empowered activists by giving them funds for everyday expenses for an 
indigenous movement, including money to pay for office rent, flyers, salaries, food, utilities, 
mass meetings, car fuel, and canvassers to knock on doors. The VEP funded the southern civil 
rights movement, focused the struggle onto voting rights activism, and united a southwide social 
movement that ended Jim Crow at the ballot box.  
 iv 
Between 1962 and 1964, the first VEP helped register approximately 688,000 African 
Americans, stoking a groundswell of registration enthusiasm that laid the groundwork for the 
Voting Rights Act of 1965. The second VEP ran from 1966 through 1969 continuing to fight for 
power at the polls, until conservatives undercut the VEP by complicating philanthropic donations 
to registration fieldwork through the Tax Reform Act of 1969. The VEP survived until 1992, but 
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 In the summer of 1962, a registration campaign took place in Orangeburg County, South 
Carolina. African American activists set up a headquarters, planned mass meetings at churches, 
and hired coordinators and secretaries. They purchased office supplies, cut radio commercials, 
printed flyers, paid utility bills, and bought advertisement space in newspapers. Leaders 
mobilized car owners to pick up rural residents and drive them to the registrar’s office. For small 
honorariums, speakers addressed packed churches on the importance of voting. Men and women 
took off work to canvass neighborhoods across the city and county. Working in teams, they went 
door-to-door, rang doorbells, handed out pamphlets from the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), talked about how whites controlled the local 
government, and urged residents to try to register. Canvassers who brought the most people to 
the registrar’s office even won small prizes. Often spending hours under the hot sun, these men 
and women, both young and old, were the Orangeburg movement.1  
 Meanwhile, just over 200 miles away, the office of the Voter Education Project (VEP) 
buzzed with activity. Within a small space on Forsyth Street in downtown Atlanta, a handful of 
staff managed hundreds of thousands of dollars in grants from philanthropic foundations. The 
VEP collected and disbursed the money to Orangeburg, as well as to hundreds of other 
registration projects across the American South. Inside the VEP’s office, typewriters clacked 
almost nonstop while stacks of mail came in and out each day. Local African American leaders 
                                                 
1 J.W. McPherson, Report from Orangeburg Area, VEP Registration Program for the Second Congressional District 
of South Carolina, n.d., Reel 181, Frames 1267-1271, Microfilm Collection of the Southern Regional Council 
Papers, 1944-1968 (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1983). (Hereinafter SRC Papers). 
 2 
applied to the VEP for funds to jumpstart community registration drives, sending in detailed 
information about their hometowns, voter statistics, and segregationist opposition. VEP staff 
reviewed each grant, weighing the costs while keeping in mind the hundreds of other projects 
they juggled. As often as possible, the VEP would approve grant applications, sending perhaps 
$500, $1,000, $5,000, or more for a grassroots registration campaign that might last several 
weeks or months. Behind-the-scenes, the VEP financed the civil rights movement. 
 Dr. C.H. Thomas Jr., am economics professor at South Carolina State College in 
Orangeburg, applied for a VEP grant. He knew that the desire to vote was strong in his county, 
where over two-thirds of the population were black but few had registered. African Americans 
had limited resources to orchestrate a prolonged registration movement. While churches passed 
offering plates and the local NAACP chapter sometimes held fundraisers, sustaining a blitz on 
the registrar’s office would be time-consuming and costly. Fuel for vehicles cost money. Paying 
bills, rent, speaker fees, and salaries was not cheap. To implement a successful drive, one that 
could maintain the energy of Orangeburg’s black community against the county’s intractable 
white political structure, money was crucial. On August 19, Thomas received good news that the 
VEP had awarded $5,000 for a three-month registration operation in Orangeburg.2 
With VEP support, a social movement for the ballot took place in Orangeburg. “Because 
of the total unrest and the general disgust with existing unbearable conditions,” J.W. McPherson, 
a retired postman in his 70s and a leader within the Orangeburg movement wrote, “there was no 
time to form new organizations. We simply lined up what we had, closed the gaps and went to 
work. The Orangeburg Movement and a determined VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT was 
                                                 
2 Dr. C.H. Thomas Jr. to the Voter Education Project, Attn. Wiley Branton, July 17, 1963, Reel 181, Frames 1061-
1062, SRC Papers; and Wiley Branton to Dr. C.H. Thomas Jr., August 19, 1963, Reel 181, Frames 1067-1069, SRC 
Papers.  
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on.”3 During those three-months, the Orangeburg County Registrar’s Office opened only on 
September 2, October 7, and November 4. On September 2, the Orangeburg movement had 
barely started canvassing neighborhoods. But momentum grew, and on October 7, 220 African 
Americans registered to vote, 115 people were left waiting in line, and another 26 were rejected.4 
On November 4, 161 people registered while 16 were rejected and 47 were left in line.5  
Over the next year, the VEP supplied Orangeburg’s movement with multiple grants 
totaling $17,900.6 During that time, organizers expanded their movement beyond Orangeburg 
into the state’s second congressional district, and in the summer of 1964, they formed the South 
Carolina Voter Education Project (SCVEP) to work throughout the state. Where African 
Americans had once encountered difficulty registering, they began swarming registrars’ offices 
throughout the state. VEP money allowed grassroots organizers to nourish their social 
movement. Other groups joined with the SCVEP, such as the American Friends Service 
Committee, which found that helping others register was easier “because of Orangeburg being 
highly organized voter education wise due to prior VEP support.”7 By summer’s end, at least 
2,839 African Americans had registered in Orangeburg, and within two years, an estimated 
40,000 had done so across the state, drawing on aid from eleven other VEP projects.8 
                                                 
3 McPherson, Report from Orangeburg Area (emphasis in original). 
 
4 VEP Orangeburg Report, October 18, 1963, Reel 181, Frame 1224, SRC Papers. 
 
5 VEP Orangeburg Report, November 14, 1963, Reel 181, Frame 1223, SRC Papers. 
 
6 Memorandum, Jean Levine to Wiley Branton, Re: “Final Accounting on VEP 3-20,” November 24, 1964, Reel 
181, Frame 1265, SRC Papers. 
 
7 Memorandum, John Due and Joe Tucker to Wiley Branton, August 10-12, 1964, Frames 1619-1629, Reel 176, 
SRC Papers. 
 
8 McPherson, Report from Orangeburg Area; and “Negro Voter Group Opens Office; Hundreds Register,” The State 
(Columbia, SC), August 16, 1964, Reel 181, Frame 1208, SRC Papers. 
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Orangeburg was one of hundreds of indigenous movements across the American South 
that thrived with VEP assistance. For over 70 years before the VEP, African Americans had 
resisted Jim Crow laws and tried to register, but segregationists maintained control over local 
governments through poll taxes, literacy tests, intimidation, economic threats, violence, and 
political monopoly. In South Carolina, according to J.W. McPherson, “each county had some 
type of organization to encourage persons to register,” but “these organizations worked on their 
own, at their own expense” before the VEP.9 Most communities like Orangeburg lacked a 
coordinated resistance movement, that is, until the VEP launched in 1962. 
The VEP was a discreet civil rights agency that supported non-partisan registration 
campaigns across the eleven states of the old Confederacy. Formed in 1961 by civil rights 
leaders, United States Department of Justice (DOJ) officials, and liberal philanthropists, the VEP 
operated within the Southern Regional Council (SRC), a research organization devoted to 
improving race relations, to finance local movements and collect data on African American 
disfranchisement. The first VEP operated from March 1962 through October 1964, and in those 
two and a half years, the organization supported 129 projects, spent $855,836.59, and registered 
approximately 688,000 people.10 A second VEP began in 1966 and lasted through 1969. In 1970, 
                                                 
9 Ibid. 
 
10 VEP Financial Statement, January 1962 – May 1, 1965, Frame 1477, Reel 173, SRC Papers; Annual Report of the 
Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council, A Review of Program Activities During 1964, April 1965, 
Box 12, Folder 15, Leslie W. Dunbar Papers, Manuscript, Archives, and Rare Book Library, Emory University 
(hereinafter Dunbar Papers); and Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The Arrival of 
Negroes in Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967), 26-27. Watters and Cleghorn were 
journalists affiliated with the SRC, and Climbing Jacob’s Ladder served as the final published report of the first 
VEP. By its own classification system, the VEP counted 129 projects between March 1962 and October 1964, but 
the actual number of local projects that received VEP support was much higher, though difficult to ascertain. 
Sometimes, the VEP classified grants to major organizations under one account number. For example, in 1963, grant 
number 3-5 went to the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) for thirty-nine local projects. I have chosen to count 
VEP grant 3-5 to CORE as one grant as the VEP did, although people in thirty-nine separate places benefitted. Other 
times, the VEP supported ongoing projects but catalogued supplemental grants under a new number, or the VEP 
gave single grants to be shared by multiple projects, or the VEP gave major organizations large grants to be divvied 
out between multiple projects and states. To avoid confusion, I hold 129 as a reasonable figure according to the 
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the VEP separated from the SRC, formed VEP Incorporated, and survived until 1992. Not every 
indigenous black registration movement in the American South drew on VEP funds, but 
hundreds did. The VEP dispensed money for registration campaigns, and in the process, united 
civil rights groups around voting rights, sustained a southwide movement, documented the fight 
against disfranchisement, and fortified black political power.  
 The VEP is not a complete mystery to historians, but none have studied the organization 
in detail. A handful of scholars have scrutinized parts of the VEP, though never the whole.11 A 
common simplification classifies the VEP as a creation of President John F. Kennedy’s 
Administration designed to pacify the civil rights movement’s growing militancy.12 Many local 
studies mention the VEP as a source for funds, and works on major leaders and the national 
                                                                                                                                                             
VEP’s own standards. To corroborate the 129 number, I compared three sources: Leslie W. Dunbar and Wiley A. 
Branton, “First Annual Report of the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council, Inc. for the Fiscal 
Year April 1, 1962 through March 31, 1963,” Box 1, Folder 1, Financial Records, Voter Education Project 
Organizational Records, Robert W. Woodruff Library, Atlanta University Center (hereinafter VEP Records); Leslie 
W. Dunbar and Wiley A. Branton, “Second Annual Report of the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional 
Council, Inc. for the Fiscal Year April 1, 1963 through March 31, 1964,” Box 1, Folder 2, Financial Records, VEP 
Records; and Mitchell F. Ducey, ed., The Southern Regional Council Papers, 1944-1968: A Guide to the Microfilm 
Edition (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1984), 144-154, in which Ducey documented VEP grants 
by separate account number. See also Appendices 2-7.  
 
11 Watters and Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder, 44-50; Steven F. Lawson, Black Ballots: Voting Rights in the 
South, 1944-1969 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 260-266; and Judith Kilpatrick, There When We 
Needed Him: Wiley Austin Branton, Civil Rights Warrior (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2007), 97-
108. Vernon Jordan and John Lewis wrote memoirs detailing accounts of the VEP. See John Lewis with Michael 
D’Orso, Walking with the Wind: A Memoir of the Movement (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998), 413-420; and 
Vernon E. Jordan, Jr. with Annette Gordon-Reed, Vernon Can Read! A Memoir (New York: PublicAffairs, 2001), 
166-204. 
 
12 Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1965), 935; Carl M. Brauer, John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1977), 112-116; David J. Garrow, Bearing the Cross: Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 161-162; Taylor Branch, Parting the Waters: America 
in the King Years, 1954-1963 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 477-482; Mark Stern, Calculating Visions: 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Civil Rights (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 63-66; Nick Bryant, The 
Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black Equality (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 283-286; David 
C. Carter, The Music Has Gone Out of the Movement: Civil Rights and the Johnson Administration, 1965-1968 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 46; and Françoise N. Hamlin, Crossroads at Clarksdale: 
The Black Freedom Struggle in the Mississippi Delta after World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2012), 104. 
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struggle acknowledge the VEP.13 Within the broader historiography of the African American 
freedom struggle, key debates have missed the significance of the VEP. Lost amid arguments 
over “top-down” versus “bottom-up,” whether or not the Black Power era represented a distinct 
period, or if the bulk of the twentieth century ought to be viewed within the “long civil rights 
movement” is the narrative of how the VEP drove forward a civil rights issue that had been a 
priority since emancipation.14  
 The VEP’s story recasts the history of the civil rights movement in two significant ways. 
First, through the VEP, philanthropic foundations underwrote two of the civil rights movement’s 
                                                 
13 For a selection of local studies that credit the VEP, see John Dittmer, Local People: The Struggle for Rights in 
Mississippi (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), 119-120, 147-148; Charles M. Payne, I’ve Got the Light of 
Freedom: The Organizing Tradition and the Mississippi Freedom Struggle (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1995, 2007), 108-109, 141-172; Adam Fairclough, Race and Democracy: The Civil Rights Struggle in 
Louisiana, 1915-1972 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995); 294-295, 302-317; and J. Todd Moye, Let the 
People Decide: Black Freedom and White Resistance Movements in Sunflower County, Mississippi, 1945-1986 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2004), 103-114. For a selection of southern and national 
perspectives that take the VEP into account, see August Meier and Elliot Rudwick, CORE: A Study in the Civil 
Rights Movement, 1942-1968 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973), 172-181; Harvard Sitkoff, The Struggle 
for Black Equality (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981, 1993, 2008), 106-111; Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 161-163; 
Branch, Parting the Waters, 573-579; Clayborne Carson, In Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981, 1995), 70, 78, 97; and Adam Fairclough, To Redeem the Soul of 
America: The Southern Christian Leadership Conference and Martin Luther King Jr. (Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, 1987), 76-77, 82-83, 95-96. 
 
14 On the debate between the top-down and bottom-up perspectives, or the “View from the Nation” versus the “View 
from the Trenches,” see Steven F. Lawson and Charles Payne, Debating the Civil Rights Movement, 1945-1968 
(Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998, 2006); and Emilye Crosby, “Introduction: The Politics of Writing and 
Teaching Movement History,” in Emilye Crosby, ed., Civil Rights History from the Ground Up: Local Struggles, a 
National Movement (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2011), 1-39. On Black Power periodization debates, see 
Sundiata Keita Cha-Jua and Clarence Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire: Temporal and Spatial Fallacies in 
Recent Black Freedom Studies,” Journal of African American History 92, no. 2 (Spring 2007), 266-268; and Peniel 
E. Joseph, “The Black Power Movement: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 96, no. 3 (December 
2009): 751-776. On the long civil rights movement, see Jacquelyn Dowd Hall, “The Long Civil Rights Movement 
and the Political Uses of the Past,” Journal of American History 91, no. 4 (March 2005): 1233-1263. For a critique, 
see Cha-Jua and Lang, “The ‘Long Movement’ as Vampire.” For other historiographical pieces on the civil rights 
movement, see Charles W. Eagles, ed., The Civil Rights Movement in America: Essays (Jackson: University Press of 
Mississippi, 1986); Adam Fairclough, “Historians and the Civil Rights Movement,” Journal of American Studies 24, 
no. 3 (December 1990): 387-398; Steven F. Lawson, “Freedom Then, Freedom Now: The Historiography of the 
Civil Rights Movement,” American Historical Review 96, no. 2 (April 1991): 456-471; Charles W. Eagles, “Toward 
New Histories of the Civil Rights Era,” Journal of Southern History 66, no. 4 (November 2000): 815-848; Kevin 
Gaines, “The Historiography of the Struggle for Black Equality Since 1945,” in Jean-Christophe Agnew and Roy 
Rosenzweig, eds. A Companion to Post-1945 America (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2002): 211-234; and 
Danielle L. McGuire, “Introduction” in Danielle L. McGuire and John Dittmer, eds. Freedom Rights: New 
Perspectives on the Civil Rights Movement (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011): 1-8. 
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most notable achievements—its successful drive for the right to vote and the rise of African 
American political power. In 2000, historian Charles W. Eagles wrote that, despite overburdened 
shelves of scholarship, “Too little is known...about the non-activist patrons of the major protest 
organizations and how and why their support may have flowed and ebbed. In civil rights as in 
politics, historians might be wise to follow the money.”15 Following the money leads to the VEP 
and its philanthropic benefactors. With foundation money, the VEP funded the southern civil 
rights movement, focused the struggle onto voting rights activism, and in the process, banded 
together a southwide social movement that ended Jim Crow at the ballot box.16 
Second, this history reveals how opponents of the civil rights movement rewrote tax 
policies to undercut philanthropic support for the VEP—a successful strategy that has received 
little attention. Segregationists had fought civil rights through violence, poll taxes, literacy tests, 
                                                 
15 Eagles, “Toward New Histories of the Civil Rights Era,” 833.   
 
16 On philanthropy and the civil rights movement, see David J. Garrow, “Philanthropy and the Civil Rights 
Movement,” Working Paper for the Center for the Study of Philanthropy, The Graduate Center at the City 
University of New York, October 1987; Darlene Joy Conley, “Philanthropic Foundations and Organizational 
Change: The Case of the Southern Education Foundation (SEF) During the Civil Rights Era” (PhD dissertation, 
Northwestern University, 1990); Claude A. Clegg III, “Philanthropy, the Civil Rights Movement, and the Politics of 
Racial Reform,” in Lawrence J. Friedman and Mark D. McGarvie, eds. Charity, Philanthropy, and Civility in 
American History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 341-362; Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in 
America: A History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 201-231; and Sean Dobson, “Freedom Funders: 
Philanthropy and the Civil Rights Movement, 1955-1965,” Commissioned by the National Committee for 
Responsive Philanthropy, June 2014. For a case study on the finances of one civil rights group, see Rhonda D. 
Jones, “Tithe, Time and Talent: An Analysis of Fundraising Activity for the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), 1957-1964 (PhD dissertation, Howard University, 2003). On the role of philanthropy, 
particularly the Ford Foundation, on the Black Power Movement, see Alice O’Connor, “The Ford Foundation and 
Philanthropic Activism in the 1960s,” in Ellen Condliffe Lagemann, ed. Philanthropic Foundations: New 
Scholarship, New Possibilities (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999): 169-194; and Karen Ferguson, Top 
Down: The Ford Foundation, Black Power, and the Reinvention of Racial Liberalism (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2013). On the longer history of philanthropy in the American South, see James D. Anderson, 
The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); James L. 
Leloudis, Schooling the New South: Pedagogy, Self, and Society in North Carolina, 1880-1920 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1996); Peter M. Ascoli, Julius Rosenwald: The Man Who Built Sears, Roebuck 
and Advanced the Cause of Black Education in the South (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006); Stephanie 
Deutsch, You Need a Schoolhouse: Booker T. Washington, Julius Rosenwald, and the Building of Schools for the 
Segregated South (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2011); and Zunz, Philanthropy in America. On the 
economics of segregation and the civil rights movement, see Gavin Wright, Sharing the Prize: The Economics of the 
Civil Rights Revolution in the American South (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2013). 
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political monopoly, and segregation for nearly a century. After African Americans won the right 
to vote and began competing for power, white opponents turned to a novel tactic: they wielded 
the federal tax code as a powerful defensive weapon. Through the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 
white conservatives in Congress, led by Senators Herman Talmadge and Russell Long, restricted 
tax-exempt contributions to non-partisan voter registration campaigns, halting the VEP’s 
momentum. Under the new law, organizations like the VEP could retain their charitable status 
only if they were active across five states at once and received no more than 25 percent of their 
funding from a single source. Violating the law would result in draconian penalties, such as 
organizations stripped of their federal tax-exemption, and philanthropic executives personally 
fined. These two restrictions, especially the 25 percent rule, destabilized the VEP, and as a result, 
grassroots voter campaigns that had relied on the VEP for financial support received less. The 
VEP was no longer in a position to maintain black political activism across the entire American 
South, and slowly, the united movement for voting power ended.17 
                                                 
17 On the post-1965 civil rights era, see Manning Marable, Race, Reform, and Rebellion: The Second Reconstruction 
in Black America, 1945-1982 (Oxford: University Press of Mississippi, 1984, 1991, 2007); Cynthia Griggs Fleming, 
In the Shadow of Selma: The Continuing Struggle for Civil Rights in the Rural South (Lanham: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2004); Moye, Let the People Decide; Emilye Crosby, A Little Taste of Freedom: The Black Freedom 
Struggle in Claiborne County, Mississippi (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2005); Thomas 
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The VEP’s story also demonstrates competing reasons why black southerners and white 
liberals embraced voter registration as a civil rights strategy. Since emancipation, African 
Americans understood the vote as a basic right, but after Reconstruction ended and Jim Crow 
laws made it nearly impossible for black southerners to register, the strain of going alone to the 
courthouse, risking humiliation, assault, or unemployment was enough to keep progress at a 
glacial pace. African Americans saw voting as the gateway to full citizenship, and with it, a 
stronger position to advocate for better jobs, pay, public services, healthcare, and everyday 
rights. Civil rights leaders, especially Martin Luther King Jr., pushed for the movement to target 
the ballot. White liberals, including philanthropists and DOJ officials, also believed that the 
movement should focus on voting rights, not only to fulfill the promise of American democracy, 
but to temper civil disobedience. And both black civil rights leaders and white liberals agreed 
that focusing the struggle on voting rights was a sound strategy to navigate Cold War politics by 
emphasizing the patriotic virtue of racial justice.  
The story of the VEP explains how hundreds of local movements broke out 
simultaneously during the 1960s. In towns and cities across Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, 
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and 
Virginia, the VEP empowered activists to intensify grassroots registration campaigns. Paying for 
fuel, booking rallies, buying food for volunteers, and giving a few dollars to people taking off 
work to canvass neighborhoods were requirements for a project spanning weeks, months, or 
years. Creating and sustaining a social movement cost money—a resource in short supply among 
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southern African Americans. The VEP powered participatory democracy at an extraordinary 
level that knitted together a massive social movement.18 
While the VEP shaped the civil rights movement to target black disfranchisement, it did 
not diminish the ability of community activists to act on their own power. As scholars have 
proven, black southerners demonstrated against white supremacy in a variety of ways, but in 
terms of voter registration, the VEP empowered them to do more, to organize more effectively, 
and to maintain the pace for months or years. The financial support enabled local groups to 
mobilize registration drives, which connected them to a mass movement stretching beyond their 
county borders. 
Results in Orangeburg suggest the kind of change the VEP promoted across the South. In 
November 1963, the three-month project ended with 381 new registrants. Orangeburg’s leaders 
applied for more VEP grants, and over the next year, over 2,000 more registered to vote. J.W. 
McPherson described the local movement: “when demonstrations were at their height and 
Negroes were being jailed by the hundreds and Negro pickets lined the streets, Negroes were 
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standing in line outside of the registrar’s office by the hundreds from one end of the courthouse 
to the other, quietly waiting to register.”19 
The movement spread. In 1969, Kathleen Knox, a student at Winthrop College, 
volunteered with the York County Voter Registration Project in South Carolina. Speaking with a 
journalist, Knox explained her involvement: “It’s up to us to convince our people that, because 
blacks for the most part lack economic power, they must compensate for it with power at the 
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CHAPTER 1: ‘A COLD WAR OF THE BALLOT’: VOTING RIGHTS, ANTICOMMUNISM, 
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE SOUTHWIDE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 
 
 Six years before the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom, Dr. Martin Luther 
King Jr. spoke to a crowd of less than 25,000 in front of the Lincoln Memorial. The date was 
May 17, 1957—the three-year anniversary of the Supreme Court’s Brown v. Board of Education 
decision—and the event was the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom. King demanded that the federal 
government do more to enfranchise black southerners. “Give us the ballot,” King exclaimed 
repeatedly. With the ability to vote, King argued, African Americans would improve the South 
by adding political pressure to end lynching, stopping the terrorism of the Ku Klux Klan, 
desegregating schools, and electing judges, governors, and congressmen who believed that the 
Constitution applied to every citizen. Empowering African Americans with the ballot would end 
Jim Crow, and activists would no longer have to appeal to the federal government to help; black 
southerners could do it on their own. The ballot had the potential to fix society, but for each 
black man and woman who had tried and failed to register, voting was also deeply personal. “So 
long as I do not firmly and irrevocably possess the right to vote, I do not possess myself,” King 
intoned.21 
 King’s well-known 1963 speech has overshadowed his 1957 address, but his words at the 
Prayer Pilgrimage signaled a strategic shift in the black freedom struggle. From 1957 through the 
1960s, the right to vote was the central goal of the civil rights movement. The vote was not the 
movement’s only objective, but it became the centerpiece that held together a massive southwide 
                                                 
21 Text of Martin Luther King Jr. Address at the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, May 17, 1957, Folder 001581-004-
1005, Bayard Rustin Papers, Proquest History Vault. 
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social movement. Yet fighting for the ballot was nothing new. Black southerners had pressed for 
the right to vote since the end of Reconstruction, when white Democrats disfranchised nearly all 
African Americans at the advent of the Jim Crow era. Ever since, African Americans had 
struggled to win back the vote—with limited success. Through a combination of poll taxes, 
literacy tests, violence, and intimidation, whites exercised their political and social power to seal 
off the vote from black southerners. African Americans in turn pursued a variety of citizenship 
rights in addition to the ballot. The vote become one of many goals that African Americans 
pursued, along with broader issues of racial and economic justice. During the 1930s and 1940s, 
black activists teamed with labor organizers, communists, radicals, New Dealers, and white 
liberals in a class-based social movement for freedom. Historians have labeled this coalition 
“civil rights unionism” and the “Black Popular Front,” and for a time during the New Deal era, 
these activists fought white supremacy alongside radical goals. They did not want to simply go to 
school with white students, take any seat on a bus, or sip from any water fountain; they wanted to 
reorder society.22 
 But civil rights unionism did not last. Cold War anti-communism undermined the left-
labor coalition of the 1930s and 1940s. The post-World War II Red Scare whipped conservatives 
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across the United States into a frenzy that equated leftist agendas with anti-American 
communism. Southern conservatives bought into conspiracy theories promoted by Senator 
Joseph McCarthy and other red-baiters that any civil rights activist was an agent of the Soviet 
Union, whether consciously or not. Black southerners who had organized through the Congress 
of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW), the 
National Negro Congress,  the Southern Negro Youth Congress (SNYC), the Communist Party, 
and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) found their 
alliances with labor unionists and white liberals shattered by the 1950 elections. McCarthyism 
gained strength into the 1950s, the leftist coalition crumbled, and Jim Crow was as strong as it 
had been in 1898. Conservatives continued to fan the fears of civil rights communism, especially 
in the South where McCarthyism outlasted McCarthy himself. Judge Tom P. Brady of 
Mississippi, an intellectual voice of the white Citizens’ Council, warned of a coming “Black 
Empire” through Soviet-inspired civil rights groups “if the people of the South do not now make 
up their minds that this is a mortal combat, that it is to the bitter end.”23 
 The Red Scare shaped the direction of the civil rights movement. According to historian 
Glenda Elizabeth Gilmore, the Cold War “unleashed a virulent southern anti-Communism that 
eviscerated postwar social justice movements and truncated the civil rights movement that 
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emerged in the 1950s.”24 Other scholars have made similar arguments, and while they are correct 
to note how anti-communism constricted the civil rights movement, few focus on how voting 
rights became central to the renewed southern black freedom struggle that emerged during the 
mid-1950s. This reorientation was not natural or inevitable, but occurred because civil rights 
activists pushed the movement in this direction. By shifting the language and goals of the 
movement, civil rights leaders tried to assuage suspicions of radicalism by appealing to the 
centerpiece of American democracy: the vote.  
The person most responsible for this change was Martin Luther King Jr. King was no less 
radical in 1957 than he had been during the 1940s, but he and his allies made the conscious 
decision to adapt to anti-communist fervor by centering on the ballot to build a true American 
democracy. Their view was global in scope, influenced by people of color revolting against 
colonial powers, often through nonviolent means. King and other African American leaders 
believed that a similar revolution could take place in the United States by framing the pursuit of 
civil rights as civic nationalism through registration and voting. “The rumblings of discontent in 
Asia and Africa are expressions of a quest for freedom and human dignity by people who have 
long been the victims of colonialism and imperialism,” King wrote in his coda to Stride Toward 
Freedom in 1958. “So in a real sense the racial crisis in America is a part of the larger world 
crisis.”25 But concentrating on voting rights was not a moderate solution to global revolution, nor 
did it lessen resistance in the United States. A “cold war of the ballot” was underway, a fight that 
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featured recalcitrant white supremacists doing everything in their power to prevent African 
Americans from gaining political power.26 
 During the 1950s within the context of the Cold War, two organizations and two key 
events centered the civil rights movement onto voting rights as never before, and in the process, 
began to turn the movement into a southwide struggle. The Southern Regional Council (SRC), a 
predominantly white research agency in Atlanta with roots stretching back to 1919, turned 
increasingly liberal during the 1950s and began compiling data on disfranchisement. 
Comprehensive research was rare prior to the SRC, and its ability to document the severity of 
disfranchisement illuminated the issue and gave activists a cause around which to rally. 
Following the Montgomery bus boycott, Martin Luther King Jr. organized the Southern Christian 
Leadership Conference (SCLC) with other ministers in early 1957 to foment a church-based 
nonviolent revolution for citizenship. The SCLC, along with the NAACP and A. Phillip 
Randolph, sponsored the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom in May 1957, directing the nation to 
view black voting rights as a moral, religious, liberal, and patriotic issue. Following the 
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Pilgrimage, the SCLC launched the Crusade for Citizenship in February 1958, an ambitious 
attempt to sustain a voter registration campaign across the South. The Crusade failed, but the 
idea took hold that a coordinated, inter-agency, southwide movement for the ballot was possible. 
Together, the SRC, the SCLC, the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, and the Crusade for 
Citizenship laid the groundwork for the Voter Education Project. 
Black Voting Rights and the Southern Regional Council 
When southern states began implementing Jim Crow laws, African Americans fought 
back. They did so through boycotts and public protests, but as historian Blair Kelley has 
demonstrated, without political rights, victories were short-lived.27 Middle-class black leaders 
battled disfranchisement in the courts, but in all 12 cases that reached the Supreme Court 
between 1890 and 1908, the Justices allowed southern states the freedom to discriminate.28 In 
1909, activists founded the NAACP, and with it, a goal of reclaiming black voting rights across 
the United States. At the NAACP’s seventeenth annual conference, President Moorfield Storey 
outlined the objectives of African Americans nationwide, which “above all” included “the right 
to vote.”29 During the 1920s and 1930s, the NAACP aided some of its southern branches 
working to register voters, but the case-by-case approach was tedious and drained resources. In 
the 1936 presidential election, African Americans proved their voting power outside of the South 
by abandoning the Republican Party in support of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s New Deal. 
Then, into the 1940s, historian Patricia Sullivan explains, “The energy for expanding [African 
American] voting rights shifted to the South.”30 The “Double V” campaign, promoted by the 
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Pittsburgh Courier to fight for democracy abroad and within the United States, heightened black 
political consciousness for war veterans and African Americans across the nation.31 The push for 
the ballot led the NAACP to challenge the constitutionality of the white primary, the electoral 
system by which southern states circumvented the Fifteenth Amendment and barred African 
Americans from voting in primaries—usually the only election that mattered in the Democrat-
controlled South. In 1944, the Supreme Court struck down the white primary in Smith v. 
Allwright. After a fight lasting over half a century, African Americans won a significant legal 
victory to reestablish their rights of citizenship.32 
While the Smith v. Allwright decision led to a spike in African American registration, no 
southwide movement for the ballot took place. Southern legislatures adapted by implementing 
new forms of discrimination, such as poll taxes and literacy tests. At the same time, the Soviet 
Union’s aggressive foreign policy, the Berlin blockade, the communist victory in China, and the 
Alger Hiss trials before the House Un-American Activities Committee coalesced into rabid anti-
communism that enveloped the United States. Charges of communist sympathies for 
organizations seeking political power were fatal. The Red Scare undercut the momentum of 
Smith v. Allwright. The NAACP complained to the Department of Justice with details about 
registrars who denied voting rights to African Americans, but officials were “held back by a 
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policy of restraint” because of legal precedents, a small staff, and a general unwillingness to 
investigate.33 At the same time, the Red Scare empowered southern segregationists to link 
communist conspiracies with civil rights activists to suggest that black voting rights would 
imperil the nation. According to Patricia Sullivan, “the dramatic gains [in black voter 
registration] that followed in the wake of the white primary decision had leveled off by the early 
1950s.”34  
 The Southern Regional Council was an unlikely organization to reignite interest in 
southern black disfranchisement during the mid-1950s. The SRC’s origins stretch back to 1919 
with the founding of the Commission on Interracial Cooperation (CIC). Methodist minister Will 
W. Alexander and his parishioner Willis Weatherford established the CIC in Atlanta to be “a 
meeting ground where the best people of both races could work together to dispel prejudice, 
tensions, and violence.”35 The CIC included moderate ministers and businessmen in a church-
based, mostly white, middle-class association that advocated for better race relations, but not to 
end segregation. According to writer John Egerton, “the CIC developed a curious image of 
liberal activism within the bounds of cautious and proper respectability” of the Jim Crow 
South.36 Under Alexander, the CIC supported affiliates throughout the South that organized 
moderate leaders to address local issues. Above all, the CIC wanted to educate white and black 
community leaders about the dangers of racial violence and promote interracial harmony. The 
CIC did so by cultivating relationships with newspapers and by appealing to the white upper-
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middle-class that racial strife was bad for business. After the Great Depression set in, CIC 
leadership scaled back their operations to concentrate on publishing and education, primarily on 
anti-lynching. In 1929, Jesse Daniel Ames, a suffragist and anti-lynching advocate, joined the 
CIC as leader of the Women’s Committee, and along with her management of the Association of 
Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynching, Ames kept the CIC afloat during the 1930s. 
Alexander and Howard Odum, a sociologist at the University of North Carolina, were unhappy 
with the decline of the CIC, and after a series of conventions in 1942 and 1943, they wrested 
control away from Ames and merged the CIC into a new organization: the Southern Regional 
Council. The old CIC had grown stagnant, and its male-dominated leadership wanted to refocus 
its mission on the academic study of southern racial and economic problems. Organizers 
chartered the SRC on January 6, 1944 in Atlanta.37 
 The SRC retained its conservatism inherited from the CIC, but beginning in 1947, SRC 
leaders began denouncing segregation. Then, in 1951, the SRC “formally committed itself to the 
aim of an unsegregated society.”38 Under the leadership of Paul Williams, a Richmond publisher 
and co-founder of the Catholic Committee on the South, and George S. Mitchell, an economist 
who came to the SRC to lead its Negro Veterans Program, the SRC began criticizing Jim Crow. 
They believed white southern liberals could no longer advocate for progressive change while 
accepting the segregationist order. While the SRC lost many members who disagreed with its 
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new direction, it evolved into a comprehensive research agency. To widen its scope, the SRC 
also established councils in 12 southern states as independent, though affiliated sub-groups to 
study and publish reports about local issues. SRC membership remained small, but its impact 
was wide. In 1955, the SRC offered an assessment of its purpose: “The Council works through 
the sound methods of education, fact-finding, and persuasion. It seeks no legislation, it carries on 
no court action, and it uses no ‘pressure group’ tactics. It collects the facts about racial problems 
and progress in the South and makes these facts available.”39 
 As the SRC turned increasingly liberal, red-baiters attacked it. The harassment began in 
December 1950 when Roy Harris, editor of the right-wing Augusta Courier, criticized Benjamin 
Mays for an article published in New South, the SRC’s main publication. Mays, the President of 
Morehouse College, supported the desegregation of Atlanta’s public schools, ending his article 
with the question, “Can there be equality in segregation?”40 Harris thought so, and throughout 
the 1950s, he and other segregationists charged the SRC as a communist front. In 1951, 
Governor Herman Talmadge of Georgia lashed out at “foreign agitators,” including the NAACP, 
the Communist Party, “and the Race-Mixing Southern Regional Council.”41 In 1954, the Fund 
for the Republic, an early think tank sponsored by the Ford Foundation that criticized 
anticommunism, raised Harris’s suspicions further. After the Fund for the Republic donated to 
the SRC, Harris accused the SRC to be “a haven for known communist fronters [that] could well 
become the Communist Party apparatus in the South.”42 Other newspapers followed suit, 
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including the Charleston News and Courier, whose editorial staff compared the Fund for the 
Republic’s support of the SRC to John Brown’s northern allies before his raid on Harper’s 
Ferry.43 George Mitchell and the SRC staff fought back by publishing editorials and sending 
corrections to newspapers, but the stories kept coming. In 1956, Georgia’s Attorney General, 
Eugene Cook, condemned the SRC and its state affiliate, the Georgia Committee on Interracial 
Cooperation, as “both dominated by individuals who, like the officials of the NAACP, have long 
records of affinity for and participation in Communist, Communist-front, fellow-traveling, left-
wing and subversive organizations and activities.”44 
 Red-baiting against the SRC was a product of its support for school desegregation. 
Beginning with Benjamin Mays’s 1950 article in New South, the SRC committed itself to ending 
segregated public schooling. Segregationists not only linked this position with communism, but 
feared the SRC promoted race-mixing. Many believed pro-Communists within the SRC wanted 
“to explore relationships between white and Negro in the South,” especially regarding 
schoolchildren.45 When the Supreme Court handed down its Brown v. Board of Education 
decision in May 1954 declaring segregated schools unconstitutional, SRC members were elated. 
But over the next three years, it became clear that southern school districts would only allow 
token desegregation. Massive resistance became the new reality as the white Citizens’ Councils 
gained strength and formed a movement against integration. Rather than continue to incur the 
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wrath of segregationists over schools, the SRC shifted its strategy to pursue a new goal, one that 
could not be so easily assailed: black voting rights.46 
 In 1956 and 1957, the SRC undertook a major research project to document African 
American voter registration, and with its final report, revealed the pervasiveness of 
disfranchisement across the South. The SRC had kept watch over black registration since the late 
1940s, but it had not studied the problem in depth. Smith v. Allwright allowed for more African 
Americans to register, but since 1947, the number of black voters had steadily decreased as local 
registrars purged rolls and state legislatures implemented new barriers. “Those who rejoiced in 
the recent series of court decisions upholding a free ballot unhampered by racial restrictions have 
been sobered by the vexing problems which have persisted,” the SRC wrote in a 1953 report.47 In 
the midst of the Montgomery bus boycott when the injustices of the Jim Crow system were on 
full display to the nation, the SRC launched its registration study. 
 With a grant from the Fund for the Republic, the SRC commissioned locals in 11 states 
during 1956 to visit counties, interview people, and look through registrar rolls to record black 
registration. What they found was disturbing. In many places, violence against African 
Americans had risen, but more common were “legal weapons” that served as “successor[s] to the 
white primary.”48 In Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, poll taxes remained in 
effect. In each of the 11 southern states, registrars administered literacy tests without oversight, 
failing anyone at their whim. Margaret Price, the author of the SRC report, entitled The Negro 
Voter in the South, estimated that around a quarter of the eligible southern black population had 
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registered—an optimistic tally. But she admitted the results were imprecise, complicated by poor 
records and white registrars who impeded the process. Price also documented hesitancy among 
African Americans to attempt to register. In Dallas County, Alabama, after visiting people in 
barber shops and pool halls, many “would not even talk about voting,” and when pressed, 
responded, “I don’t want nothing to do with it...If they don’t want me to vote, I don’t want to.”49 
But rather than blame that hesitation on apathy, the SRC noted the level of oppression, the 
difficulty of going to the registrar’s office alone, the ease at which local governments purged 
black voters, and the segregationist system that surrounded their lives. “It is difficult to arouse a 
motivation to vote when there is little concrete evidence of benefits to compensate for the trouble 
of qualifying,” Price wrote.50 
 Still, black communities throughout the South, like in Laurens County, Georgia, tried to 
register, vote, and exercise political power. As part of the research study, Dr. Brailsford R. 
Brazeal, a dean and professor of economics at Morehouse College, went to Laurens County in 
August 1956. Out of a total population of 53,606, about 40 percent were black, yet only 2,201 
African Americans were registered compared with 12,230 whites. Brazeal discovered that in 
1948, the county had purged a majority of African Americans from its rolls, calling them into the 
registrar’s office to interpret portions of the United States Constitution. “This procedure lowered 
the morale of the registrants who were purged and those who were not,” Brazeal wrote. But 
recently, local leaders had organized the All Citizens Voters League of Laurens County. They 
held mass meetings on Monday nights, and they organized a voter registration campaign. Locals 
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were determined to vote, even though white officials had put the word out that “we got to stop 
these niggers from registering.”51 
The SCLC, the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, and the Crusade for Citizenship 
 The SRC began compiling disfranchisement data around the same time as the 
Montgomery bus boycott. Soon after moving to Montgomery, Alabama to pastor Dexter Avenue 
Baptist Church, Martin Luther King Jr. joined the local chapters of both the NAACP and the 
Alabama Council on Human Relations—the SRC’s state affiliate. The Montgomery chapter of 
the Alabama Council was small and met in the basement of King’s church. King served for a 
time as the Alabama Council’s Vice-President. He later described the Alabama Council as “the 
only truly interracial group in Montgomery.”52 Serving with the Alabama Council put King in 
conversation with progressive white ministers, and through his involvement, he learned about the 
SRC. The SRC’s point person for researching disfranchisement was Dr. James E. Pierce from 
Alabama State College, who was also a participant in the Montgomery Improvement Association 
(MIA). Along with the SRC’s research, the bus boycott exposed how deeply embedded 
segregation was in both public services and at registrar offices. The MIA formed a registration 
and voting committee, and King saw firsthand how a mass movement could incorporate the 
deliberate pursuit of voting rights.53 
In January 1957 after the bus boycott had ended, King and around 60 ministers met in 
Atlanta to form an organization to make the African American church the epicenter of an 
expanded nonviolent revolution. To them, the boycott was just the beginning. Looking to Gandhi 
                                                 
51 Memorandum, Dr. B.R. Brazeal to Harold Fleming, Re: “Summary of Laurens County Interviews and Findings 
About Negro Political Participation in Politics,” August 31, 1956, Frames 1173-1179, Reel 218, SRC Papers (all 
quotes). 
 
52 King, Stride Toward Freedom, 58. 
 
53 Ibid., 18-20; 58; and Foreword by Harold C. Fleming to Price, The Negro Voter in the South (1957).  
 26 
for inspiration, whom King believed “never had more than one hundred persons absolutely 
committed to his philosophy” of nonviolence, King thought that a handful of southern ministers 
could initiate a voting rights movement spanning the South.54 During a conference at Ebenezer 
Baptist Church, the pastors asked themselves, “How can we utilize the bus protest to stimulate 
interest in voting?” and, “What broad campaign in the South should be carried on to stimulate 
interest in and educate Negroes to see the basic significance of voting?” They did not have 
answers, but they were convinced that the time had come “to broaden the struggle for Negroes to 
register and to vote.”55 After several more meetings and two name changes, the Southern 
Christian Leadership Conference formed with the goal to achieve “full citizenship rights, 
equality, and the integration of the Negro in all aspects of American life.”56 
 From its inception, the SCLC tried to channel the energy of the bus boycott into a 
southwide movement for the ballot, but King and his allies were unsure how to turn their idea 
into reality. They also faced criticism from the NAACP’s national leadership, who believed the 
upstart SCLC would drain resources from local branches better equipped to register voters. But 
King believed that the church could inspire more African Americans to register, especially those 
who were uninvolved in the largely middle-to-upper class leadership of the NAACP. On the 
national scene, the opportunity to concentrate on the ballot seemed more likely as Congress 
deliberated a new civil rights law. Since January 1956, Congress had considered legislation to 
expand federal government oversight of civil rights violations, but it had stalled by the end of the 
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year. After reelection, President Dwight Eisenhower encouraged both parties to begin anew, 
focusing on civil and voting rights rather than school integration. But the legislation crawled 
through Congress, held up by southerners who controlled committees and who were 
unenthusiastic about expanding citizenship rights to African Americans. Still, hope for federal 
legislation motivated King and the SCLC to plan a demonstration that tied together Christianity, 
nonviolence, and voting rights.57 
 On February 23, 1957, the SCLC announced a “Prayer Pilgrimage” to Washington, DC 
for the spring. “This will not be a political march,” King told journalists. “It will be rooted in 
deep spiritual faith.”58 With possibilities for the Pilgrimage fresh on his mind, King visited 
Ghana in March at the invitation of President Kwame Nkrumah to witness the nation’s 
independence. Motivated by what he saw, King returned to the United States excited for the 
potential of nonviolent revolution. King found further inspiration in Billy Graham, whose 
evangelical crusades filled arenas across the country. With Graham’s crusade rhetoric as his 
model, King had the idea to merge civil rights with civic spiritual renewal. White supremacy 
could be defeated, but the solution had to come from mass action rooted in Christian faith. King 
and the SCLC believed this would be a new angle that diverged from previous activism. With 
this focus, planners of the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom articulated five goals: to inspire 
nationwide black unity; to connect the North to the growing movement in the South; to protest 
violence; to oppose southern attacks on the NAACP; and to press Congress to pass a civil rights 
bill.59 
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The Prayer Pilgrimage was not the first civil rights march in Washington, DC. The March 
on Washington Movement (MOWM), organized by A. Phillip Randolph in 1941, was a response 
to federal economic policies that discriminated against African American laborers during World 
War II. Randolph and his supporters, especially the NAACP, National Urban League, and labor 
unions, including his own Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters, demanded a federal Fair 
Employment Practices Committee (FEPC) to ensure greater job security for black men. During 
the first half of 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt hesitated to intervene, prompting 
Randolph to launch the MOWM. Chapters started throughout the country, and organizers 
prepared for a massive protest in Washington to demand action on behalf of black workers. As 
pressure mounted, Roosevelt acquiesced, and a week before the march was to occur, he signed 
Executive Order 8802 establishing the FEPC and ending employment discrimination for federal 
jobs and defense contracts. With this victory, Randolph called off the march. The MOWM 
continued until 1947, and although it never recaptured the enthusiasm of early 1941, it served as 
a reminder of the potential for mass action in Washington, DC.60 
Unlike the MOWM, leaders billed the 1957 demonstration as a religious ceremony. 
Because of the threat that anti-communism posed, the three primary leaders, King, Randolph, 
and Roy Wilkins, couched the Prayer Pilgrimage as a fulfillment of American democracy and 
Christianity. The Prayer Pilgrimage would once again bridge civil rights and labor organizing, 
but it would not be an extension of the MOWM. Randolph was enthusiastic about the SCLC’s 
idea for the Pilgrimage, and he convinced Wilkins that the NAACP ought to be involved. 
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Bringing religious, labor, and civil rights activists under one tent, the African American freedom 
struggle embraced voting rights as the essential goal.61  
King, Randolph, and Wilkins planned the Prayer Pilgrimage to focus on the moral 
necessity of political enfranchisement. Responding to criticism that the demonstration would be 
influenced by left-wing radicalism, Wilkins told reporters that the Pilgrimage would be a 
“spiritual assembly” where “there will be no place for the irreligious.” Furthermore, he 
answered, “No Communist has been or will be invited to participate in the program either as a 
speaker, singer, prayer leader, or scripture reader.”62 To assuage doubters, the group declared 
three days before the event, “We wish to state emphatically that the Prayer Pilgrimage for 
Freedom is dedicated to the assurance that full freedom for all Americans is possible with the 
help of God under the democratic process.”63 To accomplish the Pilgrimage’s five aims, King, 
who would be the final speaker in front of the Lincoln Memorial, drafted a speech emphasizing 
the denial of voting privileges to southern African Americans. Bayard Rustin, a close friend and 
adviser to both King and Randolph, suggested that King be more insistent about the need for 
nonviolence alongside the pursuit of the ballot. In addition to coordinating with labor unions, 
Rustin advised King that voting rights was “where action [was] demanded and where action 
[was] possible in the wide struggle of community organization.”64 King agreed, for if the 
movement was to stretch across the South, people needed to believe that it was their moral right 
and American duty to register and vote—shielded against any charge of radicalism. 
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The Prayer Pilgrimage was part church service, part anti-communist voter rally. Septima 
Clark was one pilgrim who attended. Early on the morning of May 17, Clark, an organizer and 
teacher with Highlander Folk School, boarded a train in Newark, New Jersey bound for 
Washington, DC. Clark wrote Randolph of her experience after she arrived at the Pilgrimage: 
“As a sufferer in the cause of real freedom I wept tears of joy to see those people of all 
nationalities and backgrounds with banners waving marching across that green turf to stand in 
front of the Lincoln Memorial.”65 Along with 15,000-20,000 others, Clark heard Mahalia 
Jackson sing, Representative Adam Clayton Powell and Senator Jacob K. Javits speak, and 
Randolph, Wilkins, and King urge the United States to end black disfranchisement. Keeping with 
the theme of anti-communism, Randolph told the crowd, “We know that Communists have no 
genuine interest in the solution of problems of racial discrimination, but seek only to use this 
issue to strengthen the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.” To combat the Reds and bring every 
African American into the political process, Randolph stated, “I suggest no party to vote for, but 
call upon every Negro to register and vote. Be a missionary, and have every neighbor in your 
house, block, neighborhood, hamlet, village, city, and state to register and vote.”66 
After three hours of singing, speeches, and testimony, King went to the podium to offer 
final remarks. Wearing a black robe, he summed up the Prayer Pilgrimage as a religious and 
civic ceremony demanding the right to vote. “Give us the ballot,” King called out six times 
during his sermon’s crescendo. Since organizers billed the Pilgrimage as a religious service, they 
told the crowd not to applaud, but “frequent showers of handkerchief and pennant waiving as 
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expressions of approval” greeted King’s words.67 His sermon was “a fiery speech delivered 
calmly,” a journalist wrote, one that “awakened the Negro people to a new and more effective 
utilization of their ballots.”68 No longer was King just a pastor in Alabama who had led a 
successful boycott. The Prayer Pilgrimage introduced him to the nation, and with this address, he 
focused on voting rights as the key to ending Jim Crow.69 
Journalists who covered the Prayer Pilgrimage were quick to point out that while King’s 
message was inspiring, the path ahead was unclear. Writing for the Associated Negro Press, 
Hamilton T. Boswell concluded, “After all that great emotional outpouring, the one thing lacking 
was an effective program to harness it.”70 Similarly, Earl Brown with the New York Amsterdam 
News wrote that while the day was successful, more than prayers were needed to fix society: “the 
Pilgrimage will become only another meeting if we don’t roll up our sleeves and give the Lord a 
little help in our battle for civil rights.”71 
The urgent issue following the Prayer Pilgrimage was the pending civil rights legislation 
held up in Congress. On June 13, King and Reverend Ralph Abernathy, King’s top assistant 
within the SCLC, met with Vice President Richard Nixon and Secretary of Labor James P. 
Mitchell at the White House to discuss the bill. King had met Nixon previously during his trip to 
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Ghana, and during their second meeting, King “pointed out the few number of Negroes in the 
South who had any voting rights in most, if not all, of the states in the South.”72 Nixon and 
Mitchell listened, and they assured him that on behalf of the President, they would push for 
Congress to pass the legislation.73 
On September 9, after months of delays and a record filibuster by Senator Strom 
Thurmond, President Eisenhower signed the Civil Rights Act of 1957 into law. The first federal 
legislation that addressed African American civil rights since Reconstruction, the bill established 
a six-member Commission on Civil Rights to serve within the executive branch to study and 
report on major issues. It also created a new Assistant Attorney General position, paving the way 
for a Civil Rights Division within the Department of Justice. Ignoring the issue of school 
desegregation, the Eisenhower administration had urged Congress to focus the legislation on 
voting rights. But southerners in Congress still fought against the bill, and while the final version 
barred any attempt to “intimidate, threaten, [or] coerce…for the purpose of interfering with the 
right of such other person to vote,” consequences were vague and no policies set up to monitor 
disfranchisement by southern states. Instead, the Attorney General could bring a “civil action” in 
individual cases, but each trial would be decided by a local jury, all but guaranteeing 
maintenance of the Jim Crow system. The bill passed, but it lacked potency. While the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957 did little to empower the federal government to stop disfranchisement, it 
helped cement voting rights as the centerpiece of the expanding civil rights movement, and it 
gave the SCLC a stronger platform on which to organize.74 
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King was unhappy with the Civil Rights Act of 1957, but he felt it offered the 
opportunity to inspire a southwide movement. Soon after the Senate approved the legislation, 
King wrote Vice-President Nixon, “History has demonstrated that inadequate legislation 
supported by mass action can accomplish more than adequate legislation which remains 
unenforced for the lack of a determined mass movement.” While the law was not perfect, the 
SCLC would use it as an organizing tool. “I am initiating in the South a crusade for citizenship in 
which we will seek to get at least two million Negroes registered in the south for the 1960 
elections,” King promised Nixon.75 The Crusade for Citizenship would fall far short of this goal, 
but it would build the foundation for a mass movement around voting rights. 
Like the Prayer Pilgrimage, the Crusade for Citizenship blended religion and civic duty to 
guard against charges of communism while making equal access to the ballot the ultimate goal. 
Two weeks after the Prayer Pilgrimage, A. Phillip Randolph spoke to the Ladies Auxiliary of the 
Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters in Pittsburgh: “We need a crusade in the interest of the right 
to register and vote so that every door of every house in every city and hamlet of this nation will 
be knocked on.”76 The idea to label this strategy a “crusade” came from Billy Graham’s popular 
religious rallies. On July 18, in the midst of a summer-long program at Madison Square Garden 
in New York City, King delivered the invocation for the Billy Graham Evangelistic Association 
Crusade. King was drawn to Graham’s enthusiasm, his ability to connect to people, and his mild, 
yet increasing outspokenness against racism. While Graham pushed a non-political revolution of 
the soul, King’s crusade hoped to enfranchise all southern African Americans.77 
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In August 1957, the SCLC announced a massive voter registration drive that would span 
the American South. The planning began immediately, but without staff, offices, money, or 
strategy. Writer and historian Taylor Branch summed up the SCLC’s impatience, writing, “such 
a schedule was ambitious to the point of being foolhardy at a time when the fledgling SCLC 
consisted of nothing more than the preachers there in the church with King.”78 They picked a 
budget of $200,000 seemingly at random, with no idea how they would raise it. Not until 
November 5 at a board meeting in Memphis did SCLC staff begin planning for the Crusade. Less 
than two months had passed since the events surrounding the Little Rock Nine in Arkansas, 
calling further attention to the intransigence of the white South to black civil rights. Something 
needed to be done. King released a statement that was short on specifics but grand in scale: “We 
are now embarking upon an historic campaign—the Crusade for Citizenship. We intend to 
encourage every Negro in the South to register and to vote” and “to restore the honor and 
integrity of our nation as a whole.”79 
While King and other ministers were enraptured with the idea for the Crusade for 
Citizenship, two of King’s advisers, Stanley Levison and Bayard Rustin, realized they had a 
problem. Without someone who knew how to coordinate an organization from the top while 
working with the grassroots, the Crusade had little chance of success. Levison and Rustin 
believed the only person who could help was Ella Baker. An NAACP leader with connections to 
many grassroots organizations after decades of activism, Baker had a reputation for effective 
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leadership and organization while remaining outside of the spotlight. But she was a woman, and 
a woman occupying a leadership position within the patriarchal, minister-led SCLC was sure to 
stir dissent. Levison and Rustin met King at an airport, where they pressed him to ignore her 
gender and hire her to organize the Crusade. King relented, and Levison and Rustin moved 
quickly to get Baker in Atlanta to set up the SCLC office and manage the Crusade.80 
Levison and Rustin did not ask Ella Baker if she wanted to head up the Crusade for 
Citizenship, but drafted her without asking. They met Baker and told her that they had 
committed her to Atlanta with the SCLC. “I suppose this is one of the few times in my life that I 
accepted being used by people,” Baker later remembered. “And this, of course, irritated me 
because I don't like anyone to commit me. But, my sense of values carries with it something to 
this effect: that the welfare of the whole, of the people or a group of people, is much more 
important than the ego satisfaction of the individual.”81 Her biographer, Barbara Ransby, 
attributes Baker’s acceptance to her belief that the civil rights movement was at a “critical 
crossroads,” one that bridged direct action militancy and voting rights.82 Even though Baker had 
little respect for the condescending attitude of southern black ministers, she hoped to influence 
the direction of the SCLC toward grassroots organizing. She agreed to move to Atlanta, piece 
together the SCLC, and plan the Crusade for Citizenship. 
When Ella Baker arrived in Atlanta on January 9, 1958, she discovered that the SCLC 
existed only in the minds of King and his colleagues. No one had prepared for her arrival, and 
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she had no office space. On Auburn Avenue, one of the centers of black Atlanta, Baker rented a 
room in the Hotel Savoy, and for about a week, she used payphones and borrowed office phones 
in Ebenezer Baptist Church to coordinate the February 12 launch of the Crusade. She eventually 
secured her own office and an assistant, but by that time, she had realized the state of the SCLC’s 
unpreparedness. She had planned to stay no more than two weeks, but there was no one to take 
over her responsibilities. Baker recalled having no contact with King during this period. King 
spoke with the media, but not to her about coordination. King told the Atlanta Daily World that 
the purpose of the Crusade was “to see that the Negro masses give meaning to the recently 
enacted Civil Rights Bill by using it to the fullest possible extent.”83 While King broadcasted his 
ambitions, Baker sat in her office trying to make them come true. She spoke with ministers in 
Miami, Durham, Hattiesburg, and 18 other cities to plan February 12 rallies. She encouraged 
journalists to cover the story, and she invited members of the newly-formed United States 
Commission on Civil Rights to participate. Without direction, Baker worked 12 or more hours 
per day to cobble together the “great registration movement” that King and his allies thought 
possible.84 
On January 30, after weeks of Baker’s labor, the SCLC executive committee convened at 
Ebenezer Baptist Church to sketch out the Crusade’s aims for a southwide movement. After the 
meeting, King circulated a report to allies across the South. The Crusade had two goals: to 
double the number of black voters by 1960 and “to help liberate all Southerners, Negro and 
white, to extend democracy” so that “the South can have a real two party system—a necessity for 
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real democracy.” King emphasized that the Crusade was a southwide movement—the “opening 
step in a long and hard, but necessary and glorious struggle”—one that was non-partisan and 
spiritually focused. He encouraged mass participation, advocating his belief in the ballot as a 
solution to improve society. King also had to assuage doubt from Roy Wilkins and NAACP 
leadership that the Crusade would work in partnership with other organizations. Without 
specifics, King promised to fund the Crusade through church offerings and donations, yet he 
provided no instructions for local leaders to harness the February 12 rallies into a long-term 
registration movement. But the Crusade “must succeed for God has promised his children that 
the loving and the meek (the non-violent) shall inherit the earth.”85  
As February 12 neared, Baker worked with ministers to plan 21 simultaneous meetings in 
cities such as Memphis, Nashville, Atlanta, and New Orleans. Meanwhile, King devoted his 
attention to the Crusade. The two came together, invested in the idea that a southwide movement 
for the ballot was possible. After Baker had confirmed Congressman Adam Clayton Powell to 
speak at the Houston rally, King thanked Powell for participating, noting that Baker “has worked 
so selflessly in the Atlanta Crusade office for the past few weeks.”86 As Baker organized outside 
the limelight, King issued press statements and drummed up support for the Crusade. Deciding 
on the theme, “The Franchise is a Citizen’s Right—Not a Privilege,” King declared that the 
SCLC would “function as a service agency to help further registration and voting in communities 
where such efforts are already underway, and to stimulate other communities into action.”87 King 
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also outlined the SCLC’s long-term strategy “to facilitate joint [civil rights] activities and avoid 
wasteful duplication, give strength to movements by united actions, and…assess areas of major 
concentration to achieve maximum effectiveness.”88 It had never been done before, but King, 
Baker, and the SCLC were trying to ignite a social movement that stretched across the South.  
The Crusade for Citizenship began on schedule in all 21 cities with ministers coaxing 
audiences to register, vote, and pray. In Nashville, King’s father was the main speaker. In 
Shreveport, Fred Shuttlesworth spoke to an estimated 450 people. In Montgomery, the headliner 
was Kelley M. Smith, a Baptist minister from Nashville, who spoke to an audience of around 
1,000 at Holt Street Baptist Church—the site of the first mass meeting for the bus boycott. And 
in the other 18 cities, ministers called on their audiences to take part in their local registration 
campaign that blended into the southwide Crusade. In Miami, King spoke at the Greater Bethel 
AME Church on why voting mattered. He opened with a civics lesson: “The history of our 
nation is the history of a long and tireless effort to broaden and to increase the franchise of 
American citizens.” King went on to describe how white men and women eventually won the 
right to vote. Soon, King said, African Americans would gain that same right, no matter how 
brutal the resistance. Southern disfranchisement was “a very real embarrassment to our nation 
which we love and must protect.” Evoking the Cold War, King warned, “If a tragic global crisis 
is to be avoided, if America is to meet the challenge of our atomic age—then millions of our 
people, Negro and white, must be given the right freely to participate in the political life of our 
nation.”89  
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The SCLC had meant for February 12 to be the start of a movement, but the Crusade for 
Citizenship collapsed almost as soon as it began. Ella Baker put together the initial programs of 
February 12, but she could not guarantee long-term success in any location. Baker, King, and the 
SCLC hoped the coordinated drive would inspire registration movements across the South, but 
without money, organization, or stronger collaboration with other civil rights groups, the 
Crusade never had much opportunity for success. The SCLC never came close to its goal of 
$200,000. Yet Baker stayed on the job until a replacement could be found, trying without success 
to motivate local leaders from the 21 cities to orchestrate registration drives and file reports to 
her office. She encouraged Reverend J.E. Lowry of Mobile to continue with the Crusade, and she 
asked Reverend Edward T. Graham of Miami to report on any registration activity that came 
after February 12. Graham wrote of vague plans to continue the effort to register black 
Miamians, but he never sent a full report. Neither did anyone else. Baker tried to remain positive, 
knowing that “it was most unreasonable to imply failure because no record-breaking increase in 
Negro registration immediately followed the February 12 meetings,” but the movement stalled.90 
The Crusade faded from the minds of SCLC leaders once it became clear that it had 
failed. Ralph Abernathy, the SCLC’s Treasurer, responded to Edward Graham’s request for 
Crusade results by writing that Baker was out of town, implying that he did not know or care.91 
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King was also quiet about the Crusade’s collapse. On March 13, Congressman Charles Diggs 
wrote King of his disappointment: “Even in Montgomery, Negro voter applicants have dropped 
below normal…Rallies and speeches are fine for inspirational purposes but a successful 
registration campaign demands skillful follow up in the field.”92 Reminiscent of black journalists 
hoping for effective organizing after the Prayer Pilgrimage for Freedom, Diggs’s message was 
blunt. Besides Baker, no one in the SCLC possessed the ability to manage the grassroots. In its 
May 2, 1958 issue, U.S. News and World Report published a story on southern African American 
registration, and while it did not mention the SCLC specifically, its authors wrote, the “Civil 
Rights law isn't bringing out the masses of Negro voters in the South…There is no stampede 
among Negroes to qualify as voters. ‘Get out the Vote’ campaigns have flopped so far.”93  
In May, the SCLC replaced Baker with Reverend John Tilley from Baltimore, but by this 
time, the Crusade was no longer a priority. Tilley was an ineffective leader with no experience 
organizing grassroots movements, and King fired him in April 1959. During his and Baker’s 
tenure, the Crusade failed to raise much money. “Because they didn’t have any money,” Baker 
recalled, she relied on phone calls and resorted to clipping and pasting flyers together to organize 
the Crusade.94 She put some distance between herself and the SCLC, annoyed by its leadership 
who had thought rallies and sermons would inaugurate a movement without bottom-up 
organization and fundraising. Yet she stayed in touch with King and the SCLC, and the 
following year, she told King of a new potential source of funding. She cited a “need for 
developing a tax exempt ‘arm’ of SCLC,” Baker wrote. “I understand that the Marshall Field 
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Foundation has some special interest in leadership training among religious leaders.”95 With this 
tip, King and his SCLC staff began considering the possibility of foundation support for their 
voter registration fieldwork. In Stride for Freedom, King had written, the “constructive program 
ahead must include a campaign to get Negroes to register and vote.”96 Even before publication, 
however, the Crusade for Citizenship had ended.97 
During 1958, as the Crusade for Citizenship tried to spark a southwide movement, the 
SRC conducted another survey of African American disfranchisement finding no real 
improvement since 1957. The SRC discovered that, even with federal legislation in place, 
African American registration had become no easier in the South: “Neither the new civil rights 
legislation nor the federal agencies created by it promise any quick or dramatic improvement in 
Negro suffrage.” White political leaders had “fanned racial prejudice,” and in many states, new 
instruments for disqualifying black voters were introduced. In Louisiana, for example, the state 
government empowered parishes to update their voter rolls, giving registrars authority to purge 
African Americans. Since the SRC’s last report, black registration in Louisiana had fallen by 
over 31,000 while white numbers had risen. A lack of political education among African 
Americans was partly to blame, but voter campaigns were difficult to organize because local and 
national leaders had been “preoccupied by immediate problems of local discrimination and court 
tests of state and city segregation laws, which left little time for registration drives.”98 Margaret 
Price’s expanded report was published in August 1959. The study included a forecast by political 
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scientist Elston E. Roady: “We may well have reached that plateau in the development of greater 
Negro participation in politics…The successful assault on the next mountain seems to rest 
largely in the hands of the Negro citizen.”99 That assault would begin in March 1962 with the 
beginning of the Voter Education Project, combining lessons learned from the Crusade for 




































                                                 







CHAPTER 2: ‘OFF TO THE POLLS WE GO’: THE CREATION OF THE VOTER 
EDUCATION PROJECT 
 
On June 16, 1961, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy hosted the Freedom Ride 
Coordinating Committee in his office at the Department of Justice (DOJ). For seven weeks, 
Freedom Riders—young activists affiliated with the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE)—had boarded Greyhound and 
Trailways buses in Washington, DC to travel as far as New Orleans to test the Supreme Court’s 
1960 Boynton v. Virginia decision outlawing segregated bus terminals. After weeks of bus 
bombings, white mob violence, and dozens of activists imprisoned in Mississippi, Diane Nash of 
SNCC wrote the President requesting a White House meeting to discuss “the possibilities of 
action on the part of the federal government” to assist the Freedom Riders.100 The Attorney 
General accepted Nash’s request, not as a good-faith attempt to offer DOJ help to the Freedom 
Riders, but to persuade them to drop the protests and make black voter registration their new 
primary objective.  
For weeks, Robert Kennedy and the DOJ’s Civil Rights Division had been in 
conversation with philanthropists and race leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr. and 
Whitney Young, to create a collaborative project that promoted voter registration as the primary 
avenue of civil rights activism. SNCC had not been involved. When Diane Nash, accompanied 
by Charles Sherrod, Charles Jones, and Charles McDew—the three Charlies, as they were known 
within SNCC—met Robert Kennedy, they demanded that the federal government do more to 
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protect the Freedom Riders. Kennedy heard them out, but he told them that it was time to switch 
tactics. Kennedy let them know about the DOJ’s conversations with the Taconic Foundation and 
civil rights leaders to create a project that would fund registration fieldwork throughout the 
South. The plans were still confidential, but Kennedy broached the subject with the SNCC 
activists to let them know about the possibility of generous, tax-free funding to help register 
southern African Americans.101 
Charles Sherrod was mad. Along with the others, he believed that Kennedy’s offer 
bordered on bribery. “That’s where I jumped in,” Sherrod later remembered. Sherrod stood up to 
confront Kennedy. Wyatt Tee Walker, the executive director of the SCLC who was present as 
well, held Sherrod back by his coattail. Sherrod told Kennedy “that he was a public official who 
was supposed to…keep people who made trouble for us off our backs” and that it was not 
Kennedy’s “responsibility to tell us how to honor our constitutional rights.”102 Tensions cooled, 
and Kennedy continued on, arguing that registering voters might not be as attention-grabbing as 
the Freedom Rides, but it had the potential to undo Jim Crow.103 
The meeting between Robert Kennedy and the Freedom Riders was a step toward an 
unprecedented partnership between civil rights activists, the DOJ, and big philanthropy—one 
that would influence the civil rights movement toward a greater focus on voter registration. 
Recently, the southern black freedom struggle had been an ill-defined movement. The widely-
shared goal was to end segregation, but no coordinated strategy existed to accomplish it. 
Activists in local communities organized marches, protests, boycotts, sit-ins, and Freedom Rides, 
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and while each chipped away at segregation, white supremacy remained as long as black 
disfranchisement continued. Leaders in the NAACP, SCLC, and other national civil rights 
organizations sensed that voter registration work was the future of the fight, and philanthropists 
wanted to pay for it. The Kennedys also encouraged this approach because they thought it could 
generate new black supporters for the Democratic Party and move their civil rights agenda 
forward without alienating southern Democrats. Together, civil rights leaders, philanthropists, 
and DOJ officials pushed the civil rights movement toward registration activism through the 
creation of the Voter Education Project (VEP). 
Charles Sherrod was angry because he correctly sensed that others were trying to steer 
the civil rights movement. DOJ officials, foundation executives, and civil rights leaders each had 
separate motives, but all agreed that the black freedom struggle needed to concentrate on voting 
rights activism. The most powerful influence was money—tax-exempt, foundation money—that 
philanthropists promised to civil rights agencies if they used the funds to register voters. 
Activists were already interested in registration, but they lacked the finances to manage a 
southwide voter campaign. The SCLC’s Crusade for Citizenship in 1958 had proven that such a 
project might be possible if it had widespread support. The VEP would be that support, but 
establishing the VEP was not a foregone conclusion. For over a year between 1961 and 1962, 
those who believed in the idea of the VEP worked behind-the-scenes to convince others that the 
plan would work. In the process, they began to concentrate the civil rights movement as a battle 
for the black ballot.   
Stephen and Audrey Currier, the Taconic Foundation, and Tax-Exemption 
Stephen Currier was a central figure in the formation of the VEP. Born on August 24, 
1930, Currier grew up in privilege, groomed by his family for upper-class life in New York. In 
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1939, his mother married Edward M.M. Warburg, a decision that launched Stephen into a life of 
greater opportunity. Warburg came from a prestigious Jewish family with links to New York 
financial markets and philanthropy. His grandfather was Jacob Schiff, a Jewish German 
immigrant who became an influential investment banker and corporate executive from the mid-
1870s until his death in 1920. His son-in-law, Felix Warburg, grew the family fortune as a 
partner with the investment bank Kuhn, Loeb and Company. Felix’s son, Edward, continued the 
financial dynasty, but his passion was philanthropy. Fine arts captured his imagination, and 
during the 1930s, Warburg helped found the American Ballet and supported the Museum of 
Modern Art. Edward Warburg imparted his love of philanthropy to Stephen. But Stephen never 
quite fit in; he was a shy boy torn between two legacy-rich families. “He’d had a difficult 
upbringing, always in that sort of no-man’s land on the edge of the rich New York world,” 
according to a friend, Harold Fleming.104 Stephen Currier went to Harvard College, and after a 
few years, met one of the wealthiest heiresses in the United States.105 
Audrey Bruce was born in 1933 into the Mellon clan, the richest family in the United 
States. Her grandfather was Andrew W. Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury, entrepreneur, 
banker, diplomat, and philanthropist. His first-born daughter, Ailsa, struggled with depression 
throughout her life. She married David K.E. Bruce, a lawyer and state representative in Maryland 
who later became an officer with the Office of Strategic Services and served as United States 
Ambassador to France, West Germany, and Great Britain. Their marriage was turbulent, and 
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they separated around the time of Andrew Mellon’s death in 1937, when Audrey was four years-
old. Ailsa inherited a vast fortune, becoming one of the richest women in the country overnight. 
Like her father, Ailsa turned to philanthropy primarily as a tax haven, establishing the Avalon 
Foundation in 1940 but distancing herself from its operations. David finally convinced Ailsa to 
divorce in 1945, agreeing that Audrey would stay with her mother. Growing up, Audrey was a 
reserved child who enjoyed the privacy of her family estates. But Ailsa was restless, and she 
moved Audrey with her from mansion to mansion. Audrey later attended boarding schools in 
New York and Virginia, and in 1952, she enrolled at Radcliffe College.106  
Although Audrey was aware of her family’s wealth, her parents did not explain the extent 
of it until well into her college career. By that time, she had met Stephen Currier. College bored 
Currier, and he found work as an art consultant after dropping out. Higher education exhilarated 
Audrey, yet she found herself drawn to Currier, whose unstable, affluent family mirrored her 
own. Currier later confided to friends that he did not know about Audrey’s family fortune until 
after they married. Whether or not that was true, Audrey’s family and their close friends despised 
Currier. They thought he was taking advantage of Audrey to gain access to the Mellon coffers. 
Lauder Greenway, a close friend to Ailsa, believed Audrey chose Currier because she knew that 
the family would not approve, and therefore would not have to worry about the Mellons 
corrupting him. Audrey had little patience for family drama, and she gravitated toward Currier 
because she saw her life with him as separate from her upbringing. Knowing that neither the 
Mellons nor the Bruces would approve the match, Audrey and Stephen eloped on November 15, 
1954 in Fairfield, Connecticut. They kept their union secret for over a year, enough time for 
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Audrey to graduate from Radcliffe without distractions. After marriage, they began to consider 
philanthropy as their future career.107 
Two friends motivated Stephen Currier to see southern African American inequality as an 
opportunity for philanthropy. The first was long-time family friend, Marshall Field III. Field had 
inherited his family’s empire of department stores in Chicago, and he later purchased and ran 
two newspapers. In 1940, he and his wife founded the Field Foundation. Currier often visited the 
Fields, and Marshall urged Stephen to look to philanthropy as a way to put his fortune to use. 
Unlike most of their rich peers in the Midwest, the Fields supported the New Deal and civil 
rights for African Americans. Field inspired Currier, and Currier began following the events of 
the civil rights movement.108  
The second major influence on Currier was financial expert Lloyd K. Garrison, the great-
grandson of the abolitionist. In his unpublished memoir, Garrison remembered that the Curriers 
arrived at his office with a problem concerning Audrey’s inheritance. The Mellons were 
pressuring Audrey to sign a document neither she nor Stephen understood, “which would 
effectively have turned over her vast fortune to the management of the Mellon bank in Pittsburgh 
and have placed restrictions on the free use of her income.”109 With Garrison’s help, the Curriers 
retained control of Audrey’s inheritance. After settling the matter, they “talked about what 
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Stephen should do with his life.”110 Garrison encouraged the Curriers to become philanthropists. 
The Curriers and Garrison discovered they had a mutual interest in race problems. Garrison had 
served as president of the National Urban League from 1947 to 1952, and he promised to 
introduce Currier to civil rights activists. The two became close friends, and as Stephen and 
Audrey considered starting their own foundation, Garrison urged them to concentrate on racial 
inequality. Few other foundations financed civil rights projects in the South, and wanting to 
make their mark, the Curriers took Garrison’s advice.111 
 In 1958, Stephen and Audrey launched the Taconic Foundation. Named for the mountain 
range where the couple often vacationed, the Taconic Foundation became the creative space for 
Stephen and Audrey to search for interesting projects and lend a helping hand. They set up their 
office on the 35th floor of a Manhattan tower at 666 Fifth Avenue, and there Stephen and Audrey 
worked together with a small staff to channel funds to groups working to advance civil rights, 
mental health, and child welfare. In their view, the arts, sciences, and medicine had an 
overabundance of benefactors, and they wanted to finance unorthodox ventures. A favorite term 
of theirs was “enablement,” meaning a commitment to partnering with “those with the fewest 
options.”112 Building on the long history of philanthropy in the United States, Taconic’s goal was 
to make incremental improvements toward “equality of opportunity.”113 The Curriers had a novel 
vision for Taconic: to enact progressive change with a personal touch. According to journalist 
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John Egerton, the Curriers believed “that a foundation could be a participant, not merely a 
money dispenser.”114 Taconic sponsored such diverse programs as the Child Welfare League of 
America, the NAACP, the National Urban League, the Northside Center for Child Development, 
the Morningside Community Center, and an innovative program in Harlem that later became the 
inspiration for Project Head Start. According to family friend and adviser Victor Weingarten, 
“They never gave a dime for a building [to be named for them], no bricks, no mortar, only 
programs and people. They were pioneers who spent an enormous amount of time finding out for 
themselves what they wanted to support.”115  
The Mellons were aghast that Audrey spent family money on “distastefully radical 
political causes.”116 A cousin of Audrey’s recalled, “My family disapproved of the things they 
[Stephen and Audrey] were working on. Something having to do with the colored. We felt they 
were on the wrong side.”117 Members of the Mellon clan, along with Audrey’s father, believed 
that Stephen controlled Audrey and her money. The family was further annoyed that Audrey had 
not entrusted her inheritance to Mellon Banks. Throughout her adolescence, the family had 
infantilized Audrey, viewing her as sensitive and naïve. The family’s fears were confirmed when 
Audrey appeared unhappy, at one point even asking her father for divorce advice. But to 
everyone’s surprise and disappointment, Audrey stayed with Stephen. She attended Taconic 
board meetings, and she also volunteered as a nurse at Lenox Hill Hospital, where she kept her 
identity secret from her colleagues. The coupled purchased a 1,600 acre estate near The Plains, 
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Virginia called Kinloch, where they spent much of their time when not in New York City. 
Stephen was sensitive to the Mellon’s dislike of him and charges of opportunism, but he valued 
Audrey in a way the Mellons never did, and together they grew the Taconic Foundation.118 
One of the Curriers’ favorite organizations to assist was the Southern Regional Council. 
Through the partnership, they became friends with executive director Harold C. Fleming. Having 
worked with the South’s foremost interracial organization since 1944, Fleming was a “self-
effacing southerner…with an instinctive empathy for people in need.”119 He led the SRC in its 
mission to address race-related problems. Since the late 1950s, the SRC had functioned as a 
mediator between multiple civil rights groups. On November 5 and 6, 1957, the SRC hosted a 
southern interagency meeting in Atlanta to discuss a “joint fact-finding project” on black 
disfranchisement, employment discrimination, and school segregation. Many groups joined the 
SRC, including the NAACP, the Anti-Defamation League, the American Friends Service 
Committee, and Martin Luther King Jr.’s Southern Leadership Conference. Attempting to link 
multiple groups involved in the growing “resistance movement” in the South, the SRC became a 
central meeting place for leaders and organizations.120  
On October 19, 1959, Harold Fleming circulated a short essay entitled “Some 
Observations on Foundation Giving in the Field of Race Relations” reflecting on the dearth of 
philanthropic support to southern groups advocating for better race relations. The major 
foundations—Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller—had “shunned direct efforts in this field like the 
plague,” not wanting to support controversial organizations for fear of bad publicity. But he 
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began to notice “a slight, but encouraging, trend toward more interaction between Southern race-
relationists and foundation persons.”121 Mid-sized and smaller foundations such as the Taconic 
Foundation, the Field Foundation, the New World Foundation, and the Christopher Reynolds 
Foundation had supported the SRC over the past few years because Fleming developed personal 
relationships with some of the men who oversaw donations. Fleming and Currier, for example, 
had become friends, and the Taconic Foundation granted $95,000 to the SRC for programs in 
1959 and 1960.122 Not wanting to create “undue dependence,” the Taconic Foundation’s grants 
to the SRC were not exorbitant, but they were consistent.123 Fleming tried to convince other 
wealthy donors that supporting the SRC and similar organizations battling Jim Crow was a 
worthwhile cause. These budding relationships brought various philanthropists into the SRC’s 
orbit. 
Impressed with the SRC’s work, Currier approached Fleming about a new idea: to do 
something unorthodox as a foundation and lobby the federal government to ensure the rights of 
African Americans. Soon after John F. Kennedy was elected President in November 1960, 
Currier and Lloyd Garrison flew to Georgia to discuss with Fleming the idea for a Washington, 
DC-based philanthropic hub devoted to public policy and racial issues. They toured parts of rural 
Georgia and had conversations about the racism. They also attended a Sunday morning service at 
Ebenezer Baptist Church, where they heard a young Martin Luther King Jr. preach from his 
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father’s pulpit.124 Fleming had second thoughts about leaving the SRC, but after talking with 
Currier—and a subsequent visit to New York City—he agreed to lead the effort. Currier had big 
ideas, but only 29 years-old, he was unsure how to move forward. The seasoned Fleming did, 
and with his enormous contact list, they established the Potomac Institute as an “off-shoot or 
subsidiary of Taconic.”125 The Curriers did have conditions, though. As with their earlier work, 
they wished to remain out of the limelight. Fleming remembered, “They insisted that their 
personal benefactions be given no publicity and that their privacy be respected.”126 As executive 
vice president, Fleming put together a small staff in an office on 18th Street, meeting Currier’s 
wish that the organization remain “quiet” and “unpretentious.”127 Currier and Fleming sensed 
they were in the midst of a political shift incorporating civil rights issues into the national 
legislative agenda. They wanted to be at the forefront, and the Potomac Institute became an 
influential research and lobbying firm in Washington, DC. According to Fleming, “No other 
organization was so linked both to government offices and the southern civil rights movement, 
and so trusted by both.”128 
Stephen Currier’s creation of the Potomac Institute was important because it challenged 
an old precedent within the world of philanthropy, one that the VEP would shatter a year later. 
Since major foundations first emerged a half-century earlier, philanthropists like Currier had 
wanted to get involved with politics, but interpretations of the law prevented them from doing so. 
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At stake was tax-exemption. Educational pursuits counted, but political advocacy did not. After 
the Sixteenth Amendment established the federal income tax in 1913, the Treasury Department 
created policies by which charitable gifts could be tax-exempt. But the rules were murky, 
especially since so few major foundations existed at the time. For years, the Treasury 
Department relied on a mixture of court rulings and state laws to clarify the terms, approving 
most charitable gifts as long as they somehow benefitted society and were not overtly political. 
The Treasury allowed tax-exemptions for educational initiatives, but over time, the difference 
between education and political advocacy blurred as more people applied for exemptions and 
foundations increased in number. In 1919, Treasury regulators updated their policies by 
“drawing a line in the sand” between advocacy and education because they “wanted to make sure 
beneficiaries of tax exemption did not engage in politics under the cover of educational activity,” 
according to historian Olivier Zunz.129  
Although regulators designed the Revenue Act of 1934 to clarify tax-exemption, it only 
added to the confusion. The main reason for the 1934 law was to close loopholes and raise tax 
revenue amid the Great Depression, but buried in one article was the root cause of philanthropy’s 
boom over the next three and a half decades. After some debate between Congress regarding the 
language, they compromised with this clause: as long as “no substantial part of the activities” 
were political in nature, foundations and other organizations could be tax-exempt if “organized 
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes.” 
But the law forbade them from engaging in “propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence 
legislation.”130 With parameters set, foundations concentrated on education, medicine, public 
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health, poverty, and fine arts. Major philanthropies like Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller were 
joined by hundreds of small to mid-sized family foundations looking to spend their wealth for 
the public good. But while the law was explicit, the word “substantial” left plenty of ambiguity 
in place. Foundations avoided outright partisanship, but as they funded more and more projects, 
the difference between education and advocacy remained hazy.131  
Tax-exemption was crucial to philanthropy. Through tax-exemptions, charitable giving 
became an American institution, practiced by the middle-class and the wealthy alike. The 
Revenue Act of 1934 ushered in a new era of giving, one not wholly motivated by altruism. 
Donors found a way to avoid taxation by giving through family foundations. Writing about the 
law’s effect five years after implementation, economist C. Lowell Harriss realized, “The 
exemption acts in effect as a government subsidy to institutions qualifying for the benefit under 
the law.”132 The federal government picked up the tab in lost tax revenue by providing generous 
terms for tax-exemption, and America’s wealthy class took advantage. Tax lawyers perceived the 
implications, and they advised their rich clients to set up family foundations to serve as tax 
shelters where they could protect their family assets from the Treasury Department, maintain 
control of their holdings, and serve the public good on their own terms. Studying these effects in 
1949, researcher B.W. Patch found, “With tax rates at high levels and with charitable 
contributions exempt from income tax…large contributors in the top tax brackets sometimes may 
make up in tax savings, for themselves or their estates, more than one-half of the amount of their 
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contributions.”133 Over the years, foundations fiercely guarded their tax-exemption status, 
creating a culture of big philanthropy dependent on tax breaks. This idea was still paramount in 
1961 as the VEP began to take shape. 
Voting Rights and the John F. Kennedy Administration 
While the Curriers concentrated on the Taconic Foundation and the Potomac Institute 
between 1958 and 1961, the election of John F. Kennedy on November 8, 1960 suggested a new 
focus on civil rights within the federal government. Running on a campaign that included 
greater, albeit vague plans for federal action, Kennedy appeared to many African Americans as 
sympathetic on racial matters. More than President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Vice-
President Richard M. Nixon, who ran on the 1960 Republican ticket, Kennedy promoted equal 
rights during his campaign, but never offered specific policies for fear of upsetting southern 
Democrats. Kennedy called Coretta Scott King while her husband was in jail to offer some 
comfort, and his staff made sure his display of sensitivity reached the media. Several months 
after the first sit-ins in Greensboro, Kennedy praised the demonstrators: “It is in the American 
tradition to stand up for one’s rights—even if the new way to stand up for one’s rights is to sit 
down.”134  
After Kennedy won the Presidency, the SRC sensed a positive shift toward improved race 
relations. Harold Fleming and his research director, Leslie Dunbar, wanted to create an ally in 
Kennedy. Following the election, the SRC invited incoming Kennedy Administration staff to 
attend their annual meeting. Several came, and suddenly, SRC staff felt like they “were on the 
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same side as the people running the country.”135 With segregationists dominant in the Senate, 
effective legislation to address civil rights stood little chance of passing, but many believed the 
President could issue executive orders. A few weeks before the election took place, with help 
from a Rockefeller Brothers Fund grant, Dunbar commissioned Daniel H. Pollitt, a law professor 
at the University of North Carolina, to draft a paper detailing the possibilities of executive action 
on civil rights. Explaining the assignment to his mother, Pollitt wrote that he was preparing a 
“study on what a strong and willing President could do within existing powers to alleviate the 
racial problems in as many areas as I can think of.”136 After Pollitt completed the first draft and 
Kennedy won the election, he and Dunbar coordinated with dozens of other civil rights activists 
to make sure the report was comprehensive, incorporating recommendations from the NAACP, 
the NUL, and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. After revisions, Dunbar and about a dozen 
others met in Washington, DC with Kennedy staff to scrutinize the document. Before sending it 
to President-Elect Kennedy, those involved wanted to make sure the report’s recommendations 
were achievable and legally sound.137 
In January 1961, Harold Fleming sent the completed 48-page report to Kennedy in hopes 
of persuading the President-Elect to act on civil rights. Entitled “The Federal Executive and Civil 
Rights,” the paper made 18 recommendations for ways the President could use the power of his 
office to end racial inequality in the South. Among the proposals, the SRC encouraged the 
President to take executive action to affirm the Brown v. Board of Education Supreme Court 
decision, push the DOJ to enforce civil rights laws, increase the staff of the Civil Rights 
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Division, end housing and employment discrimination, and accurately represent the country’s 
racial problems to the international press. It called on the President to promote African American 
voting participation by organizing a “national campaign to educate people in their voting rights 
and to encourage them to vote.”138 The SRC also circulated the report to the national press. 
Kennedy read it before he was sworn into office, and it shaped the way he considered civil rights 
issues during his Presidency. The report also introduced the Kennedys and members of his 
administration to the SRC and its high quality work, an important factor that later brought 
movement activists and DOJ officials together to form the VEP.139 
Kennedy had met African American leaders during his Senatorial career and early 
presidential campaign, and he began assembling a team sympathetic to the movement, including 
Harris Wofford. An advocate of Gandhian nonviolence, Wofford earned law degrees from 
Howard University and Yale University before serving as an attorney with the United States 
Civil Rights Commission under the Eisenhower Administration. During his time with the 
Commission, he became friends with Martin Luther King Jr. and sent him literature on 
nonviolence. While teaching at the University of Notre Dame Law School in 1959, Wofford 
became interested in Kennedy’s presidential aspirations. Wanting to push Kennedy on civil 
rights, Wofford mailed the Kennedy brothers an opinion paper in which he suggested that “a 
shift of focus to the clear-cut issue of voting rights would be ‘politically right and 
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psychologically healthy.’”140 Wofford’s paper made an impression, and the following year, the 
Kennedys brought him on board their campaign as an adviser on civil rights.141 
The Kennedy brothers began promoting voting rights as their primary intervention into 
the civil rights movement. To them, focusing on access to the polls was the best way to address 
civil rights without enflaming southern conservatives over the prospects of integrated schooling. 
According to Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., the Kennedys believed “Negro voting did not incite 
social and sexual anxieties; and white southerners could not argue against suffrage for their 
fellow Negro citizens with quite the same moral fervor they applied to the mingling of the races 
in schools.”142 The Kennedys began to conceive of voting rights as a pragmatic avenue to 
address racial inequality, but still avoided direct statements during the presidential campaign. 
After the election, Robert F. Kennedy noticed an anomaly in Fayette County, Tennessee 
that signaled the rising power of the black vote. Under Eisenhower, John Doar with the DOJ 
investigated economic reprisals in Fayette and Haywood Counties where strong evidence 
showed that white landowners punished and removed black tenants for political participation. In 
the 1960 election, demonstrating some Republican loyalty for investigating these acts, African 
Americans voted overwhelmingly for Nixon in Fayette County. Whereas Kennedy captured a 
much higher percentage of the black vote elsewhere in the country, the numbers in Fayette 
County proved that black voters were not locked in for the Democrats. Fayette County’s example 
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cemented in Robert Kennedy’s mind the need to increase black registration, and hopefully, win 
over more Democratic voters.143  
Harris Wofford became a Special Assistant on Civil Rights within the DOJ after 
Kennedy’s victory, and soon after his appointment, he recommended executive actions to the 
President-Elect. Familiar with “The Federal Executive and Civil Rights,” Wofford echoed its 
message and laid out a plan for translating ideas into action. His tone was optimistic, arguing that 
Kennedy should welcome the opportunity to skirt an unhelpful Congress. This route offered the 
greatest number of possibilities to do good, Wofford suggested, because the executive branch 
could do more than any piece of watered-down legislation. Wofford advised Kennedy to support 
the anti-poll tax amendment clogged in Congress, strengthen the Civil Rights Division within the 
DOJ, compel southern leaders to fully desegregate schools, end federal housing discrimination, 
renew the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, and host public meetings with civil rights leaders to 
demonstrate empathy with the cause. According to Wofford, “you [Kennedy] can do without any 
substantial civil rights legislation this session of Congress if you go ahead with a substantial 
executive action program.”144 
In the same memorandum, Wofford counseled Kennedy to prioritize black registration. 
Taking stock of the civil rights movement, Wofford wrote, “It would probably help now to shift 
the spotlight from lunch counter sit-ins and school desegregation to Negro enfranchisement.”145 
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Citing his belief that registration offered the greatest potential for concrete progress with less 
chance of conservative resistance, Wofford envisioned African Americans registering en masse 
if only given federal support. He also explained that focusing on black registration could be a 
boon for the Democratic Party: “It would be a dramatic and good thing for the national 
Democratic Party to announce and launch such a drive, instead of leaving it to the NAACP and 
King’s movement.”146 With more black votes, Democrats would secure the South while evolving 
beyond a whites-only party in the region. If the national Democratic Party did nothing to wrench 
the segregationist wing out of power in the South, Wofford feared African Americans would turn 
to the Republican Party. To make sure this did not happen, Wofford suggested state parties 
pursue black registration while national leaders supported greater enfranchisement. “The 
southern Negro temper is changing fast and these state Democratic parties will need to adjust or 
risk losing the Negro vote,” Wofford warned.147  
Wofford based some of his predictions on what Robert Kennedy observed in Fayette 
County, Tennessee, in which many African Americans awarded their votes to the Republican 
Party. Scott Franklin, President of the Fayette County Civic and Welfare League, telegrammed 
the President-Elect on December 30 that white landowners continued to evict black 
sharecroppers. “We have all been boycotted,” Franklin wrote, “unable to purchase food, 
clothing, medical supplies and gas.”148 He asked for help, and Wofford advised the federal 
government to get involved.149 Fayette County suggested what Democrats could do to hang on to 
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their black supporters—those few who could vote. To prevent an exodus to the Republicans and 
increase Democratic votes, the Kennedy Administration needed to protect and extend civil rights. 
Robert Kennedy was convinced, telling DOJ lawyer John Doar, “I want to move on voting.”150 
In addition to his report, Wofford’s catalogue of contacts from his service with the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights proved valuable to link civil rights leaders, philanthropists, and 
White House insiders. He learned about SCLC leadership making inquiries about philanthropic 
money for voter registration. Wofford gave the SCLC the names of foundations that might be 
interested in helping, and he told philanthropist friends that the Kennedy Administration was 
moving toward voter registration as its main civil rights target. He then told those within the DOJ 
about interests shared by the SCLC, foundations, and the executive branch. In this way, Wofford 
was a crucial link that put the three sides in conversation, a foundational step towards the 
eventual creation of the Voter Education Project.151 
During the transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy, the search to find a new leader for the 
Civil Rights Division became crucial to the DOJ. President Kennedy’s brother-in-law and 
campaign organizer Sargent Shriver wanted Wofford, but others within the DOJ were worried 
about his politics and friendship with King, not wanting to unnerve allies among southern 
Democrats. Burke Marshall came up as an alternative. Wofford and Marshall had been law 
partners and had known each other since attending law school together at Yale. Unlike Wofford, 
Marshall was a corporate anti-trust lawyer with no apparent opinions on racial matters or 
personal ties to civil rights leaders. His lack of knowledge worked in is favor, and after an 
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awkward interview with Robert Kennedy in which the two men reportedly sat in silence for 
several minutes staring at each other, Marshall became the new head of the Civil Rights 
Division. Robert Kennedy thought Marshall was sympathetic to improved race relations, but 
uninformed enough not to worry conservatives. On February 8, 1961, Fleming wrote Currier 
with the disappointing news that their friend Harris Wofford would not be appointed to lead the 
Civil Rights Division. Fleming heard from a source that “Bobby Kennedy decided Harris was 
too hot for the Assistant Attorney General spot.” Wofford approved the selection of his old 
partner, although, Fleming heard “a dismal picture of the prospects for vigorous action generally 
in civil rights” from his informant.152  
On March 6, Robert Kennedy and Burke Marshall met with SRC and race leaders to 
argue that civil rights agencies should pursue voter registration above all else. Martin Luther 
King Jr. was conspicuously absent. A month earlier, The Nation had printed an editorial by King 
calling on the Kennedy Administration to support the civil rights movement by issuing executive 
orders, bucking tradition that incoming Presidents be given a grace period in the media. King 
based much of his material on “The Federal Executive and Civil Rights.”153 Feeling ignored, 
King wrote the White House requesting a private meeting. Busy with foreign policy matters, the 
President’s staff declined, but DOJ officials weighed engaging King. Louis Martin, assistant 
chairman of the Democratic National Committee, suggested bringing King in for a private 
meeting to gauge how well he could work with the new administration. Over a month later, they 
met for lunch at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington, DC. Accompanied by trusted friend 
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Stanley Levison, King met Robert Kennedy, Marshall, Wofford, and others from the DOJ. At the 
meeting, the Civil Rights Division laid out their vision for the future of the movement. Marshall 
said that the SCLC and other race organizations ought to concentrate on voter registration, a 
pressing issue throughout the Jim Crow South. Marshall explained the DOJ could be most 
effective by filing lawsuits and pressuring local officials to stop harassing African Americans if 
they were trying to register. Militant demonstrations exacerbated tensions and conflicts the DOJ 
might not be able to resolve. According to John Seigenthaler, a DOJ aide, Kennedy told King, 
“Put on drives in these areas…I think some funds can be found from some of the foundations 
who are interested in this sort of thing.”154 King listened and did not say much. He agreed with 
the DOJ’s opinion, but King made sure the DOJ understood his belief that meaningful 
demonstrations should include much more than voting campaigns. Kennedy and his colleagues 
were relieved to find King amenable to their ideas on registration. As a show of good faith, 
Marshall gave King his personal phone number with instructions to call him if trouble arose.155 
In 1961, according to Arthur Schlesinger, “[President] Kennedy left civil rights policy 
pretty much to his brother,” but Robert Kennedy was inexperienced in racial politics.156 An early 
opportunity for Robert Kennedy to learn occurred in Athens, Georgia. Soon after he began 
serving as Attorney General, Jay Cox, an undergraduate student at the University of Georgia and 
President of the Student Advisory Council, hand-delivered an invitation for him to speak on 
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campus. Only a few months earlier, the university had suspended its first two black students, 
Hamilton Holmes and Charlayne Hunter, after violence broke out on campus. Although the 
university administration had brought the students back, tensions were raw in Athens. Cox 
thought a visit from the Attorney General could help the university move forward. Kennedy had 
yet to give a major address as Attorney General, but he liked the idea of standing in the Deep 
South declaring that the DOJ would not hesitate to enforce the law. Intransigent southern 
governors and lawmakers irked Kennedy, and he savored a chance to remind them who had 
ultimate authority. He wanted to set a decisive tone at the outset of his tenure, so he accepted 
Cox’s invitation.157 
Over the next five weeks, Robert Kennedy pored over multiple drafts of his speech, 
bringing in at least seven colleagues and journalists to give him feedback. While he looked 
forward to the speech, he was preoccupied with the failed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba and 
efforts to help his brother deal with the political fallout. Global opinion was on Kennedy’s mind 
as he prepared his Georgia speech, and in his edits, he framed the civil rights issue as part of the 
larger struggle for democracy worldwide. The supremacy of the law emerged as the unifying 
theme of his speech, tying together Kennedy’s thoughts on civil rights, which he admitted was 
not one of his major concerns before he became Attorney General. But he understood the perils 
of democracy denied within his own country, and he planned to lead the DOJ against southern 
unlawfulness.158  
For all of his preparation, Kennedy was nervous when he stepped on stage and delivered 
his address to an Athens auditorium crowded with 1,600 people on May 6, 1961. But after a few 
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minutes, Kennedy found his rhythm. “Southerners have a special respect for candor and plain 
talk,” he told them. “They certainly don’t like hypocrisy. So…I must tell you candidly what our 
[DOJ] policies are going to be in the field of civil rights and why.”159 Kennedy promised the 
DOJ would not be passive, but would pursue court action to enforce the law. For too long, 
southern leadership had dragged its feet or ignored court orders to desegregate, and this would no 
longer be permitted. Kennedy deferred to the law: “I happen to believe that the 1954 decision 
[Brown v. Board of Education] was right. But, my belief does not matter—it is the law. Some of 
you may believe the decision was wrong. That does not matter. It is the law. And we both respect 
the law.”160 Framing his approach in global terms, Kennedy reminded the audience that much of 
the world was non-white, and that when international audiences saw images of American 
children attending school, they should see black and white children together. Kennedy vowed 
that the DOJ would work to enfranchise African Americans: “An integral part of all this is that 
we make a total effort to guarantee the ballot for every American of voting age…The right to 
vote is the easiest of all rights to grant.”161  
After Kennedy finished, there was a brief moment of silence, then wide applause broke 
out across the auditorium. He outlined his intentions without humiliating the South, helped along 
by including criticisms of the North and the federal government. And he clarified his belief in 
equal voting rights. Civil rights leaders praised Kennedy for proclaiming a new era of justice 
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from inside the Deep South. “This is the kind of plain and forthright speaking that the South 
needs to hear,” editorialized the Chicago Daily Defender.162  
Two days before Kennedy’s speech, on May 4, 1961, the first Freedom Rides set out on 
one Greyhound and one Trailways bus from Washington, DC toward New Orleans. The 
passengers on board made it through Virginia and North Carolina largely unscathed, but in Rock 
Hill, South Carolina, locals heard of the approaching buses and attacked several Freedom Riders 
at the terminal. The worst violence occurred on May 14 just outside Anniston, Alabama when 
police coordinated with the Ku Klux Klan to stop a bus. The attackers bombed the bus and beat 
passengers as they fled the smoke-filled cabin. Images of bloodied Freedom Riders and a 
smoking bus filled the nation’s newspapers. Robert Kennedy tried to negotiate a peaceful 
solution. James Farmer of CORE called off the journey to New Orleans after “mobs and official 
hostility broke the back of the first Freedom Ride,” but SNCC organized more passengers to take 
their place and keep up the pressure.163 Recognizing the students’ determination and the 
callousness of Alabama’s Governor John Patterson, Kennedy directed DOJ officials to arrange 
protection for the Freedom Rides to avoid any more violence. Once activists crossed into 
Mississippi, officials arrested the passengers and put them in Parchman, the Mississippi’s main 
penitentiary. But Freedom Rides continued, ignoring Robert Kennedy’s criticism.164  
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Behind the scenes, Robert Kennedy worked to resolve the crisis, setting a new precedent 
that would later benefit the establishment of the Voter Education Project. Before the Freedom 
Rides began, King suggested that Robert Kennedy pressure the Interstate Commerce 
Commission (ICC) to act on the Boynton v. Virginia ruling and desegregate bus terminals. 
Kennedy declined, citing the slow-moving reputation of the ICC, not to mention that it was an 
independent body unaccustomed to arm-twisting from the DOJ. By May 29, Kennedy had 
changed his mind. He pressured the ICC to desegregate bus terminals in line with the goals of the 
Freedom Riders. Kennedy’s staff at the DOJ petitioned the ICC, an unprecedented move and 
breach of traditional executive procedure. For months, DOJ officials urged the ICC to rule for 
desegregation, and on September 22, 1961, the ICC issued the official order. Marshall 
remembered the ICC ruling “was really a remarkable administrative law achievement” that 
prevailed on a “conservative, very difficult administrative body.”165 According to Taylor Branch, 
Kennedy “telescoped a process that normally took years” and pulled off a “bureaucratic 
miracle.”166 This example of strong-arm lobbying established a new precedent within the DOJ, 
one that would reverberate when it would assist the VEP months later. 
The Freedom Rides, along with Robert Kennedy’s previous meetings in March with King 
and other race leaders, caused the DOJ to pursue a voter registration program financed by 
philanthropic dollars “with a vengeance.”167 The Kennedy Administration could not afford more 
militancy in the South. They could not deny the existence of Jim Crow laws, and the Freedom 
Riders pushed them to respond in new ways. From the DOJ’s standpoint, funneling the militant 
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spirit of the Freedom Rides into voter registration campaigns offered the best solution that also 
had the potential to increase Democratic voting strength and temper the civil rights revolution. 
Toward a Registration Coalition 
While the DOJ endorsed registration as a civil rights strategy, the SCLC happened on a 
fortunate break. Myles Horton of the Highlander Folk School, an interracial training institute for 
labor and civil rights activism in Tennessee, suggested the SCLC take over its citizenship 
schools as it faced legal battles regarding its tax-exemption. Directed by Septima Clark, a long-
time NAACP activist, educator, and Highlander workshop organizer, the citizenship schools had 
trained hundreds of men and women through weeklong courses on how to register to vote, 
circumvent uncooperative registrars, and mobilize their communities. Recalling the failure of the 
Crusade for Citizenship in 1958, Martin Luther King Jr. and Walker Tee Walker leapt at the 
chance to absorb an already functional voter registration organization into the SCLC. Clark was 
upset because she was not consulted about the transfer, but she agreed to continue working under 
the SCLC banner and the renamed Citizenship Education Program (CEP). The CEP continued 
well into the 1960s, located at its new home in Dorchester, South Carolina training activists in 
grassroots methods of voter registration. To continue the program amid financial difficulty, the 
Field Foundation donated $26,500 for one year under the SCLC, which the United Church of 
Christ administered to avoid tax liabilities. With this grant in 1961, King and Walker’s eyes 
opened to a vast source: big philanthropy.168 
Wyatt Tee Walker knew that to expand the SCLC’s reach, it needed money. After the 
Field Foundation’s donation to the SCLC’s citizenship training program, he began to notice other 
foundations that seemed eager to assist in race matters. Together, King and Walker “learned a 
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whole new vocabulary: grant proposals, funding conduits, advance budgeting, program 
reviews.”169 They began to seek out sympathetic foundations, a decision that would bring race 
groups, philanthropy, and the federal government closer together.  
While King and Walker were becoming interested in soliciting foundation sponsors, 
Harold Fleming and Burke Marshall began discussing the possibility of winning over IRS 
approval for a philanthropic-backed registration project. In his memoir, Fleming remembered 
that in their frequent conversations, Marshall cited the need for black southerners to devote 
themselves to voter registration rather than sit-in demonstrations because the DOJ could only get 
involved when local authorities discriminated against registrants. While scattered voter leagues 
had existed for years and NAACP chapters had mounted registration drives in the South, the 
major race organizations were either promoting direct action militancy or stumbling toward voter 
registration without any coordinated, inter-organizational effort. Marshall realized the major 
impediment to mass registration was financial. He knew foundations were interested in donating 
money to voter registration, but murky tax rules prohibiting political advocacy restricted any 
assistance. Marshall told Fleming that it might be possible to maintain tax exemption for 
foundations engaged in voter registration if it could be framed in a way not to alarm the IRS. If a 
project “included a significant research component and adequate safeguards against political 
partisanship,” Fleming recalled Marshall saying, it might be possible to link philanthropy and 
voting activism in a novel way.170 Marshall and Fleming conceived the idea to bridge advocacy 
and education and break a long-held precedent.  
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Excited by their plan, Fleming approached his friend and benefactor Stephen Currier. 
Marshall’s idea thrilled Currier. For three years, the Taconic Foundation had funded projects 
combating poverty and racism, but with the IRS demarcating education and advocacy, the 
Curriers could not directly engage in political ventures for fear of losing tax-exemption. 
Marshall’s idea broached new possibilities, and the Curriers went to work alongside Fleming, 
Marshall, and the Civil Rights Division to plan how such a project might function.171 
Back in November 1960, Currier had met Martin Luther King Jr. for the first time in 
Atlanta, and the two struck up a friendship that would have lasting consequences for the civil 
rights movement. Currier was so impressed with King that he invited him to meet the Taconic 
Foundation board. King visited the Taconic Foundation’s New York office on February 3, 1961 
to discuss the SCLC’s upcoming voter registration project in Atlanta. They talked about voter 
registration broadly, with King impressing on Currier the denial of voting rights as the central 
race issue affecting the South. The two struck up a friendship, one that King would place his 
faith in over the coming year as the Taconic Foundation moved to bring civil rights groups 
together in a joint program. During this same period, Garrison introduced Currier to a number of 
other race leaders he knew from his time as president of the National Urban League. As more 
relationships were built, Garrison remembered, Currier “became more and more interested in 
their problems.”172  
Before a new program could be built to funnel philanthropic dollars into voter campaigns, 
organizers needed a willing host with an established tax-exemption to satisfy the IRS. The ideal 
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solution first occurred to Fleming: the Southern Regional Council. Having worked with the SRC 
from 1944 through 1960, Fleming was well versed in the SRC’s history, and he thought Leslie 
Dunbar, his successor as executive director, would be receptive to the idea. As one of the South’s 
most influential and progressive organizations, the SRC built its reputation on solid research to 
document race problems with voter statistics, investigative reporting, and publications that 
reached lawmakers and journalists. The SRC was not an activist organization, but a research-
driven one. Race leaders respected the SRC and had drawn on its resources for years. As a 
neutral body, the SRC would not exacerbate tensions among African American leaders, either. 
The SRC offered the best possible home for a coordinated voter registration effort with the 
support of philanthropy and the DOJ.173  
 While Currier, Fleming, Marshall, and Wofford planned, they believed that all of the 
major civil rights organizations needed to commit as partners. Tensions between the NAACP, 
SCLC, CORE, and SNCC sometimes boiled over. Another challenge was to get everyone to see 
eye to eye on the importance of voter registration. SNCC and CORE were committed to militant 
nonviolence, and voter registration had not yet been a major strategy of theirs as it had been to 
the NAACP and SCLC. On a diplomatic mission, Burke Marshall traveled to Capahosic, 
Virginia in June 1961 to meet with CORE and SNCC members not locked up in Parchman for 
participating in the Freedom Rides. He explained to the group the necessity of voter registration. 
Timothy Jenkins, a young SNCC member, listened with particular interest. Jenkins was a former 
student body president at Howard University, and unlike some of his SNCC colleagues, did not 
put much faith in the long-term goals of sit-ins and Freedom Rides. Marshall’s presentation 
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intrigued him, and he left the meeting committed to influencing others within SNCC to work 
with the Kennedy Administration and pursue voter registration.174 
After the June 16, 1961 meeting with the Freedom Riders, Robert Kennedy and his DOJ 
staff stepped up their efforts to lobby SNCC to accept their plan. Unity was key in pursuing voter 
registration as a main tactic, and if SNCC could not be reliable, the entire project could fall apart. 
To demonstrate their power, Kennedy and Marshall arranged for a New York Times front-page 
story by journalist Anthony Lewis suggesting that civil rights groups were drifting towards voter 
mobilization. Appearing ten days after the meeting between Kennedy and the Freedom Ride 
Coordinating Committee, the article explained that DOJ officials were predicting a shift because 
“Negro leaders, including young and militant newcomers, are prepared for the first time to throw 
their full weight behind a registration and voting drive.”175 Lewis alluded to Marshall’s recent 
journey to Capahosic, where he received feedback from some SNCC activists about the DOJ’s 
plan. Bordering on speculation, Lewis wrote, “Confidence that the Government will do its best to 
protect those who try to register and vote also encourages Negroes to make the attempt.”176  
    The day after the Lewis story ran in the New York Times, Harry Belafonte, a popular 
entertainer who supported the movement, hosted a meeting for skeptical SNCC students to coax 
them to pursue voting rights as their main form of activism. A few days earlier, Robert Kennedy 
had Belafonte over to his house to ask for his help reaching out to reluctant SNCC members. The 
Kennedys and Belafonte were old friends, and Belafonte agreed that voting rights ought to be the 
central thrust of the southern movement. Timothy Jenkins and Charles Jones were part of the 
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SNCC group that visited Belafonte, and both were already leaning toward voter registration as 
the organization’s main work. The group discussed the merits of grassroots registration work, 
and Belafonte gave SNCC $10,000 to initiate the process. The faction within SNCC that wanted 
to push the organization toward voter campaigns increasingly gained power, and a series of 
meetings during the summer of 1961 solidified their position.177 
Meeting in Baltimore from July 14-16, SNCC’s executive committee discussed a range 
of topics, including the Belafonte meeting and shifting SNCC’s emphasis to voter registration. 
Charles Jones gave a verbal report of the gathering between himself, Timothy Jenkins, Charles 
McDew, Diane Nash, Walter Williams, Lonnie King and Harry Belafonte that took place in 
Washington, DC three weeks earlier. During their meeting, they discussed raising funds and 
expanding the movement by one or two hundred thousand students. More realistically, the group 
“felt that voter registration was the most important issue and that the real possibility to enact a 
successful program was at hand.”178 Led by Bob Moses, several SNCC students in Mississippi 
were already concentrating on registration work with the help of Amzie Moore of the state 
NAACP, and more SNCC personnel were seeing the value of their work. They suggested giving 
greater attention to voter registration work without discontinuing direct action protests like the 
Freedom Rides and sit-ins. The SNCC students who met with Belafonte also proposed creating a 
six-person staff to oversee all voter registration work. Since this was only an exploratory 
meeting, the representative students could not commit SNCC to anything without formal 
approval, but they continued to work on the proposal over the next month.179  
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Following a series of meetings, SNCC’s leadership accepted the strategy to concentrate 
on voting rights activism. Gathering at the Highlander Folk School in August, Ella Baker 
mediated a compromise in which SNCC would have one wing devoted to voter registration and 
another to direct action. With this agreement, SNCC was poised to take the lead on rural 
grassroots mobilization efforts across the South, expecting the DOJ to provide support when 
needed. In November 1961 at another SNCC leadership meeting, Bob Moses led a session on 
“Why Voter Registration?” followed by Marion Barry’s workshop on “Why Direct Action?”180 
By then, SNCC had accepted both strategies.181 
Leslie W. Dunbar and the Southern Regional Council 
As plans went forward for the SRC to host the joint registration project, Leslie W. 
Dunbar emerged as a credible leader. Harold Fleming later said of Dunbar, “Southern liberals of 
his breed are familiar with evil, for they grew up with it; discerned it among family, friends, and 
neighbors; learned to detect and combat it within themselves.”182 From childhood through 
adulthood, Dunbar witnessed racism all around him, and as he undid its grip on him, he worked 
to eliminate it from society. Dunbar was born on January 27, 1921 in Lewisburg, West Virginia, 
but he grew up in Baltimore, a diverse, yet segregated border city that exposed him to racial 
inequality. He remembered Baltimore’s rigid racial code that extended “from the schools to 
residential areas to swimming pools and everything else. We even had [segregation] in the parks, 
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black baseball diamonds and white baseball diamonds.”183 Growing up in Baltimore, he 
perceived the effects of segregation, but “not in the sense that you felt it was something you 
needed to do something about. We just saw the order of things.”184 After graduating from the 
University of Maryland and briefly attending law school, Dunbar went to Cornell University and 
earned his doctorate in political science. He soon received a job offer to teach at Emory 
University beginning in the fall of 1948, and he moved to Atlanta to begin his career.185 
Dunbar saw racism with clarity and horror during his time in Atlanta. He recalled one 
experience that forced him to reckon with the everyday injustices black men and women faced in 
the South. Soon after joining Emory’s faculty, he advised the undergraduate political science 
club. He came up with the idea to invite an African American professor from Atlanta University 
to speak to their group. Dr. William Boyd earned his PhD from the University of Michigan and 
was a respected expert in international relations, but when Dunbar phoned to ask him over to 
Emory’s exclusively white campus, he asked Boyd to talk about race relations, assuming that 
would be his preferred topic. Boyd obliged, and he took the opportunity to detail the racist slights 
his family often dealt with. When they traveled to Washington, DC, Boyd told the club, his 
family had to pack their food and plan out bathroom breaks, knowing they could not pull into 
any store. Even more recently, he said, his daughter’s school took up a collection for the Atlanta 
Zoo to purchase a new elephant, but he had to explain to her that even though she donated a 
dime, she would not be able to go see the elephant once it arrived. Dunbar sat stunned in the 
back of the room, realizing he offended Dr. Boyd by not asking him to talk about his field of 
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study. He apologized and Boyd accepted, but Dunbar realized he had been blind to many 
everyday troubles African Americans faced in the South. Race was not Dunbar’s specialty within 
political science, but he began to pay more attention to the subject, leading him toward a much 
different career path.186 
In Atlanta, Dunbar became familiar with the SRC, befriending executive director George 
Mitchell and Harold Fleming, and he eventually joined the staff in 1958. Mitchell gave a talk at 
Emory in 1949 or 1950 that Dunbar remembered as life-changing: “From then on I took the 
[Southern Regional] Council as my guide to what was wrong about the South, and how it could 
be made right.”187 He became interested in the SRC’s work on race relations, and Mitchell first 
offered him a job at the SRC in 1954, but Dunbar declined. Dunbar later joined the faculty at 
Mount Holyoke College, but academia bored Dunbar, and he never quite forgot the job he turned 
down at the SRC. Another opportunity came once Fleming became the SRC’s director in 1957. 
Fleming offered Dunbar a summer position with the SRC during 1958, and since Dunbar did not 
want to return to Mount Holyoke, Fleming made the job permanent.188 The SRC had expanded in 
recent years with grants from the Ford Foundation and Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and Dunbar 
and Fleming decided to create a research department with Dunbar at the helm. The civil rights 
movement was taking hold across the South, and the SRC wanted to help through research.189  
Dunbar helped the SRC craft a national reputation as a reliable source of information on 
southern race relations. Coinciding with Dunbar’s hire, the SRC employed Benjamin Muse as 
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field director, whose job was to travel the South, meet with leaders, interview people, and 
document southern issues. A former Virginia politician, Muse made a name for himself in a 
weekly column he wrote for the Washington Post, opposing massive resistance and supporting 
desegregation. At the revamped SRC, Fleming, Dunbar, and Muse worked with other staff to 
promote a liberal perspective on race in the South. SRC staff combed through newspapers and 
magazines from across the region, organizing clippings files and piling up a mass of research on 
various topics. They wrote news releases, pamphlets, and special reports on the state of school 
desegregation. As director of research, Dunbar pushed the SRC to produce information quickly. 
Soon after the student sit-in movement took off across the South in the winter and spring of 
1960, Dunbar published a special report on the protests “while the stools at the first Woolworth’s 
were still warm.”190  
As major newspapers began to pay more attention to the South and the civil rights 
movement, the SRC maintained close relationships with reporters, feeding them information they 
could use in their articles. Claude Sitton was a New York Times reporter assigned to the Atlanta 
bureau during Dunbar’s time at the SRC, and the two of them developed a partnership that 
produced numerous pieces in the Times. In addition to reporters, the SRC sent its research and its 
magazine New South to state and federal legislators, foundations, and churches. While fair and 
accurate, Dunbar liked to say the SRC’s creed was “partisan objectivity”—clearly on the side of 
liberal reform, but meticulous in its research to help reporters spread the word that the South was 
on the precipice of change.191 “I felt in 1958, ’59, and ’60, that the work of the SRC was to be a 
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leading part of a great mind changing going on in the South…Our role was to be something of a 
guide to it.”192 
On March 30, 1961, James McBride Dabbs, President of the SRC, announced that Harold 
Fleming was leaving as executive director and that Leslie Dunbar would be his successor. Dabbs 
showed confidence in Dunbar as the new SRC executive director: “he expresses in his own 
person the essential spirit of the Council: a sympathetic probing of Southern problems, a dislike 
for the limelight, a willingness to make small gains if they are sure, and the determination always 
to advance.”193 As Dunbar settled into his new role, he became an ally of civil rights leaders, 
philanthropists, and DOJ officials, emerging as a central figure in forming the VEP. 
Establishing the VEP 
While SNCC debated the merits of a voter registration strategy, Stephen Currier 
continued to meet with DOJ officials and civil rights leaders to form an organization to supply 
funds to southern campaigns. Currier convened meetings on July 11 and 28, 1961 to discuss 
logistics. Those involved knew that inter-organizational rivalries among civil rights groups 
endangered such a broad project, so coordinating the effort through a neutral source was 
paramount. Fleming was involved in the discussions, and he floated the idea that the SRC should 
be the headquarters for their operation. Behind the scenes, he gauged the opinions of others 
about having the SRC take the lead, including Martin Luther King Jr. Fleming knew that the 
SRC had experience drawing together multiple organizations. More importantly, the SRC was 
tax-exempt, nonpartisan, and educational. Fleming approached Dunbar with the idea to host a 
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clearinghouse to dispense money to registration campaigns. Dunbar was agreeable, but he had 
conditions. Before he consented, the new venture must be guaranteed not to endanger the SRC’s 
federal tax-exemption. Dunbar also wanted Currier to oversee the fundraising, to which Currier 
agreed. The registration project also needed its own director, and that person must be a 
unanimous choice. If anyone from the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, NUL, or SNCC did not feel 
comfortable with the leadership, the tenuous alliance would shatter before it began. And finally, 
Dunbar insisted that the SRC control who received funding, and that local organizations be 
supported alongside major groups. The idea of the SRC managing the process intrigued King, 
but he wanted to meet Dunbar before finalizing his opinion. Dunbar heard about King’s 
reservations, so he called King and asked to talk in person. King visited Dunbar one Saturday 
morning in his office, and afterward, King felt comfortable with the SRC as the appropriate 
home for the project.194   
Dunbar attended the July 28 meeting and forwarded his observations to the SRC 
executive committee, documenting the coalescence of the still-unnamed voter education 
program. Representatives of foundations included Stephen Currier, Jane Lee Eddy, and Lloyd K. 
Garrison of the Taconic Foundation; Justine Wise Polier of the Field Foundation; and Vernon 
Eagle of the New World Foundation. Harris Wofford and Burke Marshall represented the 
Kennedy Administration. Civil rights leaders included King and Walker from the SCLC; Charles 
McDew and Marion Berry of SNCC; Roy Wilkins from the NAACP; Thurgood Marshall and 
Robert Carter of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund; Lester Granger and Whitney Young from the 
NUL; James Farmer of CORE; and Timothy Jenkins representing the National Student 
Association (NSA). The group asked Marshall to discuss “the legal responsibilities of the 
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Department of Justice in the voter registration field,” which he did to their satisfaction.195 Four 
hours into the meeting, King motioned that the SRC take leadership of the project, and by the 
end of the meeting, everyone agreed that the SRC was “an acceptable coordinating agency.”196 
Tax lawyers were also present and insisted that focusing on voter registration would not imperil 
the SRC’s tax-exemption. Specific donation amounts were not discussed, nor did foundation 
representatives commit to join. Dunbar thought the amount donated would be “substantial but 
not grandiose,” and the attending civil rights leaders all voiced their enthusiasm for the project. 
The meeting was a success, with Dunbar noting he was “deeply impressed by the amiability and 
harmony of the gathering.”197 
Before everyone departed, each representative promised to send the Taconic Foundation 
and SRC a detailed statement of their respective organizations, along with prospective methods 
for participating in a collective voting drive. The next meeting would fall on August 23, and the 
group required everyone to submit their statements for review by August 14. The NAACP, 
SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and NUL each drafted and sent a report before the deadline. Leaders saw 
the value of creating a united southwide registration drive—a feat never before attempted. None 
of them wanted to be left out, and each put forward an ambitious plan.198 
Even though the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and NUL were often able to create 
large budgets through donations, membership dues, and occasional philanthropic support, 
financial troubles plagued them all. The size and bureaucracy of their operations devoured their 
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budgets, leaving little to devote to grassroots registration fieldwork. Even though the NAACP’s 
membership grew to nearly 500,000 by the mid-1960s, the national office remained constantly in 
debt. The SCLC relied on church donations and labor union support, and although Wyatt Tee 
Walker exploited King’s popularity to raise large sums of money, the SCLC spent more than it 
took in. Through telethons, benefit concerts, direct mail, speaking tours, and by capitalizing off 
the energy of the Freedom Rides, CORE raised $607,484.39 during the 1961-1962 fiscal year, 
but was in debt $120,000 by the next year. “Our financial cupboard is bare,” James Farmer wrote 
in a fundraising letter.199 While Whitney Young crafted relationships with several philanthropies, 
solvency likewise remained elusive for the NUL. By comparison to the other four, SNCC 
operated in relative poverty. In 1960, SNCC took in $5,000, and in 1961 raised a mere $14,000 
from outside sources, unable to even meet its proposed budget of $15,980.200 Leaders from each 
of these organizations felt steady pressure to raise money. The joint project offered a practical 
solution to take in more.201  
 Roy Wilkins composed the NAACP’s response to the collective registration project. 
Bordering on arrogance, Wilkins painted the NAACP as the most competent civil rights 
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organization in the country that deserved most—if not all—of the available funds. With the 
exception of Alabama, which had banished the NAACP in 1956, the group had thriving chapters 
in every southern state, a total of 337 active branches across 10 states. For half a century, the 
NAACP had promoted black registration through local drives and in court rooms. Beginning in 
1957, the NAACP renewed its focus on the ballot when it created a voter registration committee 
with Charlotte NAACP chapter president Kelly Alexander at the helm. The next year, W.C 
Patton and John Brooks, two long-standing NAACP activists, took over at the NAACP’s 
national office on matters of voter registration. Together, they coordinated a small team of field 
secretaries that visited branches to help launch local registration campaigns. The NAACP 
concentrated its resources on urban areas to target the greatest number of unregistered African 
Americans, citing successes in cities such as Memphis and Baltimore. With a precedent for 
registration work already in place, Wilkins stated, the NAACP “has the structure and the 
personnel to insure that voter registration campaigns are launched and carried forward.” Over the 
next several years, he wrote, the NAACP would expand its voter registration activities in 
branches across the country. For these reasons, the NAACP desired to be an essential partner 
within the southwide registration effort, leading the way if possible.202 
Lester B. Granger, executive director of the NUL, appealed to the Taconic Foundation as 
a qualified partner, citing the NUL’s history of voter registration activism. Although its principal 
aim had been to promote “welfare resources, vocational guidance, and information on housing 
and employment,” the NUL felt confident it could enhance its programs on voter registration. 
The NUL had chapters in 13 southern cities, although many had been “greatly weakened in 
recent years by attacks from segregationist forces.” But with additional funding, Granger 
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insisted, the NUL could revitalize its work in the South and coordinate with other civil rights 
organizations. At the July 28 meeting, the majority had decided the project would concentrate on 
the South, but with the NUL’s main support coming from more than 50 chapters in the North, 
Granger urged the group to “review its decision to limit our activity only to the South.” Pointing 
out that over half of the country’s black population resided in the urban North, Granger 
suggested the NUL would be in a stronger position to help if Taconic’s resources could extend 
beyond the South.203  
James Farmer penned CORE’s self-evaluation and voter registration goals. With roots in 
communities across Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina, CORE was prepared to “carry on 
dynamic voter registration programs” in rural and urban areas. Drawing on years of experience, 
Farmer laid out how funds from the Taconic Foundation would be used to increase staff, set up 
small offices, print materials, offer legal aid, and host workshops. Fitting with CORE’s national 
program and ideology of nonviolence, Farmer wrote, “Our registration campaigns would be 
undertaken in the spirit of assuming an obligation of citizenship…to bring about an integrated 
society of friends.”204  
Martin Luther King Jr. and Wyatt Tee Walker wrote the SCLC’s prospectus for the 
southwide voter drive. Citing evidence that only about a quarter of eligible African Americans 
were registered in the South, they blamed poll taxes and literacy tests, as well as outright 
violence and economic intimidation. Organized through the church, the SCLC’s strategy would 
harness the power and connections of pastors and congregations to lead local movements for the 
ballot. King and Walker went through the list of states where the SCLC had contacts, indicating 
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where it could be most effective. They also communicated that they were willing to work with 
other civil rights groups, taking careful steps to indicate their respect for the NAACP and desire 
for coordination. Suggesting a collaborative project of two years, the SCLC looked forward to a 
“dynamic Southwide Voter Registration Program.”205 
Charles McDew submitted a voter registration plan for SNCC. He pointed out SNCC’s 
approval of the SRC as the central hub of the campaign, and he suggested creating an advisory 
board with members from each partner organization. For SNCC’s part, it would concentrate on 
recruiting students to live in southern communities and organize voting workshops and 
citizenship schools. In the spirit of nonviolent protest that characterized the sit-ins and Freedom 
Rides, SNCC envisioned stand-ins at the offices of registrars who discriminated against African 
Americans. SNCC also planned to host mass meetings, canvass neighborhoods, print literature, 
drive people to the courthouse, and embed themselves within local communities to “aid in 
securing the franchise for all qualified citizens.”206 
While these five organizations wrote proposals about their plans for a southwide project, 
SRC staff drafted policy recommendations that would apply to all groups. They finished the 
proposal a week before the August 23 meeting, circulating it so the group could discuss ideas 
when they came together. In it, the SRC summarized obstacles to a unified drive, including white 
opposition, coordination between major organizations, and “money—and regarding this no 
comment is necessary.” A sustained registration campaign would be a challenge as well, which 
“in the absence of dramatic causes, is hard, grubby, tiring, unspectacular, frequently 
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discouraging.” Yet, the SRC, the Taconic Foundation, and all participating leaders believed in 
the idea. Evidence was growing that black political participation was on the upswing, and 
activists believed a full-throttle push in that direction would achieve lasting results in race 
relations. “Free and full participation of Negroes in southern elections,” the SRC report stated, 
“may be the surest means of ending or at least decreasing southern preoccupation with race.”207 
On August 23, the group reconvened in New York to discuss each organization’s 
proposal and the SRC’s blueprint for a united registration drive. Stephen Currier led the meeting, 
along with Lloyd Garrison of the Taconic Foundation. Dunbar represented the SRC, Fleming 
attended as an observer, Wofford and Marshall stood for the federal government, and James 
Farmer, Charles McDew, Timothy Jenkins, Whitney Young, Martin Luther King Jr., Wyatt Tee 
Walker, and Henry Lee Moon represented the six major civil rights groups.208 The group 
evaluated each organization’s proposal, determining that each made valid points and offered 
sound goals. Young raised the issue put forward in Lester Granger’s NUL proposal that the 
group reconsider engaging with the North, but the majority insisted the project stay focused on 
the South where “resistance [was] the greatest.”209 At this point, Dunbar remembered that Young 
became upset, realizing the NUL would not get as much money out of the arrangement as the 
others since its power was in the North: “He wanted money. Everybody wanted money.”210 
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McDew wanted to know if the group could grant “immediate approval” for 10 SNCC field 
workers to stay in the Deep South because they needed to return to school if money was not 
immediately available. But the project was still in its planning stage, and Currier was unwilling 
to commit any funds before the SRC was ready and could make sure that its tax-exemption 
remained in place. Moon asked Currier how much the Taconic Foundation planned to donate, 
and Currier promised $250,000 for a two-year initiative, with the hope that he could recruit other 
foundations to support them as well.211  
Three weeks after the meeting, Dunbar wrote to everyone with a detailed plan of action 
coordinated through the SRC. After speaking with his executive committee, Dunbar reported that 
the SRC “can accept the proposed grant, for the opportunity it offers to deepen and perfect our 
research into voting in the South.” The SRC would be the junction between major civil rights 
organizations while respecting each group’s autonomy. It would allocate grants made possible by 
the Taconic Foundation and future sources, coordinate local and regional registration campaigns, 
offer consulting, evaluate results, and publish material based on collective documentation. 
Dunbar indicated that each group must account for all expenditures, warning that if accounting 
was inadequate, the SRC would withhold future funds. Over objections from Wilkins and 
Young, the SRC stated it planned to fund local campaigns as well, not only to widen the net of 
research, but to empower grassroots agencies. Under the SRC, the voting initiative would have 
its own name, director, staff, and office space. On the SRC’s side, Dunbar wrote that publicity 
for the project would be “the necessary minimum,” but that others could promote it at their 
discretion. He noted that the voter campaign “now gives us [SRC] the opportunity to study and 
evaluate the methods which can best change these conditions” to hasten the destruction of Jim 
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Crow. Before moving forward, Dunbar awaited confirmation from each organization that they 
were amenable to the SRC’s plan.212  
Roy Wilkins had a conflict on August 23 and could not make it to the meeting, so he 
asked NAACP public relations director Henry Lee Moon to go in his place. Briefing Moon 
beforehand, Wilkins wrote that Currier was the “head man and has the important money…he is 
quite a ‘hep’ person and wants to aid in this field, but is far from being a patsy. Very nice and 
very sharp.”213 But Currier was upset when Wilkins did not show up. He pulled Moon aside 
before the meeting to ask why Wilkins did not come, stressing to Moon how important it was for 
each group’s national leader to demonstrate his commitment. Moon apologized for Wilkins, but 
made it clear he was more than capable of filling in for his boss, having written a book himself 
on the black vote in 1948. A week later, Wilkins wrote Currier to explain his absence, to which 
Currier expressed his relief that Wilkins did not skip the meeting out of disinterest. In order for 
the plan to work, he told Wilkins, the NAACP must be involved.214 
The NAACP was the last to agree to the coalition due to reservations from senior staff. 
Before committing his organization to the group, Wilkins solicited feedback from some of his 
top officers to see what they thought about the registration project. Gloster Current, the 
NAACP’s director of branches, strongly opposed joining forces with other groups, “particularly 
the newer ones which have not demonstrated any degree of responsibility in such a project.” 
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Current also worried that involvement would expose the NAACP’s internal administration for 
other organizations to see, and he thought the idea was a ruse to register more Democrats. “If the 
Taconic Foundation really wanted to advance registration and voting,” Current wrote Wilkins, “it 
would give the funds directly to the NAACP,” not realizing direct involvement with any single 
group was precisely what the Taconic Foundation wanted to avoid.215 The NAACP was the 
largest civil rights group with the greatest capacity for southern registration campaigns, and 
Current did not think that linking with others would be in its interest. John Brooks, the NAACP’s 
voter registration director, liked the idea, but could “sense a big fight for organizational prestige 
among the groups participating” and worried that newer groups were not as committed to 
registration as the NAACP. “Look out for the explosion [of registration activism] when Miss 
Voter Registration is made real glamorous with a dress of dollar bills from the Taconic 
Foundation,” Brooks warned.216  
The delay annoyed Currier and Dunbar. By October 5, only the SCLC and NUL had 
committed, and until the others confirmed, the project could not move forward. Currier 
expressed a “deep disappointment in the lack of immediate enthusiastic response” that was on 
display during the July 28 meeting. The two agreed they needed to delay the project past the fall 
of 1961 when they had first hoped to begin. The delay worried other foundations, Currier 
speculated, with some of the initial excitement cooling as some groups appeared to have major 
reservations about the alliance.217  
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During this waiting period, Louis Lomax, a well-known black journalist who had risen to 
fame after co-producing The Hate That Hate Produced in 1959 about the Nation of Islam, broke 
the story about the pending civil rights coalition with significant backing from a foundation. In a 
radio editorial on WBAI in New York on October 17, Lomax told his audience that three months 
earlier, “I came upon a good story, a scoop,” but that others asked him to stay quiet “for the good 
of the race because some people said if I broke the story then I’d muddy the water and the thing 
wouldn’t come to pass.” He went on to detail how back in July, a foundation that Lomax left 
unnamed had earmarked $250,000 for black voter registration campaigns, and after gathering 
together representatives from leading African American organizations, the foundation 
encouraged them to form a coordinated plan of attack. They soon settled on running the program 
through the SRC—“a staid and somewhat conservative, yet very active longtime organization in 
the area of civil rights”—to serve as a clearinghouse. With a plan in place, each participating 
group needed only to ratify the SRC’s plan for action and “off to the polls we go.”218 
But early excitement for the alliance had waned, and Lomax criticized civil rights leaders 
for the delay. Lomax editorialized, “I find it incredible that civil rights leaders would take the 
better part of six months to accept and implement such a program. Here we have a case of an 
interested foundation being willing to give a large sum of money to underwrite Negro voter 
registration” and yet they drag their feet. They had the support not only of the foundation, but 
also of the Kennedy Administration, which seemed to Lomax the perfect combination to make 
significant headways on racism at the ballot box. Lomax speculated that the delay was because 
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black disfranchisement intimidated some leaders, for none wanted to tie themselves to a project 
doomed to fail for fear of hurting their national reputation. Whatever the reason, Lomax called 
for leaders considering the project to move forward and not waste the opportunity.219 
Not coincidentally, on the same day Louis Lomax aired his commentary, the NAACP 
joined, becoming the last to sign on after SNCC and CORE pledged days earlier. But Wilkins 
asked Dunbar to clarify a number of points that worried his senior staff. He expressed concern 
that other groups would overshadow the NAACP and receive greater funding, even though the 
NAACP had the most extensive network of chapters. Wilkins also worried that combining forces 
would lead to territorial disputes, and he opposed any money directed toward grassroots 
campaigns unaffiliated with national groups. Dunbar wrote back to assuage Wilkins’s 
misgivings: “We [SRC] have made our participation in the registration effort conditional upon 
yours. This is the measure of our regard for the NAACP.” Placating to Wilkins, Dunbar 
emphasized how crucial it was for the NAACP to participate, because if it did not, the entire 
project would collapse. Dunbar explained that the joint undertaking would enhance the 
NAACP’s voter registration efforts, not dilute them. And while he understood the concern about 
working with untested local groups, Dunbar wrote they must “agree to disagree.”220 Dunbar’s 
letter arrived on Wilkins’s desk on the day of a board meeting, and after discussion, the NAACP 
restated its intention to join by letter on November 22. “There is no dispute upon the necessity of 
a voter education-registration project,” Wilkins wrote Dunbar. “We want to address ourselves to 
it, ironing out minor items as we go along.”221 
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While he awaited Wilkins’s answer, Dunbar requested a grant of $250,000 for two years 
from the Taconic Foundation and appealed to the IRS. Settling on the name “Voter Education 
Project,” planners hoped to begin operations in January 1962, but everything was conditional on 
the NAACP’s acceptance and the IRS affirming the SRC’s tax-exemption. Classified as a 
501(c)(3) tax-exempt nonprofit organization under the IRS’s 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the 
SRC could not participate in any type of partisan political activity. After speaking with its 
lawyers, the SRC was positive that funding non-partisan registration drives and studying the 
results was not a violation. “As a matter of prudence, however,” wrote Dunbar, “we have 
initiated discussions with the Internal Revenue Service in order to secure an advance ruling.” 
The SRC went ahead with its grant application, confident of a favorable ruling from the IRS 
soon after the new year.222 
The Taconic Foundation received the SRC’s grant application for the Voter Education 
Project in late November, and even though Currier was supportive, he and his executive board 
believed they needed to hear official word from the IRS before they could grant the full amount. 
To get the project up and running, the Taconic Foundation gave the SRC $16,000 before the end 
of November.223 After this initial donation, Currier, Dunbar, and everyone else waited. On 
December 14, Adrian W. DeWind, a noted tax lawyer working at Lloyd Garrison’s New York 
law firm, requested a ruling on the SRC’s proposed voter registration project from IRS 
Commissioner Mortimer M. Caplin. DeWind was an expert on tax policy, having served as chief 
counsel for the Treasury Department in the late 1940s and for the House Ways and Means 
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Committee during the early 1950s.224 He knew how the IRS operated, and he knew how to frame 
the registration campaign in terms the IRS staff would approve. The SRC first achieved tax-
exemption in 1947, DeWind explained, and in January 1960, the IRS reaffirmed the SRC’s status 
as a 501(c)(3). The proposed project would not conflict with the SRC’s primary mission, but 
would “enable the Council to promote and to study and evaluate methods for teaching and 
encouraging exercise of the right to register and vote.” DeWind outlined the SRC’s methods for 
working with various civil rights organizations, none of which had 501(c)(3) status. The SRC 
would impose “stringent conditions” on all grant recipients, requiring them to submit detailed 
accounting for all expenditures. Grantees would not be allowed to engage in any kind of partisan 
activity or attempt to influence legislation. If any group violated these conditions, the SRC would 
terminate the relationship. As a charitable program, DeWind stated the SRC’s primary purpose 
was to study black disfranchisement in the South by funding a massive registration drive.225 
DeWind, along with Dunbar and Marshall, hand-delivered the request to Mitchell Rogovin, 
Caplan’s Attorney Adviser.226 
   Currier, Dunbar, and DeWind framed the VEP’s mission as educational. Dunbar 
credited DeWind with formulating an “ingenious kind of theory” that the “VEP was really 
engaged in research, that we were researching the best ways to register voters in the South, and 
our method of research was [direct involvement].”227 Put this way, the SRC’s funding of voter 
registration campaigns would provide much needed data on the realities of black 
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disfranchisement in the South. It would measure the effects of Jim Crow laws, document 
registrar discrimination against African Americans, and track new registration numbers across 
the South. The SRC positioned its registration project as educational in which black 
disenfranchisement would be studied and reversed. Rather than challenge the IRS’s longstanding 
policy that foundations not engage in political advocacy, the SRC adapted its program to fit a 
pedagogical model. Named the Voter “Education” Project for a reason, the VEP drew attention 
away from its primary purpose—to blanket the South with funds for registration campaigns. 
Even with a high-powered lawyer and the involvement of Burke Marshall and Harris 
Wofford, there was no guarantee that the IRS would extend the SRC’s tax-exemption to the 
registration program. Soon after DeWind submitted the request to the IRS, Robert Kennedy 
personally intervened in the matter. Kennedy earned his law degree from the University of 
Virginia, and one of his professors had been Mortimer Caplan, now the IRS commissioner. 
Utilizing this relationship to his advantage, Kennedy asked Caplan to have the IRS rule 
favorably for the SRC. “I was able to work out with Mort Caplan for them [SRC] to receive a tax 
[exemption],” Kennedy later remembered.228 Kennedy, Marshall, Wofford, and others at the DOJ 
had invested too much in the idea of the VEP to see it end prematurely. The precedent for 
Kennedy’s direct involvement had come months earlier when he strong-armed the ICC after the 
Freedom Rides to desegregate bus terminals, and in the same way, Kennedy used the power of 
his position to ensure the black registration project could go forward without any federal 
hindrance. At the time, it was crucial for Kennedy to remain inconspicuous lest the DOJ or 
White House be accused of partisanship in the registration drive. If word leaked about the DOJ’s 
role in the VEP, the SRC’s tax-exemption for the project might be in jeopardy. Marshall, along 
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with John Seigenthaler, believed DeWind’s request was “a very fine legal document,” but for a 
time, all they could do was wait.229 
As 1961 ended and weeks went by in the new year without any word from the IRS, 
Dunbar asked for patience and counseled the leaders of the participating groups to refrain from 
making a public announcement about the VEP. He did not want to give the IRS any reason to be 
skeptical about the project, fearing that if anyone went to the press too soon, the entire operation 
would be off. Dunbar believed a ruling would come by mid-January: “In the meantime, we 
should all do what we can to keep the story from spreading,” he wrote King.230 By late January, 
the Tax Rulings Division within the IRS contacted DeWind seeking more information before it 
could make a sound judgment. Accompanied by Fleming, whose Potomac Institute had just 
hosted a southern interagency conference to discuss VEP plans, DeWind met representatives 
from the Tax Rulings Division in Washington, DC on January 31. 10 days later, after conferring 
with SRC leaders, DeWind drafted a supplemental letter to the IRS going into greater detail 
about how the registration program fit within an educational model. At this point, DeWind and 
others were confident the SRC would receive a favorable ruling, but they could not be sure 
when. On February 22, still without notice from the IRS, the VEP went ahead and announced to 
cooperating agencies that its office was open and in the same building as the SRC at 5 Forsyth 
St. NW in downtown Atlanta, but reminded everyone to say nothing to the press.231 
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On March 22, 1962, the IRS sent official word to the SRC that its voter registration 
program qualified as tax-exempt. John W.S. Rittleton, the director of the IRS Tax Rulings 
Division, wrote to the SRC to explain how his office reached its conclusion. Since the project 
would educate people “with the knowledge and will to register” without partisan bias, the SRC’s 
tax-exemption was not in question. Rittleton approved of the SRC’s detailed methods to oversee 
the program, including the immediate suspension of funds to any group violating its terms, and 
the SRC’s plans to publish thorough reports on the overall initiative to encourage greater black 
political participation. Since the project “will be useful as a source of research, knowledge and 
experience, it may be considered for approval.”232 With this rendered judgment, the SRC 
retained its 501(c)(3) designation as an institution exempt from paying federal income taxes, a 
precondition the Taconic Foundation and other philanthropies needed. 
 The SRC had tiptoed around the IRS’s restrictions on partisan political activity. Even 
though it would supply funds to register African Americans, the SRC’s Voter Education Project 
qualified for an exemption since it was “primarily a research effort designed to develop 
educational programs which will be most effective in providing voters with the knowledge and 
will to register.”233 On March 29, the VEP issued a press release citing the collaboration between 
the NAACP, CORE, SCLC, SNCC, and NUL. They made sure to mention that the chairmen of 
both the Republican National Committee and the Democratic National Committee endorsed the 
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idea of the VEP as well. The VEP was determined to remain non-partisan, not only to keep 
within IRS regulations, but to maintain its focus on black disfranchisement in the South, and, if 








































                                                 







CHAPTER 3: ‘THE VOTER REGISTRATION CAMPAIGN…EXPRESSED IT ALL’: THE 
FIRST VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT, 1962-1964 
 
On February 5, 1963, VEP executive director Wiley A. Branton placed a check in the 
mail for $500. The money went toward voter registration activities in Alabama, where Bernard 
Lafayette of SNCC had started organizing around Selma. A grant from the VEP, the money gave 
SNCC a boost by enabling it to purchase basic necessities such as food and car fuel. Grassroots 
mobilization cost money, and the VEP grant provided much-needed relief. The following month, 
Colia Lafayette, Bernard’s wife, reported to Branton that even though police in Selma were 
intimidating field workers, the community was coming around to SNCC’s message that voter 
registration was an effective strategy for fighting white supremacy. So far, 21 people had tried to 
register, although none had succeeded. But by June, almost 200 had registered—the start of a 
movement that would carry on to the showdown on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in 1965.235 
 Six months earlier, the VEP awarded CORE a $12,800 grant for registration fieldwork in 
four states.236 One community that benefitted was Kingstree, South Carolina, a small town of 
less than 3,000. CORE field secretary Frank Robinson used the money to coordinate car pools 
and canvassers to help people get to the courthouse to register. On March 4, 1963, 138 people 
stood in line before the registrar’s office opened. By the end of the day, only 14 people had been 
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admitted, but 11 had registered. The next month on April 1, a crowd once again gathered to 
register. This time, as police cars drove up and down the street next to the long line, 11 entered 
the office and nine registered.237 
 Between April and May 1962, the VEP granted $3,600 to the All-Citizens Registration 
Committee (ACRC) of Atlanta. The ACRC had begun its campaign in January, but the VEP’s 
contribution allowed it to expand. Between April 12 and May 5, 7,644 black men and women 
registered to vote in precincts across Atlanta. The ACRC saturated black neighborhoods with 
50,000 handbills, purchased radio spots and newspaper advertisements, organized car pools, 
rented busses to ferry people to the courthouse, drove sound trucks up and down roads, and 
canvassed neighborhoods on foot. In a matter of weeks, Atlanta’s registered black population 
went from 37,301 to 44,945.238  
 Selma, Kingstree, Atlanta: the VEP was at the root of each one. In these places, and in 
Miami, Gadsden, Asheville, Lake Charles, Lynchburg, Fort Worth, Orangeburg, Hattiesburg, 
Knoxville, Americus, Pine Bluff and hundreds of other towns and cities across the South, the 
VEP provided money for independent and national civil rights groups to conduct voter 
registration campaigns. From 1962 through 1964, the VEP spent $855,836 and registered an 
estimated 688,000 African Americans, averaging $1.24 per person.239  
With money from foundations, the VEP shaped the civil rights movement to focus on 
voting rights activism. These funds equipped activists to pay for food, salaries, canvassing, car 
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pools, handbills, mass meetings, gas, office rent, and other everyday expenses. The money was 
enough to cover the basic costs of orchestrating a movement. The VEP managed the money, 
deciding which grant applicants to support, which communities to help, and which organizations 
to back. For two and a half years, VEP staff worked behind-the-scenes to finance as many 
indigenous projects as possible, gathered research, and administered support for the black 
freedom movement in the South.  
Wiley Branton and the Beginning of the VEP 
 On January 2, 1962, still waiting to hear from the IRS about tax-exemption, Leslie 
Dunbar wrote leaders of the NAACP, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and NUL that Wiley A. Branton 
would lead the VEP. Five months earlier, Dunbar had written, “The Project director should be 
Negro, a man of stature, vigor, and sagacity. He will need to have the confidence of all sponsors. 
These being nearly impossible qualifications, the finding of the right man will be hard.”240 
Leaders of the “Big Five”—a common nickname for the NAACP, SCLC, SNCC, CORE, and 
NUL—had suggested other candidates, but Branton’s name stood out. The group unanimously 
approved the selection of Wiley Branton as executive director.241 
 Wiley Branton grew up in segregated Arkansas. His father owned a taxi company in Pine 
Bluff, and its success ensured a middle-class upbringing for Wiley and his siblings. Wiley was a 
bright student who excelled in school. Influenced by Booker T. Washington, his parents 
encouraged him to overcome white supremacy by working hard. Wiley responded to their 
teaching, but early experiences confronting racism shaped his personality as well. Once while 
shopping Wiley witnessed a white clerk attack his brother Leo in a fit of rage. Leo fought back, 
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but ran out of the store when the clerk grabbed a gun. The clerk falsely accused Leo of assault 
with a knife. Leo was found guilty, but managed to avoid imprisonment because of a lung 
condition. The experience etched into Wiley’s mind the brutality and unfairness of white 
supremacy.242 
 After serving in the military during World War II, Branton returned to Arkansas. He 
joined the Pine Bluff NAACP, and he participated in voter registration drives. After finishing 
college in 1950, he enrolled at the University of Arkansas School of Law, the fifth African 
American to do so. By this time, he was 27 years old, an Army veteran, branch president of the 
NAACP, married with three kids, and in charge of the family taxi business. But he wanted to do 
more, later remembering that he “decided suddenly one day that I wanted to be a lawyer, 
growing out of some very bitter personal civil rights experiences.”243 He excelled in law school, 
and after graduating, established a practice in Pine Bluff.244  
 On May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court ruled in Brown v. Board of Education that 
segregated schooling was unconstitutional, and the next year, vaguely instructed states to begin 
desegregating schools “with all deliberate speed.”245 In Little Rock, the school board adopted a 
desegregation plan in May 1955, but members scaled back the proposal once they realized 
neither the state nor federal government would force quick integration. The NAACP chapter and 
some parents of black schoolchildren wanted to challenge the school board’s indefinite plans, 
and in February 1956, Branton filed a suit on their behalf in Aaron v. Cooper. After a year and a 
half of litigation, nine black students attempted to enter Central High School on September 4, 
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1957, but fulfilling his promise two days earlier, Governor Orval Faubus dispatched national 
guardsmen to prevent the students from entering the building. The standoff captured national 
attention, and President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered federal troops to Little Rock to escort the  
students into the building. The legal process continued, and Branton remained behind-the-scenes 
working with NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) leader Thurgood Marshall on behalf of the 
Little Rock Nine. During this long ordeal, crosses were burned on Branton’s lawn and 
anonymous callers threatened his family. For protection, Branton carried a gun wherever he 
went, and friends and family often guarded his home. The school integration case dragged out 
through 1962, taking up much of Branton’s time until Leslie Dunbar contacted him about the 
Voter Education Project.246 
While working on the Little Rock case, Branton became well-known within the national 
civil rights community. He won the trust of Thurgood Marshall and the national NAACP 
leadership. He also met members of SNCC and CORE who were part of the Freedom Rides. 
When Freedom Riders were arrested in Jackson, Mississippi, Marshall called Branton to ask him 
to go to the jail, bail them out, and provide legal aid. Branton did so, making a lasting impression 
on SNCC leader John Lewis, who remembered Branton as the first attorney to arrive after he and 
other Freedom Riders earned a 66-day prison sentence.247 From 1956 through 1961, through all 
of the legal drudgery on behalf of the Little Rock Nine, Branton developed a reputation among 
national civil rights leaders as someone who was knowledgeable, dependable, level-headed, and 
passionate about civil rights. Knowing that the VEP director would need the trust of multiple 
                                                 
246 Interview with Wiley A. Branton by Robert Penn Warren, March 17, 1964, Louie B. Nunn Center for Oral 
History, University of Kentucky; Branton interview, October 21, 1970, 2, 54-59; and Kilpatrick, There When We 
Needed Him, 63-96. On the Little Rock Nine case, see Elizabeth Jacoway, Turn Away Thy Son: Little Rock, the 
Crisis That Shocked the Nation (New York: The Free Press, 2007); and Karen Anderson, Little Rock: Race and 
Resistance at Central High School (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010). 
 
247 John Lewis, “Wiley Branton Was There For Us,” Legal Times, January 2, 1989, 16. 
 103 
civil rights leaders, Dunbar reached out to Branton because he had a “healthy ego,” was “tough,” 
and was “a good NAACP type” of person—the perfect blend to handle many personalities all 
asking for money.248 Before hearing Dunbar’s offer, Branton had been close to accepting a 
position with the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. At first, he tried to get others to take the 
VEP position, but as he later recalled, “the more I tried to sell other people on this exciting new 
venture, the more I became personally interested.”249 By the new year, Branton had accepted the 
position as VEP executive director.250  
 Meanwhile, leaders of the Big Five moved their organizations forward with the promise 
of impending VEP funds. Since attending the planning session at the Taconic Foundation in July 
1961, James Farmer had “committed himself to securing CORE’s participation,” according to 
historians August Meier and Elliot Rudwick.251 The NUL planned to assist several of their 
southern chapters with the new funds, and Roy Wilkins, despite initial misgivings he and his 
senior staff had toward the registration alliance, readied the NAACP. The SCLC and SNCC were 
also eager to begin, both struggling to meet everyday expenses. Soon after Branton joined the 
VEP, Dunbar recommended that he reach out to the SCLC and SNCC in particular. “[T]hese 
people need guidance,” Dunbar stated bluntly.252  
 The SRC announced the VEP by press release on March 29, and the New York Times 
picked up the story. The Times identified the five major participants, along with the SRC serving 
as the central hub: “The actual registration drive will be carried out by these organizations. The 
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council’s role will be confined to administering financial aid through its newly organized Voter 
Education Project.”253 To Branton’s relief, the Times mentioned that both John M. Bailey and 
Representative William E. Miller, the chairmen of the Democratic National Committee and the 
Republican National Committee, respectively, endorsed the project. In the South, the black 
newspaper Atlanta Daily World published a small article based on the news release from the 
same day, and a week later, the Baltimore Afro-American announced the VEP.254 The launch did 
not become headline news. Branton wanted the story to remain in the background, fearful that 
the VEP’s tax-exemption could be endangered if the spotlight fell on them. But he thought more 
media attention would come once reporters realized a massive voter registration program was 
underway in the South, and he cautioned participants not to give away too much information. 
The VEP began small, with only a staff of two: Branton and his assistant, Jean Levine. Tucked 
away in the offices of the SRC, the VEP guarded its semi-secrecy. Stephen Currier did not want 
the Taconic Foundation be in the media either, or be tied to the VEP. Branton circulated a note to 
leaders of the Big Five instructing everyone to respond to media inquiries about funding vaguely: 
“the foundations (plural) do not wish their grants to be publicized at this time.”255  
 News of the VEP’s launch did not escape the attention of Senator Herman E. Talmadge. 
No friend to desegregation or racial equality, Talmadge questioned IRS Commissioner Mortimer 
Caplan about how foundations could sponsor tax-exempt voter registration drives aimed at 
African Americans. Talmadge wrote to Caplan on March 29, the day the New York Times 
reported on the VEP. He asked if the Taconic and Field Foundations could lose tax-exemption 
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for financing political activity. Caplan did not respond until mid-May, but when he did, he 
outlined the implications of 501(c)(3) organizations like the SRC and Taconic Foundation. He 
explained that the IRS had reviewed the SRC’s proposal for a registration campaign, and since 
the program promised to remain non-partisan and educational, the SRC had retained its tax-
exemption.256 Talmadge did not press the point any further, but his interest proved that the VEP 
needed to be cautious as it moved forward, lest it rouse southern segregationists. 
Along with the first public announcement, the VEP released an internal report for 
participating agencies entitled “What Is Our Aim?” encouraging partners to frame the project as 
patriotic. In the document, the VEP defined itself as a research initiative trying to end 
disfranchisement. “The United States strives to be a democracy. It falls short of being one when 
one-third of our adults do not or may not vote,” the authors wrote. Enfranchising southern 
African Americans was not radical, but the fulfillment of American constitutional principles. It 
was white segregationists who were un-American, denying the ballot to black citizens. Aware of 
long-standing conservative attacks labeling civil rights groups as extremist, the VEP brought the 
coalition together under a patriotic narrative: “The times are too serious, the threat of Communist 
power and ideology too vicious, for America not to be true to itself.”257 
As the VEP moved ahead, DOJ officials backed away. Burke Marshall remained 
involved for a time, as did Robert Kennedy and Harris Wofford, but their involvement with the 
VEP waned. Kennedy had encouraged the IRS to extend the SRC’s tax-exemption to its 
registration project. The DOJ believed it had done its part by helping set up the VEP. Yet, SRC 
staff expected the DOJ to remain involved once local projects began, anticipating white backlash 
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against registration campaigns. On March 29, the same day the VEP announced itself, Marshall 
spoke at a conference about the Civil Rights Division’s litigation to protect African American 
civil liberties. After he heard about the IRS’s tax-exemption decision, he wrote to Leslie Dunbar: 
“It is a great relief to have the waiting period over with. I have no doubt that there are going to be 
a lot of problems, and I urge you to feel absolutely free to call me at any time that you think that 
we can be of assistance in any official or unofficial fashion.”258 Dunbar and Branton both took 
Marshall’s message as a promise of DOJ help whenever voter registration attempts provoked 
violence from southern whites. They expected the DOJ to share information and offer protection 
to registration workers. Over the next two years, however, the DOJ failed to collaborate with the 
VEP in any meaningful way.259 
The VEP and DOJ split deepened with Louis E. Lomax’s publication of “The Kennedys 
Move In On Dixie” in the May edition of Harper’s Magazine. “Although the public is scarcely 
aware of it,” he reported, “the Kennedy Administration is now deeply involved in an 
unprecedented campaign to get hundreds of thousands of Southern Negroes to vote for the first 
time in their lives.” Lomax went on to argue that the plan was partisan, and that the effort would 
“rivet the Negro’s loyalty to the Democratic Party for a long time to come.” Lomax wrote that 
“white liberals” wanted to give money for registration work, and that black leaders believed 
these liberals were “unofficial emissaries” representing the Kennedy Administration.260 Lomax’s 
facts were vague throughout the article, but Wilkins was incensed. “We [NAACP] are not voting 
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for the Kennedy Administration or the Democratic Party,” he wrote Branton, but “we are 
working for our people.”261 Branton was also perturbed, and he wrote to the magazine to explain 
that the VEP operated independently of the Kennedy Administration and had the approval of 
both the Democratic National Committee and the Republican National Committee.262 Always 
concerned with tax-exemption, Branton dreaded how such misguided information could 
jeopardize the VEP. To protect its image, the VEP downplayed its relationship to the Kennedy 
Administration. 
The Field Foundation and the Stern Family Fund 
 Once the IRS confirmed a tax-exemption to the SRC, the VEP could receive 
philanthropic contributions. Stephen Currier, who took the lead the previous summer hosting 
meetings between philanthropists, race leaders, and DOJ officials, gave the VEP its first major 
grant. Back on November 10, 1961, Dunbar had requested $250,000 from the Taconic 
Foundation, noting that the “conferences during the past summer [had] given dimensions of 
urgency to this undertaking.”263 The day after the VEP began, Currier mailed a check for 
$50,000 to Dunbar, representing the first part of the $250,000 grant to the VEP. The Taconic 
trustees had met, Currier told Dunbar, and they voted to fund the campaign for the requested 
amount.264  
 With the Taconic Foundation leading the way, Currier encouraged other foundations to 
join. Currier first reached out to the Field Foundation. The Field family had been longtime 
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friends to Currier, and he had learned from Marshall Field III that philanthropic giving could be 
honorable, pleasurable, and beneficial to society. With the VEP having the potential to alter the 
political and social landscape of the South, he wanted to include the Field Foundation, whose 
support he and the SRC needed.265 
 As an adult during the Great Depression, Field III, who had inherited his grandfather’s 
fortune of $120,000,000 as a 12-year old, became increasingly supportive of the New Deal. Over 
time, Field had become disenchanted with the Republican Party after supporting its platform for 
years. He grew tired of hearing his rich, conservative friends discuss poverty as a natural 
phenomenon that needed to occur without state intervention. And he disagreed with Republicans 
who believed that high taxes on the wealthy were unjust. Seeing the poverty that surrounded 
Chicago and across the country during the early 1930s, Field spurned family ideology and 
became a vocal supporter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As Field’s wealth multiplied and 
his politics turned progressive, he became interested in a different kind of philanthropy that 
could improve the material lives of the less fortunate.266  
 Field married his third wife, Ruth Pruyn Phipps, and together, they created the Field 
Foundation in October 1940. After decades of private philanthropy, Field wanted to create an 
organization that could handle hundreds of requests and choose projects worthy of investment. 
The Field Foundation’s charter stated that it would give to “charitable, scientific, or educational” 
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endeavors, and that it would only bestow grants on agencies with federal tax-exemption.267 After 
a decade of operation, the Field Foundation was “a quiet sort of foundation, with no extensive 
fellowship program, no spectacular news releases, no multimillion-dollar grants, no museums, no 
showcases.”268 But with assets around $11,000,000 in 1949, the Field Foundation had become a 
mid-size philanthropic agency during a period in which foundations were springing up 
throughout the country. To manage the Foundation’s daily activities, former journalist and 
fundraiser Maxwell Hahn served as executive vice president. Over the years, the Field 
Foundation assisted health and education organizations, child advocacy groups, universities, and 
the American Council on Race Relations in Chicago. When Marshall Field III died in 1956, he 
bequeathed a wealth of land, stock, and money to the Foundation, ensuring its continuation under 
the care of Hahn and Ruth Field.269  
 Since the late 1950s, the Field Foundation had been a supporter of the SCLC’s 
Citizenship Schools and the SRC. Since 1959, the SRC had relied on the Field Foundation’s 
annual grants of $25,000 for its operational costs.270 With this precedent, Dunbar and Branton 
believed the Field Foundation would be receptive to financing the VEP. Stephen Currier thought 
so too, and on November 16, 1961, he wrote Ruth Field encouraging her foundation to join with 
Taconic and support the VEP: “I think this is a dramatic opportunity. A cooperation between our 
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two Foundations could result in massive breakthroughs in the South.”271 Maxwell Hahn wrote to 
Dunbar in February 1962 that the Field Foundation were preparing to offer “substantial 
assistance” to the VEP once it heard from the IRS.272 By the end of March, the Field Foundation 
awarded the VEP a one-year grant of $75,000.273 
 With the Field Foundation and the Taconic Foundation committed to the VEP, Branton 
appealed to the Edgar B. Stern Family Fund. Founded in 1936, the Stern Family Fund dispensed 
the wealth of New Orleans philanthropists Edgar and Edith Stern. Edgar’s family had ties to the 
Crescent City’s financial markets, and Edith was the daughter of noted philanthropist Julius 
Rosenwald. Influenced by her father’s philanthropy, Edith wanted to alleviate African American 
poverty and racial inequality. Between 1936 and 1956, Edith and Edgar’s foundation gave out 
more than $5,000,000. During the mid-1950s, the Stern’s children became more involved in the 
Fund and wanted to invest in opportunities outside New Orleans. For years, the Fund had given 
to Tulane University, Dillard University, the New Orleans Symphony Orchestra, and other local 
causes, but during the late 1950s and early 1960s, it supported the University of North Carolina’s 
Institute for Research in the Social Sciences, the Brookings Institution, and other national 
ventures. In 1959, according to executive director Helen Hill Miller, the Fund began investing 
“in fields to which American society currently gives only moderate recognition.”274  
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On May 5, 1962, Branton addressed Stern Family Fund’s board to request money for the 
VEP. Branton impressed, and the Fund promised $124,000 over two years. Miller wrote Branton 
with the good news two days later, telling him that after his “persuasive presentation,” the board 
of trustees voted to aid the VEP.275 Harris Wofford had also encouraged the Stern Family Fund 
to join the partnership.276 As the VEP was getting ready to begin its first major southwide voter 
registration campaign, the Stern Family Fund provided one last boost. 
To start, the VEP had $187,000 from the Taconic Foundation, the Field Foundation, and 
the Stern Family Fund, with more promised for the future. Even with this sum, historian Claude 
A. Clegg III has suggested that the VEP was “woefully underfunded,” but there were reasons 
why foundations did not give more.277 Foundations wanted to spread their investments around, 
funding multiple projects in several fields. The Taconic Foundation, for example, funded dozens 
of organizations specializing in child welfare, neighborhood improvement, and mental health 
alongside its support of the VEP and other race-related projects. In 1962, at about the same time 
as it committed $250,000 to the VEP for a two-year program, the Taconic Foundation granted 
$55,450 to the American Social Health Organization for drug addiction research, $30,000 to the 
Anna Freud Foundation for combating mental illness, and $75,000 to Henry Street Settlement for 
a New York City housing program. Foundations also spread out their donations because they did 
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not want to create dependency. Even though Stephen Currier was fond of the VEP, he was wary 
of investing too much of his time and money into a single project.278 
Summer 1962: The Crash Program 
With an investment of $187,000, the VEP began sponsoring voter registration programs. 
In the South, no state offered year-round, continuous voter registration. Registrars usually 
operated out of courthouses on a limited basis during registration season, and their presence was 
nonexistent at other times during the year. African Americans—and whites too—had a small 
window in which to register each year. Southern states sometimes allowed additional voter 
registration during the summer and early fall before Election Day. In May 1962, the VEP 
introduced a 90-day crash program.  
On April 17, VEP and SRC staff met with civil rights leaders in Atlanta to plan the crash 
program and divide southern territories among the Big Five. For at least part of the summer and 
fall, six southern states—Louisiana, Tennessee, Mississippi, Virginia, North Carolina, and South 
Carolina—had available registration days. Marvin Rich from CORE attended the meeting and 
informed James Farmer about the plan. The VEP would make “flat grants” to CORE and the 
other organizations to work in specific cities and areas across the South.279 The month before, 
each organization submitted an ambitious budget for the 90-day crash program. In its request, the 
NAACP asked for $138,850 for voter registration campaigns in 30 locales in nine states, and it 
wanted to hire eight full-time staff workers.280 The SCLC asked for $60,000.281 All together, 
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budget requests from the five groups totaled $556,000 for the first year.282 Considering the VEP 
could only count on $187,000, Branton had to make difficult decisions on which groups to fund, 
where, and at what level. 
Once the VEP received all budget requests for the 90-day crash program, Branton divvied 
the money and handed out assignments. The VEP could not come close to giving everyone what 
they asked for, but it tried to be fair. For the NUL, the VEP allocated $5,750 for voter 
registration programs in Winston-Salem, Richmond, and New Orleans. The VEP gave the same 
amount to SNCC programs in several Mississippi counties and Orangeburg, South Carolina. 
CORE received $8,625 for its work in Baton Rouge and Jackson, along with areas of South 
Carolina. The SCLC and NAACP each received the largest amounts, with the SCLC taking 
$11,500 and the NAACP earning $17,250 for programs in Louisiana, Tennessee, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and South Carolina.283 In many cases, the VEP assigned the same locations to multiple 
organizations, directing them to work together and conduct coordinated voter registration 
campaigns. In Jackson, Mississippi, for example, CORE, the NAACP, and SNCC all had plans 
for the area since each group had chapters and field organizers already working there. Instead of 
splitting them up, the VEP asked the three groups to pool their resources. When turning over 
these payments, the VEP also set ground rules. Agencies were required to keep the money in 
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designated bank accounts, log all expenditures, send registration data reports back to the VEP, 
and avoid all partisan activity.284  
After receiving VEP funds and beginning local projects, agencies reported to Branton on 
their progress through field reports. As a research initiative, the VEP required all grantees to 
document their expenditures and registration figures, but it also wanted stories. These reports 
gave the VEP an idea of what was happening on the ground. By the end of July, the VEP had 
received reports from SNCC field workers in Mississippi that chronicled their hardships. 
Compiling these reports into one document, VEP staff wrote that while not many Mississippians 
had registered, “it is very clear from a reading of the field reports…that the groundwork has been 
laid from which should eventually come substantial increases in Negro political participation.” 
SNCC kept field workers in Holly Springs, Greenville, Greenwood, Hattiesburg, and Vicksburg, 
and from each location, field workers documented their experiences trying to convince African 
Americans to register while constantly watching out for whites who meant to do them harm. 
“The resistance techniques of the whites are truly amazing in their versatility,” the VEP 
concluded from SNCC reports. “They range from delaying tactics at the registrar’s offices to the 
beating and jailing of registration workers.” In their reports, SNCC staff wrote about one man 
who had helped them in Greenwood. The police took action against him, arresting him on a 
charge of bigamy, even though he had been living with his partner for 15 years. “It seems likely 
that the sudden interest of the police in this man is directly related to his connection with the 
voter registration activities in Greenwood,” the field workers reported.285 
                                                 
284 Wiley A. Branton, “Conditions Governing Grants,” Voter Education Project, May 1962, Box 138, Folder 1, 
SCLC Papers, King Center.  
 
285 VEP Summary Report, SNCC Program in Mississippi, May 11, 1962-July 31, 1962, Frames 862-863, Reel 176, 
SRC Papers (all quotes).  
 115 
The VEP also received field reports from independent projects during the crash program. 
In North Carolina, the VEP gave $2,500 to the Durham Committee on Negro Affairs (DCNA) to 
reverse a voter purge taking place in the county. All names—black and white—were removed 
from the rolls, and the county allowed re-registration only between April 21 and May 6, 1962. 
The DCNA was in the best position to re-register purged African Americans.286 Elsewhere, the 
VEP funded local campaigns in Atlanta, Raleigh, Tennessee, and Alabama. In Jackson, 
Tennessee, a local movement led by the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) urged 
over 1,500 people to register after knocking on more than 2,500 doors. In Raleigh, a local 
contingent of the National Student Association, an organization of college student governments, 
registered 1,641 people between June 15 and August 3 from a grant worth $1,140. Canvassers 
went door to door asking people to register, and in some cases, they were able to bring deputy 
registrars to register people inside their homes. Across 30 counties, the Alabama State 
Coordinating Association for Registration and Voting (ASCARV), led by NAACP leader 
William C. Patton, used a $1,500 grant to contact 9,371 people—and incredibly for this Deep 
South state—register 1,742 African Americans.287 From various field reports of independent 
organizations drawing on funds, the VEP documented thousands of African Americans who 
registered during the summer crash program of 1962. 
Civil rights leaders sent Branton information about events on the ground. In Sumter, 
South Carolina, James Farmer wrote, CORE efforts alongside a local group had netted over 400 
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registrants. Working with the NAACP in Baton Rouge, CORE helped register 144 people. In 
Baton Rouge, Farmer wrote that working with the NAACP was going well, and that CORE was 
responsible for the south side while the NAACP took charge of the east. Farmer reported that 
CORE’s main methods were canvassing and handing out sample application forms.288 Wyatt Tee 
Walker sent Branton the SCLC’s report. He described efforts in eastern North Carolina, the 
fourth congressional district of Virginia, and parts of Georgia and Tennessee where the SCLC 
worked with local groups and the NAACP. Instead of giving exact figures, he only reported 
“substantial increases” in these areas.289 In another response, SCLC figures for the crash program 
amounted to 7,285 registered African Americans, but the author admitted “cumulative data 
sheets were not kept on each of the areas involved so that no actual enumeration of results is 
possible.”290 With such inaccuracies, and knowing the VEP had to publish its results, Branton 
decided to bring in an expert near the end of the crash program to help with research. 
Branton announced the hiring of Jack Minnis on July 12, 1962, and under Minnis, the 
VEP professionalized its data collection. Minnis was close to completing his PhD in political 
science at Tulane University on New Orleans politics when he joined the VEP. Skilled in 
documenting voting trends and compiling statistics, Minnis became the VEP’s director of 
research and oversaw all data collection carried on by participating organizations—from 
narrative field reports to registration information.291 Most volunteers and staff members within 
the participating agencies were young. They were primarily interested in the fulfilling, yet taxing 
work of canvassing and trying to convince people to register. They had little time to compile 
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lengthy analyses to send back to the VEP. And few, if any, had any type of training in the 
creation of data sets. Minnis and Branton realized the problem, and they encouraged grant 
recipients to send narrative instead of quantitative reports. Some organizations, particularly 
SNCC, latched onto the idea. For the next two years, dozens of SNCC workers in Mississippi, 
Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina sent personal accounts of voter registration work. The 
VEP adapted to conditions on the ground, and in the process, realized that these narrative reports 
conveyed the human experience of the civil rights struggle better than numbers alone. In the 
VEP’s final report, its authors wrote that narrative reports were “not exactly material for 
computer programming, but the stuff of which the movement was made.”292  
The VEP’s crash program ended on July 31, 1962, although reports trickled in for 
months. During those three months, the VEP paid out $64,240 to 12 organizations—five national 
and seven independent. Voter registration campaigns went forward in nearly 100 communities 
across six states. The VEP documented that 28,955 African Americans registered to vote through 
these collective efforts. Granting $64,240 and netting 28,955 new voters was a real achievement 
for southern African Americans.293 
With the crash program behind it, the VEP handed out numerous long-term grants 
extending into March 1963. CORE received $13,800 and was assigned parts of Louisiana, South 
Carolina, and Miami, Florida. The SCLC obtained $15,700 for over a dozen projects in eight 
southern states. For its rural organizing in Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina, SNCC 
received $8,254. The NAACP’s grant was for $22,000 to fund registration work in 56 cities and 
counties across nine states. The NUL received support to carry on projects in Fort Worth, Texas, 
Richmond, Virginia, and Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The VEP funded 12 independent 
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organizations as well, including the Greater Little Rock Voter Registration Movement for 
$1,511.60, Womanpower Unlimited in Mississippi for $1,000, the Dougherty City Voter 
Education League in Georgia for $4,000, and the Jefferson County Voter Registration Campaign 
in Alabama for $9,000. By March 1963, the VEP recorded 125,007 new registrants as a direct 
result from its programs after spending $111,787.60.294 
The VEP in Southwest Georgia and Mississippi 
Two projects that received VEP funding shortly after the crash program were the Albany 
Movement in southwest Georgia and the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) in 
Mississippi. Historians have written about the movements around Albany and Greenwood, 
Mississippi, but without attention to the centrality of the VEP. The VEP helped SNCC and local 
leaders carry on the work in southwest Georgia for years after the media lost interest with the 
departure of Martin Luther King Jr. in the summer of 1962. King regarded Albany as a defeat, 
but the VEP’s continued support ensured that the movement lasted. The VEP was involved in 
COFO from the beginning, acting as the nucleus that brought together activists from SNCC, 
CORE, the SCLC, and the NAACP. Because of VEP support, COFO workers had enough money 
to pay staff salaries and embed themselves in rural communities for over a year.295 
In August 1962, the VEP began funding the Albany Movement. Less than 200 miles 
south of Atlanta, Albany was the economic center of rural southwest Georgia, a land filled with 
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farms, plantations, and sharecropper tenements. A few middle-class African American 
businessmen held some influence, but the majority of African Americans were powerless, spread 
out across thousands of square miles. Many families worked the same land as their ancestors. In 
September 1961, SNCC sent field workers to Albany to live in the black community and help 
them register. Charles Sherrod was among the group, an energetic, Bible-believing Virginian 
who had spent a month in jail after a sit-in in Rock Hill, South Carolina. He was devoted to 
nonviolence, using it as an organizing tool to encourage people to shed their fears. But the 
violence and intimidation that hung in the air around Albany unnerved him: “It took me time to 
understand how to get an old fellow who says, ‘Yassuh,’ ‘Nawsuh,’ while looking down straight 
at the ground” to overcome terror in southwest Georgia, remembered Sherrod.296 
After SNCC field workers moved into Albany and began winning the trust of the black 
community, they joined with local leaders and the NAACP to form the Albany Movement in 
November 1961. The next month, they invited King and the SCLC to join the coalition. King 
brought the national spotlight to Albany, where Laurie Pritchett was waiting. As Chief of Police, 
Pritchett prepared his officers to fight nonviolence with nonviolence, to calmly arrest protestors 
without inciting crowds. “The men were instructed that if they were spit upon, cussed, abused in 
any way of that nature, that they were not to take their billyclubs out,” Pritchett later 
explained.297 After months of protests, arrests, and constant news coverage, King withdrew from 
Albany in August 1962. SNCC workers were convinced that the SCLC’s presence had disrupted 
the local movement in southwest Georgia, and they were determined to pick up the pieces. 
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SNCC remained in Albany after the newsmen packed their cameras and the SCLC moved on to 
Birmingham, but SNCC needed help to sustain the movement. 
Dr. W.G. Anderson, an osteopathic doctor and president of the Albany Movement, 
applied to the VEP for financial assistance. An upcoming registration deadline was set for 
October 1, 1962, Anderson explained to Branton, and he felt the community was on the precipice 
of change. Branton gave the appeal “emergency consideration” and mailed a check for $2,000, 
the first half of a $4,000 grant. The amount was the largest yet for any project. Branton explained 
to Anderson that Albany “offers such an interesting research problem” the VEP must study the 
registration results. In his proposal, Anderson floated the idea of paying field workers by 
commission according to how many people they registered. Branton admired Anderson’s 
ingenuity, but forbid them from doing so because “such a proposal would not set well, in our 
opinion, with Internal Revenue nor with the foundations giving us money.”298  
VEP funds allowed SNCC to expand their operations beyond Albany. Penny Patch, a 
white college student who joined SNCC in southwest Georgia, submitted an early field report to 
the VEP about her experience. “Southwest Georgia is very, very beautiful. It just needs a little bit 
of fixing,” she wrote.299 With VEP assistance, more young activists like Patch joined the 
movement. Jack Chatfield was a white SNCC volunteer focused on voter registration. He went to 
the Terrell County courthouse to read the official voter rolls, but the registrar and a deputy from 
the sheriff’s office would not allow him access. Chatfield and other SNCC workers urged people 
throughout the county to take citizenship classes. They pursued friendships with high school 
students at the all-black Carver High School, but the principle, E.E. Sykes, did not want SNCC 
influencing his students or passing out leaflets on campus. Some churches resisted SNCC’s 
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requests to speak to their congregations, afraid of bomb threats and the possibility that insurance 
companies would not pay if they learned the church hosted registration workshops. Their fears 
were warranted. Three churches were burned during the summer of 1962 in Lee and Terrell 
Counties.300 Rising concerns from the black community discouraged Chatfield, aware that he 
needed registration results to justify more VEP grants. In a December 1962 field report, he 
wrote, “One is obsessed with the feeling that nothing counts. Wiley Branton is looking over one 
shoulder, Sherrod over the other, and one’s own self is perching on one’s head.”301  
By April 1963, organizers saw an improvement in “the tone of feeling in the Negro 
community towards SNCC workers.”302 Many remained wary of SNCC’s tenacious organizing, 
but they noticed a decrease in white harassment. A minister in Terrell County told SNCC worker 
Ralph Allen, “Y’all sure have done a lot ‘round here. Ain’t been no more killings in a long time. 
Used to be ‘bout every week they was shooting someone.”303 In Lee County, Allen and Chatfield 
worked with a team of high school women to canvass neighborhoods. They were bold enough to 
visit their teachers as well, talking with them on their front porches on weeknights and 
Saturdays. Penny Patch paired with a black woman to canvass. “We’d go knocking on doors 
down these dirt roads in Albany,” she reported, “recruiting people to come to mass meetings or 
giving them information about this and that, starting to talk to them about registering to vote.”304 
During March and April 1963, 15 people registered in Lee County, and another 40 in Terrell 
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County.305 “It [was] not easy to get people to register to vote,” Janie Culbreth Rambeau recalled 
about her time with SNCC in southwest Georgia, “because you [had] to convince them that 
voting will bring about a change.”306  
Persuading people was difficult because of the “organized economic tyranny of the 
whites” that kept many black adults from registering, afraid they would lose their jobs if sighted 
at the registrar’s office, Allen wrote in a VEP field report.307 Chatfield, Allen, and others heard 
that whites in towns across southwest Georgia swapped information, keeping each other 
informed about which African Americans were aligning with SNCC. Mildred Beasely, an 
elementary teacher in Terrell County, had applied to register back in 1961. Her superintendent 
somehow heard, and he passed word that he would fire her if she did not rescind her application. 
Not wanting to lose her job, she withdrew her application before it could be processed. “I felt 
that if I did not get my application back, I would lose my teaching job as a result,” she told 
Chatfield.308 Stories like these were common, and even though SNCC’s popularity rose in the 
region, many people felt they could not register for fear of losing their job. 
Even with VEP support, financial limitations persisted. In February 1963, Sherrod 
reported to Branton that money was low and he and other SNCC activists might need to resort to 
odd jobs to make ends meet: “Of course we don’t mind that work; we have done it before, but 
the money from the V.E.P., permits us to work under less tension and anxiety concerning the 
essential elements of life.”309 Allen included in his field report, “One final thing…we need gas 
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money.”310 While the numbers of registered voters in southwest Georgia remained low, Branton 
and Dunbar were impressed by SNCC’s work. Although the VEP could not always give the 
requested amount, it funded the project through 1964. 
As activists in southwest Georgia continued to receive VEP support, they wanted to do 
more than canvass and help people register. They wanted to march in the street, sit-in at 
restaurants that denied service to blacks, and stage nonviolent demonstrations. But they could not 
use VEP funds for these activities, and so “a request was made by the SNCC Southwest Georgia 
Project Director to break its contract with VEP. This request was accepted.”311 Activists 
supplemented their voter registration work in July and August with direct action campaigns in 
Albany, but by September, they ended these protests and once again focused on registration. But 
having disassociated with the VEP, even though on friendly terms, SNCC’s work in the area 
diminished. On March 3, 1964, Don Harris and Worth Long, two SNCC leaders, visited Branton 
at the VEP office with a written proposal for renewed sponsorship. They wanted to concentrate 
on Lee, Sumter, and Terrell Counties, convinced that locals would register in large numbers if 
SNCC had greater resources to reach them and transport them to the registrar’s office. Their 
ambition and strategy impressed Branton, and he awarded them $2,000 for two months. Branton 
was excited to renew the relationship with SNCC’s southwest Georgia project, believing the data 
accumulated from such a long-term mission was valuable for the VEP’s study. A week after the 
VEP sent the money, Randolph Blackwell, the VEP’s field director, visited the SNCC project, 
staying long enough to watch a 20-block registration parade, attend a mass meeting, and hear 
about how 345 people had registered since the new year.312  
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Registering people in southwest Georgia was no easier in 1964 than it had been in 1962. 
Although much of the “financial burden [had] been alleviated since VEP…accepted our 
proposal,” Don Harris reported, segregationist whites pushed back against the renewed 
grassroots campaign.313 Some resistance was passive, but effective. On Saturday, March 22, 
many people arrived at the Terrell County courthouse to find three out of four doors locked and 
the registration testing room relocated to another part of the building. They had received official 
notices earlier about where to go, but the confusion wasted time and prevented many of them 
from taking the test.314 Other situations turned ugly. In Americus, SNCC workers reported, “One 
lady had trouble filling out the application card and Sheriff Fred D. Chappell came into the 
registrars office and cursed the lady and told her that she didn’t know what she was voting 
for.”315 Less than a month later in Americus, an organizer who transported people to the 
courthouse went to the restroom, where the local Justice of the Peace, J.W. Southwell, attacked 
him. The irony of the local JP inflicting violence was not lost on the SNCC workers.316 
As resistance mounted, more people went to the registrar’s office in places across 
southwest Georgia. In March 1964, over 200 tried to register in Lee, Sumter, and Terrell counties 
following a VEP grant. The next month, the SCLC, which had returned to Albany on a smaller 
scale led by Andrew Young, registered 459 people by paying for 28 canvassers with VEP funds. 
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The VEP also provided an additional $3,000 to SNCC through September. C.D. King, a local 
black lawyer, ran for Congress in 1964, motivating more people to register and support his 
candidacy. Using high school students to help them canvass, SNCC covered large parts of 
southwest Georgia through the summer and into the fall of 1964.317 
While the VEP assisted the Albany Movement, it also worked closely with COFO in 
Mississippi. With VEP funds, SNCC began organizing in six Delta counties as part of the 
summer 1962 crash program, but few people registered. Branton knew the challenge of white 
supremacy and disfranchisement was perhaps greatest in Mississippi. In May 1961, Dr. Aaron 
Henry, a pharmacist and NAACP leader based in Clarksdale, started COFO to bring together 
civil rights activists in Mississippi who had been working through different organizations. 
Medgar Evers, the NAACP’s Mississippi field director, suggested the VEP fund all voter 
registration work in Mississippi through COFO. As Branton remembered it, the general feeling 
was “perhaps it would be better if everything was coordinated, rather than having each 
organization go its separate way.”318 Mississippi activists suggested that COFO operate as an 
“umbrella organization” that shared grants made by the VEP.319 Branton thought it was a good 
idea, and they met together on August 22 in the basement of a Clarksdale church. Branton 
presided over the meeting where past midnight, the participants “wrote rules, drew territories, 
allotted future funds” and elected SNCC’s Bob Moses as director of voter registration and Henry 
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to serve as COFO president.320 The initial grant to COFO was for $14,000, but over the next year 
that figure mushroomed to well over $50,000, one of the largest grants the VEP ever made.321 
 COFO marked a turning point for Branton and the VEP. Branton became personally 
invested in the project, developing friendships with young and eager registration workers. As a 
result, the VEP became much more than a conduit for funds and research. “From a day to day 
operational standpoint,” Branton recalled, “I treated it [the VEP] as an action group.”322 Leslie 
Dunbar agreed, recalling that he and others in the SRC “always liked the SNCC kids” and were 
later willing to bend the rules at times for them.323 Mississippi captured the full attention of the 
VEP, even as it funded dozens of other projects across the South. 
 With the VEP grant, COFO projects took off across the Mississippi Delta.324 SNCC 
workers embedded themselves in Bolivar, Coahoma, Leflore, Marshall, Sunflower, and 
Washington Counties. Branton and Minnis communicated with Moses, Henry, and other field 
workers about the financial and narrative reports the VEP required. The VEP soon discovered 
that field workers often did not consider filing reports to be a high priority. Minnis wrote to 
Moses in early September listing instructions for the forms to fill out: “It is absolutely essential 
for our research purposes that these forms be properly filled out and mailed to us no later than 
the tenth of each month.”325 The same day, Branton sent Henry a check for $4,000 and promised 
to send COFO another $2,000 at the beginning of each month thereafter to pay salaries and other 
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expenses.326 Branton, Dunbar, and Minnis realized that field workers were busy doing important 
work, but wanted to make sure COFO staffers knew they needed to account for their funding. 
“We are not trying to hustle you unduly,” Minnis wrote Moses to remind him of an upcoming 
due date for a monthly report, “nor are we implying that you might neglect such mundane 
matters as reporting in favor of the more interesting problem of staying alive in Mississippi.”327 
Many of SNCC’s reports were grand in vision but lacking in detail. Minnis wrote Moses again in 
mid-October asking COFO workers to record all registration attempts, even if the number was 
zero: “After all, a VEP-2 [the form recording registration statistics] full of goose eggs tells an 
eloquent story in itself.”328  
VEP funds were critical to COFO. In its October financial report, COFO documented the 
salaries for all 15 of its field workers. Each was paid 25 dollars per week, a paltry sum, but an 
amount that allowed everyone to work full-time.329 SNCC members saved money by staying 
with locals and sharing meals, drawing on the generosity of friends. Through November 9, the 
VEP had granted $10,000 to COFO, which the organization used to pay salaries, buy two cars, 
cover multiple bails, and compensate lawyers who represented them in court.330 But COFO 
reports back to the VEP were inconsistent. On November 20, Branton wrote Moses, “We realize 
how busy you are” but you must “take time off from your other important activities and see to it 
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that these reports are sent to us.”331 Nine days later, he wrote Moses again: “I feel that I must 
impress upon you again the fact that this is primarily a research project and we simply cannot 
make grants to those who ignore duties.”332 Perhaps believing he was too harsh, Branton was 
conciliatory in a letter on December 6, telling Moses, “I hope that you do not feel that we have 
lost faith in you or COFO but we simply must get back on the right track in order for us to carry 
on effectively.”333 Moses was far from disinterested in the VEP, but when his field workers were 
being harassed, he prioritized events on the ground.  
After Branton and Minnis stressed the need for documentation, SNCC field workers 
began sending in more field reports in a narrative style that chronicled their everyday challenges, 
serving as much as personal journal entries as data about disfranchisement. Charles McLaurin 
sent a field report about his time in Sunflower County. Along with Charlie Cobb and Landy 
McNair, McLaurin spent one of his first days in Ruleville walking around the community and 
meeting people: “We would ask questions about the Plantations and cotton, about the schools, 
parks, paved streets, stop signs at intersections and police brutality.” These were topics that 
mattered to residents, and SNCC workers encouraged them to try to register and vote as acts of 
resistance that could bring change to the area. On September 10, 1962, four days after an 
energetic mass meeting, unknown assailants fired gunshots into the home where McLaurin lived, 
then shot at another house, injuring two girls getting ready for school. The community was so 
shaken by the shooting that attendance at mass meetings plummeted and people avoided SNCC. 
They told McLaurin “that if we [SNCC] had not come to Ruleville all this wouldn’t have 
happened.” For the rest of the month, McLaurin, Cobb, and McNair tried to repair relationships 
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by helping locals chop wood and pick cotton. Their efforts paid off, and the community 
embraced the SNCC workers. McLaurin transported people to Indianola to register, helped them 
sign up for welfare benefits, and worked to find food and winter clothing to pass out. Fannie Lou 
Hamer moved to Ruleville, who McLaurin noted “was a very good singer and she can do most 
anything…we feel that she will play a big part in getting people from the plantation to 
register.”334 Because of McLaurin’s report, and several others, the VEP learned much about 
disfranchisement and white supremacy in Sunflower County. 
Not every field report to the VEP was upbeat. Many, like one from Charlie Cobb 
reporting on the situation in Greenville from December 9-15, 1962, were downcast, reflecting the 
hard grind of the registration project. “This week has been really slow,” Cobb opened. Only one 
person had attempted to register. “Voter registration wise,” Cobb wrote, “we have done next to 
nothing this past week…Trying to deal with all this APATHY here in Greenville is much more 
frustrating than the fear one finds in the rural areas.” But even without results, Cobb pressed on. 
Since few people were willing to register, he started collecting statements from residents 
explaining why they were unwilling to try. He sent these to the VEP, providing more data about 
disfranchisement for the project’s records.335 But combined with COFO’s efforts across 11 
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counties in Mississippi, Cobb’s work was paying off. Moses reported to Branton that over 1,100 
people had tried to register since May, although only a few had succeeded.336 
In December, COFO organizers had also collected and distributed food and clothing to 
the poor along with voter registration work. Jack Minnis visited Mississippi in January and 
observed the lines of people waiting for supplies while COFO workers had them fill out forms 
indicating their registration status. For those not registered, SNCC activists asked if they would 
be willing to try. Some said they would try right away, willing to march down to the courthouse 
“while their bundle is being prepared.”337 When Branton read COFO financial reports suggesting 
that VEP money was being used for food and clothes for the poor, he was troubled. If the IRS 
heard, the VEP’s tax-exemption might be revoked. According to Branton, he voiced his 
frustrations to Moses, who simply replied, “I know, Wiley. But what can you do when you’re 
faced with all those people standing in line?” Branton answered, “All right, but don’t document 
it! Don’t put it in the reports.”338 Branton bent the rules for SNCC working through COFO in 
Mississippi, understanding that what was happening in Mississippi was unique. But Branton was 
concerned with the well-being of the VEP, which was funding projects all over the South and 
registering far greater numbers in other locations. Minnis had visited once, and now Branton sent 
the VEP’s newest member, Randolph Blackwell, to find out what was going on with COFO.339 
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While driving on the highway to Greenwood, along with Moses and Tougaloo College 
student Jimmy Travis, Blackwell’s vehicle was attacked by white vigilantes. After following for 
miles, the a Buick pulled alongside and three white men opened fire. They shot at least 13 
rounds, and while Moses and Blackwell escaped harm, one bullet grazed Travis’s head and 
another lodged in his spine. In a later affidavit, Travis recalled, “I felt something burn my 
ear…They had opened fire on us…it sounded like a machine gun. I yelled out that I had been 
shot, as I let go of the wheel. Moses grabbed hold of the wheel and brought the car to a stop on 
the shoulder of the highway. I was scared.”340 Blackwell and Moses brought Travis to the 
hospital in Greenwood where doctors patched him up, but told the group he needed to go to 
Jackson to have the bullet removed. The next morning doctors at the University Hospital in 
Jackson removed a .45 caliber bullet from the top of Travis’s spine without using anesthesia.341   
As soon as he learned about the shooting and Blackwell barely escaping injury, Branton 
was infuriated, but as angry as he was, he sensed an opportunity for the VEP and COFO. He got 
in touch with leaders of the NAACP, SCLC, CORE, and SNCC to let them know what 
happened. He suggested that each group come to Greenwood and work through COFO to build 
the registration movement. Everyone agreed, and Greenwood became the civil rights 
movement’s ground-zero almost overnight. Branton fired off a telegram to President Kennedy 
and the Attorney General: “This is but the latest of these vicious assaults against registration 
workers and applicants in Mississippi. This cannot longer be tolerated. We are accordingly today 
announcing a concentrated, saturation campaign to register every qualified Negro of Leflore 
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County.”342 He sent a copy to the New York Times, hoping to capture the attention of the national 
media.343 Branton later remembered, “It seemed to be the only way to answer this kind of 
violence: instead of letting up, to pour it on; instead of backing out, to move more people 
in…and that if anything was going to happen at all, there was going to be increased activity.”344  
During March and April 1963, the VEP played an activist role in the Greenwood 
movement. Branton, Minnis, and Blackwell each spent time in Leflore County. For all of 
COFO’s work since the summer of 1962 in Greenwood, only around 250 African Americans 
were registered out of a total black population of 13,567.345 The VEP had already spent a good 
amount in Mississippi with little registration to show for it, but Branton wanted to see the result 
of a concentrated campaign in Greenwood. The VEP paid around 20 local people 10 dollars per 
week to canvass neighborhoods. “For the first time in a Mississippi,” Branton wrote in a press 
release, “there has been a breakthrough of the fear which has held Negroes back.”346 
As the movement gained traction, so too did violent responses. By the end of March, 
Greenwood appeared to be a “major disaster area,” with the police out in full force against the 
black community.347 The COFO office was burned, white mobs and police attacked African 
Americans on the street, and the local newspaper published the names and addresses of those 
attempting to register. Several marches through town provoked police officers to loose dogs on 
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the crowd resulting in several injuries, one being Reverend Donald L. Tucker, an African 
Methodist Episcopal pastor.348 More churches joined the movement and attendance at mass 
rallies increased, one local man recording at least 450 people packed inside a small church 
building on one occasion.349 At that rally, Branton spoke to the crowd and “brought the house 
down” after he refuted reports that outside agitators were responsible for the chaos.350 By the end 
of March, the VEP noted that at least 513 local people had attempted to register, but later 
evidence pushed that figure higher to around 1,300.351 
DOJ and FBI indifference toward Greenwood annoyed Branton, but he kept pushing, and 
federal officials eventually sued the city of Greenwood. John Doar had been in Mississippi along 
with at least six FBI agents, but their work was mostly litigation and observation, not direct 
involvement.352 In a telegram to Robert Kennedy, Branton tried to elicit some response from the 
federal government: “Will you please inform me as to what steps will be taken to aid these 
citizens.”353 The telegram and increased media attention had an effect, and on March 30, the DOJ 
filed suit against Greenwood. Scheduled for a district federal court hearing on April 2, DOJ 
lawyers intended to order city officials to release eight registration workers in jail, cease “further 
interference with a registration campaign,” and allow “Negroes to exercise their constitutional 
right to assemble…and protect them from whites who might object.”354 VEP staff, COFO 
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workers, and the black community were elated, believing this to be the first time the federal 
government had stepped in to protect black registration activities. At a mass meeting, Branton 
told his audience, “it’s the greatest thing the President of the United States can do to let the world 
know we believe in democracy.”355  
But a week later, the DOJ cut a deal with Greenwood’s white officials and abandoned the 
voter registration movement. Doar met Branton to break the news a few hours before the federal 
trial was to begin in Greenville. Branton was devastated, and he later remembered the DOJ’s 
decision to abandon Greenwood “cause[d] us to develop some very bitter attitudes toward the 
role of the Justice Department. We thought that they had really sold us out.”356 Branton pleaded 
with Burke Marshall to do something, to no effect. The deal called for eight registration workers 
to be released from jail and for a promise from city officials to stop harassing people. 
Mississippi’s two Senators, James Eastland and John Stennis, had both denounced the DOJ’s 
lawsuit against Greenwood. Wary of losing southern Democrat supporters and frightened of 
igniting a race war, the Kennedys decided not to pursue the lawsuit. Receiving a light 
punishment, white officials were emboldened. Branton tried to get the city commissioners to 
hold up their end of the bargain by stopping the harassment of voter applicants, but they made no 
promises.357  
The Greenwood movement did not end with the DOJ’s decision, but it never recovered 
its momentum. Days later, national attention shifted to Birmingham, where the SCLC-led 
mobilization campaign provoked police to spray water hoses and turn dogs loose against 
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nonviolent demonstrators. The Greenwood movement was all but forgotten, except by those who 
stayed in Mississippi. Branton began at once to create a new plan to build off of COFO’s work. 
Around the time when the Greenwood movement had peaked, Branton wrote Aaron Henry, 
“Obviously, we cannot continue to maintain such a heavy financial program for one county 
[Leflore] for any long period.”358 A month after the DOJ’s desertion, Robert Moses visited 
Branton in the VEP’s Atlanta office to plan a new budget for COFO through September. For five 
months, the VEP agreed to pay COFO regular installments of $1,775, totaling $8,875. The funds 
supplemented the modest salaries of field workers in Greenwood, Greenville, and Holly Springs, 
in addition to paying for office supplies, utility bills, and food.359 The total amount was more 
than the average grant to any one project, and it demonstrated the VEP’s sympathy for 
Mississippi. But the pragmatic Branton knew the VEP could not continue to sink money into 
Mississippi indefinitely. After working out the budget with Moses, he wrote Henry, “I pointed 
out to him [Moses] the serious need for us to cut back immediately on all Mississippi 
expenditures.”360  
 In November 1963 with the VEP grant to COFO coming to a close, Branton made the 
difficult choice to stop funding projects in Mississippi, except for a small NAACP effort in 
Jackson. Branton summarized the decision for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, stating that 
the VEP tried to be equitable with its grants for projects across the South, but that “expenditures 
in Mississippi were heavily out of proportion, while the registration results were extremely low,” 
totaling 3,228. He blamed the DOJ for the VEP’s exit. Until the DOJ “is able to win an effective 
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decree” to dismantle disfranchisement laws, Branton wrote, “it seemed best to the Voter 
Education Project staff to expend our resources in other states.”361 He later remembered, “I 
hoped also that our actions would spur the Justice Department to recognize that it needed to do 
more.”362  
 Some SNCC workers who had been a part of COFO were upset. They suspected that the 
VEP left because of the SNCC Freedom Vote, a mock election to demonstrate the desire for 
black Mississippians to register, which began a week before the VEP made the announcement. 
Marion Berry thought the VEP “stopped the grants because we just wouldn’t do some of the 
things they wanted us to do…particularly around the political organizing, like the Freedom 
Vote.”363 Even though VEP funds had never been extravagant and filing reports had often been 
inconvenient, many had come to rely on VEP support. Other civil rights organizations had come 
to view SNCC workers as frugal over the years. With this opinion of SNCC in mind, the VEP 
did not think cutting its funding would necessarily disable the Mississippi movement. Recalling 
the VEP’s decision years later, Dunbar said, naively, “SNCC was living off the land and having 
money was not a big thing, I didn’t think.”364  
Sustaining the Movement 
While the VEP invested in COFO, the Albany Movement, and other independent groups, 
it often struggled with the NAACP’s national office and the SCLC. Roy Wilkins remained 
skeptical of the VEP, yet the NAACP produced high registration totals because of its long-
established network of southern branches. After receiving inadequate reporting from the NAACP 
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in 1962, Branton met with Dr. John A. Morsell, Wilkins’s executive secretary, to impress on him 
the need for branches to produce detailed reports.365 Morsell passed the message along, and 
NAACP reports to the VEP improved. But Dunbar remembered the “NAACP was a problem all 
the way” because it’s leadership did not like being tethered to the VEP’s policies.366  
The SCLC’s relationship with the VEP was worse. In 1963, the VEP initiated a 
“temporary cutoff” of funds to the SCLC until it could account for its finances.367 During a 
meeting at the Ford Foundation on February 6, King asked Branton if the SCLC was sending all 
of the information the VEP needed. Branton seized on the chance to bring up the fact that the 
SCLC’s reports were faulty and “in a state of suspension” until it could account for prior 
funding. King “expressed great concern over this problem” and promised to look into it.368 
Branton had Minnis prepare a detailed summary of the SCLC’s lack of communication with the 
VEP and forwarded it to King. To date, Minnis found, the SCLC had sent only three reports to 
the VEP, and those were deficient and confusing. After studying these reports, Minnis found the 
SCLC to be disorganized in several states, lacking in leadership at the local level, and 
unconcerned with following the VEP’s policies.369 Minnis’s account passed to Andrew Young, 
the SCLC’s leader of the Citizenship Education Program, who was displeased with its findings. 
He wrote Minnis, “There were several things that disturbed me about the report, but mainly it 
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was what I’ll call your ‘cruel objectivity.’”370 Young had thought of the VEP as a partner in the 
struggle and was caught off guard when it cut off funds for lack of requisite accounting. He 
blamed the situation on poll taxes, literacy tests, workers who did not know how to research 
properly, and closed registration books in many counties. But by the end of the letter, he had 
become more apologetic. “There is really no excuse for the reporting of finances the way they 
were reported to you,” Young wrote. “This is strictly my inadequacy.”371 According to Dunbar, 
“In administering the voter project, we had our biggest trouble with SCLC. They weren’t any 
good at voter registration. They wanted money for their own uses, and we had a couple of tense 
times with them.”372 Out of these negative experiences with the NAACP and SCLC, the VEP 
built up its relationships with independent agencies. “We started more or less eliminating the 
involvement with the national organizations,” Branton later recalled.373  
 One such independent partnership was with the Non-Partisan Voters Registration 
Coordinating Committee in Charlotte, North Carolina. In September 1963, the VEP granted 
$1,000 to the Committee and its leader, Dr. Reginald A. Hawkins, a dentist and energetic leader 
of the Mecklenburg Organization on Political Affairs, for a 30-day registration campaign. 
Describing the group’s tactics for registering students from Johnson C. Smith University and 
residents in West Charlotte, Hawkins told the Charlotte Observer, “We’re using a fan-out 
technique of catching people on the street and asking them to register.”374 In a field report to the 
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VEP, Hawkins documented that between September 16 and November 9, the Committee 
registered 1,051 African Americans. In February 1964, the VEP answered Hawkins’s application 
for more money with an additional $3,000 through May, allowing the Committee to pay bills for 
rent, telephone, heat, water, and electricity, as well as for supplies, an office secretary, and 
salaries to canvassing workers at 50 dollars per week.375 
Another notable VEP partnership was with Voters of Texas Enlist (VOTE)—the project 
that registered the most people during the first VEP. When the VEP launched in March 1962, 
Branton did not expect to fund many projects in Texas, where annual poll taxes were still 
required. But in July 1963, Blackwell attended a conference in Dallas organized by the Texas 
Democratic Coalition, and after hearing plans of voter registration across the Lone Star State, 
recommended that the VEP get involved. The Democratic Coalition was a liberal organization 
founded in 1962 to bring together African Americans, Latinos, union members, and white 
liberals to wrest control of the Texas Democratic Party away from conservatives. Larry 
Goodwyn, the Coalition’s executive director, led a motion to create a non-partisan voter 
registration wing of the Coalition at the Dallas convention. On November 9, Texas citizens 
would vote on a referendum to outlaw the poll tax, and the Coalition wanted to register as many 
people as possible beforehand. The Coalition had two goals: strike down the poll tax and conduct 
a massive registration campaign. They asked Blackwell to address the convention, and he 
“related some experiences in voter registration efforts in other Southern states where it isn’t as 
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easy to qualify to vote as it is in Texas.”376 The Coalition approved Goodwyn’s idea, and the 
group created VOTE.377 
 The day after the Coalition chartered VOTE, it requested support from the VEP based on 
Blackwell’s recommendation. Nell Goodwyn, the Coalition’s finance chair, explained that 
VOTE “will be for voter education only, and not in behalf of any political candidate or partisan 
political issue.”378 Always concerned with tax-exemption, Branton was cautious not to rush. By 
itself, VOTE was non-partisan, but it was part of the openly political Democratic Coalition. And 
part of its strategy before November 9 was to help people pay their poll taxes of $1.50 or $1.75, 
something the VEP could not do. After thinking it over for a month, Branton agreed to finance 
VOTE, as long as it accounted for its finances and used VEP money only for voter education, 
never poll taxes. The VEP gave VOTE a $3,500 grant in August 1963.379 
After receiving the grant, Goodwyn explained VOTE’s strategy for voter registration. 
The plan hinged on motivating thousands of block workers to join together from the four legs of 
the Coalition—African Americans, Latinos, white liberals, and labor unions. In a 1960 
registration campaign in Houston, local activists tested the model with some success, using 1,800 
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block workers to usher 42,000 registered African Americans to vote. By coordinating mass 
meetings across the state, local leaders would bring together motivated community members and 
have them sign pledge cards to become block workers in the upcoming election. Each block 
worker was responsible for 20 people. Block workers would meet their assigned people, share 
literature, and make sure they voted on Election Day. Using IBM computers to crunch polling 
data, VOTE coordinated volunteers—“generally women”—to compile lists of 20 names for 
block workers, usually within their neighborhood.380 “The blockworker program is extremely 
complex,” Goodwyn admitted to Branton, “involving the transfer of thousands of names from 
poll tax lists to 3x5 cards, reshuffling the cards by street address, breaking them down into 
groups of 20 to be given to individual blockworkers.”381 But for such a massive state in both 
population and geography, VOTE believed this was their best hope to beat the poll tax. Always 
looking for new tactics to study, the VEP was eager to see what happened in Texas.  
During September and October, as VOTE worked to raise enough block workers before 
November 9, it went back to the VEP for more funding. VOTE’s objective was to commit 
12,000 block workers and register 240,000 people, lofty goals that required more money. The 
AFL-CIO and wealthy liberals donated to VOTE, but it needed a bigger financial commitment 
from the VEP. Demonstrating its belief in the project, the VEP committed an additional $10,500 
in September and another $10,000 in October. With bills piling up, Goodwyn worried about the 
project collapsing before Branton called in October to let him know more dollars were on the 
way: “I’m afraid a bit of despair was creeping into my mind. So, your call was most timely. I feel 
like a vast weight has been lifted.”382 With the influx of cash, Branton warned Goodwyn again 
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about the VEP’s delicate tax-exemption: “You mentioned the fact that perhaps the Texas 
Coalition could contribute to a campaign regarding the poll tax but since these are partisan 
matters we [VEP] cannot be involved.”383 VEP funds could be used for staff salaries, printing 
costs, stuffing envelopes, paying bills, and supplying VOTE’s on-the-ground block workers. 
Goodwyn promised to keep funding separate, letting Branton know that political events were 
heating up: “The election continues to look like a cliffhanger. The other side is now openly 
organizing against us—elements of the Republican party, and the business community.”384 
The week before the referendum, VOTE stepped up its organizing. VOTE recruited 
Martin Luther King Jr. to write a letter to Texas voters urging them to the polls on November 9. 
“In the Delta of Mississippi, in Alabama, in Southwest Georgia, in so many places, we cannot 
vote,” King explained. “You can vote. And your vote on Saturday can free thousands of your 
brothers to vote in the future.”385 Goodwyn wrote block workers the week before with 
instructions for moving their 20 people to the polling places. This coming Saturday, Goodwyn 
wrote his volunteers, “The job you will be doing this week is the most important political work 
you have ever done in your life.”386 By the time of the referendum, VOTE had not met its 12,000 
block worker goal, but managed to recruit around 9,000 people. For weeks they had canvassed 
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neighborhoods, encouraged their 20 people, and attended mass rallies. Turnout was high, but not 
high enough.387 
The referendum on November 9 did not pass, and the 61-year old poll tax law remained 
in effect. Although 243,445 voted to repeal the poll tax, 316,008 voted to keep it in place. 
Goodwyn was disappointed, but he tried to find a silver lining. The block worker program was 
successful, having encouraged grassroots participation in an off-year election. But Goodwyn 
believed the repeal failed because the other three legs of the Texas Coalition did not pull equal 
weight to the African American contingent. Racism continued to plague the AFL-CIO, and while 
its leaders campaigned to end the poll tax, most local unions were indifferent to forging alliances 
with African Americans and Latinos. While an average of about 40 percent of registered voters 
turned out in black precincts across the state, only 15 to 20 percent of Latino, white liberal, and 
labor voters cast a ballot. The VEP was disappointed in the results. Branton wrote Goodwyn four 
days after the referendum, “Even though we cannot support partisan politics I think it is no secret 
that we were all hoping that the poll tax would be outlawed in Texas.”388 
 After the sting of defeat wore off, VOTE decided to renew its voter registration campaign 
through the end of January with a goal of registering over 300,000 African Americans and 
Latinos. They intended to make use once again of the block worker program after witnessing its 
effectiveness in the lead-up to the referendum. With a budget of $37,000, VOTE received 
$10,000 from the Texas AFL-CIO and more from a few private donors, “but the Lord only 
knows where the remaining $10,000 will come from, unless it is from the V.E.P.,” pleaded 
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Goodwyn.389 On December 26, Branton sent Goodwyn a check for $10,000, and VOTE spent the 
next month prodding its block workers to register as many people as possible. They worked in 22 
urban areas and two rural sites, 80 counties in all. During the last week of the campaign, the last 
state needed to ratify the Twenty-Fourth Amendment did so, outlawing the poll tax in the United 
States. Even though the poll tax held up on November 9, it was now a moot point. Once again, 
VOTE extended its program, this time through March 6 coming at the end of a special 30-day 
registration period initiated by the state government. The VEP supplied more money, and while 
VOTE did not hit its 300,000 goal, it oversaw the registration of a record number of African 
Americans and Latinos in Texas. From September 1963 through March 6, 1964, approximately 
268,000 registered as a direct result of VOTE organizing. VOTE was the most successful 
program in the VEP’s history. In his final report, Goodwyn thanked Branton for the VEP’s 
crucial support: “There are so many thousands of block workers who will never know the role 
SRC and VEP played in the VOTE effort.”390 
 As the VEP worked with VOTE, national organizations, and independent groups, its staff 
underwent several changes. The VEP’s first major shake-up came with a firing. Jack Minnis had 
revolutionized the VEP’s research protocols since he joined in July 1962, and he was responsible 
for improving the quality of field reporting from partner agencies. With his help, the VEP was 
well on its way to collecting a rich archive of materials on disfranchisement. Minnis also visited 
projects and reported on them to Branton. On August 14, 1963, he went to Plaquemine, 
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Louisiana to study CORE’s registration work in the area. A week earlier, around 20 registration 
workers had been arrested, and activists from the area met to plan a demonstration in front of the 
Iberville Parish jail. Minnis attended and advised the demonstrators to demand the release of the 
workers because their incarceration impeded voter registration activities. Minnis’s counsel in 
Plaquemines alarmed Branton, who interpreted his actions as provocative. He wrote Minnis, “I 
shudder at the thought of the ‘suggestions’ which you made at the meeting…VEP staff members 
simply should not make any suggestions regarding demonstrations of any kind, including those 
having to do with voter registration activities, particularly where arrests are likely to result.”391 
Branton was always cautious about the VEP’s tax-exempt status, and any breach of the 
agreement endangered the VEP. As Minnis later remembered, the SRC fired him for 
“unspeakable political things.”392 Minnis soon joined SNCC and set up its research department.  
With only Branton, Blackwell, and administrative assistant Jean Levine, the VEP staff 
was too small for the size of the operation. When the Council for United Civil Rights Leadership 
(CUCRL) drafted Branton to oversee their meetings and finances (see chapter four), he hired 
Vernon Jordan, Dunbar’s assistant, to be the VEP’s Acting Assistant Director starting in 
September 1963.393 With Minnis gone, the VEP still needed help. In early 1964, Branton hired 
Barbara Whittaker, John Due, and Weldon Rougeau to assist in field operations. He also brought 
in two additional employees to help run the office, Janet Shortt and Barbara Stewart. Whittaker 
graduated from Spellman College and earned a Master’s degree in social work from Atlanta 
University, where she taught before the VEP hired her as a research assistant. John Due was a 
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young lawyer from Florida who worked as an intern. The VEP was already acquainted with 
Rougeau after his successful organizing in Miami for CORE over the past year and a half, and 
Branton contracted him to travel and report on local registration campaigns. All together, the 
VEP remained a small organization set within the larger SRC, but added others to meet the 
demand of grant requests.394 
By the end of 1963, the VEP made grants totaling $382,003, and its affiliates had 
registered 327,588 people.395 With projects across the South going ahead, the VEP was 
determined to continue its work through October 1964, just before Election Day. The Taconic 
Foundation, the Field Foundation, and the Stern Family Fund had guaranteed funding only 
through March 1964, but with seven months remaining until the election, the VEP wanted to ride 
the wave of political enthusiasm that came during presidential campaign cycles to maximize 
black voter registration. Many states also held longer hours in registrar offices during primary 
season and during the months before the general election. And, after one and a half years, 
enough states had ratified the Twenty-Fourth Amendment in January 1964, eliminating the poll 
tax. For these reasons, the VEP believed that black registration could reach new heights in 1964.  
Branton first wrote to the trustees of the Stern Family Fund to ask for an additional 
$100,000 for the VEP’s final year. The Fund had given $124,000 during the last two years, and 
Branton had kept in touch with its leadership by providing details on how grantees used the 
money. A month after Branton’s request, the Fund granted $20,000 to the VEP, and in February 
1964, gave an additional $55,000 for the VEP’s last year. David Hunter, the Stern Family Fund’s 
executive director, wrote Branton with the good news, indicating that the board of trustees hoped 
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the VEP would concentrate in urban areas to increase the numbers of black registrants before 
year’s end. Branton made no promises, since the VEP was involved in many rural areas, but 
thanked Hunter for the foundation’s generosity.396 
On January 8, 1964, Leslie Dunbar wrote on behalf of the VEP to request additional 
funding from the Field Foundation and Taconic Foundation. In his letter to Maxwell Hahn of the 
Field Foundation, he described the VEP’s ambitions for the remainder of the year and requested 
$125,000. “Voting is not a panacea,” Dunbar wrote, “Yet it is unmistakably the indispensable 
pre-condition to all other civic advance.”397 Three months later, the Field Foundation’s trustees 
voted to grant the VEP $75,000, not the full amount requested, but a sizeable check.398 Dunbar’s 
letter to Stephen Currier was similarly worded, and since the Taconic Foundation had been the 
VEP’s principal supporter from the beginning with its $250,000 grant, the VEP requested 
$150,000 for its final year.399 Currier did not inform the VEP of its funding decision until April, 
and in the meantime, both Dunbar and Branton wrote Currier again clarifying the VEP’s aims for 
the year, expressing how crucial it was to have a boost in funding. The VEP was unable to 
finance several local registration campaigns in early 1964 for fear of depleting its bank account. 
On April 22, Currier informed Dunbar that the Taconic trustees had voted to award the VEP with 
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$80,000, and the Foundation left the door open to additional funds later in 1964 should the VEP 
require. The VEP entered into its final stretch with financial security.400 
The Final Stretch 
Within the civil rights movement, 1964 was a pivotal year. President Lyndon B. Johnson 
became President after Kennedy’s assassination in November 1963, and he spent much of 1964 
working to pass a civil rights bill. On July 2, after surviving a two-month filibuster, Johnson 
signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. Months earlier, SNCC launched Freedom Summer 
in Mississippi, and three volunteers, James Chaney, Andrew Goodman, and Michael Schwerner, 
were murdered in Neshoba County. At the Democratic National Convention, the Mississippi 
Freedom Democratic Party (MFDP) tried and failed to unseat the whites-only state delegation. 
These events captured national media attention, but in the background, the VEP continued 
supporting local drives throughout the South. 
During January, February, and March 1964, 241,659 people registered through VEP-
sponsored programs, sending the total to 569,247 since March 1962. With help from the VEP, 
which had invested $199,799.98 on Big Five projects and $186,023.23 on independent 
organizations through 1963, indigenous campaigns were successfully registering people across 
the South. For the first time in history, black southern voters topped 2,000,000 people, 
representing about 15 percent of the total southern electorate in 1964.401 
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Dozens of projects across the South contributed to the VEP’s total in 1964. An SCLC 
campaign in Petersburg, Virginia, received $16,000 from the VEP in 1964, using the money to 
pay for office supplies, transportation, radio advertisements, and for babysitters so that more 
adults could canvass neighborhoods.402 In North Carolina, the Citizens Committee of Wilson and 
Wilson County used $500 from the VEP to hire 20 canvassers at the rate of one dollar per hour. 
After a week, Randolph Blackwell noted, their work in Wilson had netted less than 200 new 
registrants, but he felt confident that results would improve.403 In Fort Valley, Georgia, an 
NAACP-led registration drive had capitalized off local anger after the sheriff killed a black man 
in the Peach County jail, with at least 420 registering within two weeks in February.404 While 
projects in Petersburg, Wilson, Fort Valley, and dozens of others were not without their 
problems, VEP aid allowed local leaders to manage registration projects in hopes of increasing 
black political participation 
From April through October, the VEP continued to fund scores of concurrent projects 
throughout the South, until its finances were depleted. During that time, the VEP registered 
another 118,000, bringing the grand registration total of the first VEP from 1962 through 1964 to 
an estimated 688,000. This figure represents the VEP’s attempt to arrive at the most accurate 
representation of its entire project, after taking into account narrative and quantitative reports 
from local communities. Total southern African American registration now stood at 2,174,200, 
nearly 44 percent of those qualified to register, up from around 29 percent just two and a half 
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years earlier. Back when the VEP began its operations, the SRC estimated that black registrants 
in the South likely did not exceed 1,350,000. An increase of nearly 700,000 black voters in less 
than three years is remarkable, especially considering the absence of federal legislation 
protecting the right to vote. The VEP was responsible for one of the most dramatic voter 
increases in American history.405  
The VEP’s impact could be felt in the 1964 presidential election, and its reverberations 
would echo into 1965 with the signing of the Voting Rights Act. Lyndon B. Johnson drubbed 
Barry Goldwater on Election Day, but the South was more competitive. During the week and a 
half following the election, the SRC poured over the results to estimate the effect of the black 
vote. Out of the six southern states Johnson won, according to the SRC’s report, “four clearly 
would have gone Republican had it not been for the Negro vote”—Arkansas, Florida, Tennessee, 
and Virginia.406 In Virginia, for example, the SRC estimated that 166,600 African Americans 
voted, and that the VEP had registered around 78,700 during the previous two years. Since 
Johnson won Virginia by around 77,000 votes, the VEP’s work helped deliver Virginia to 
Johnson. Black voters tipped the scales for Johnson across the South. According to the SRC’s 
research, an estimated 211,800 African Americans voted in Florida, 67,600 in Arkansas, and 
168,400 in North Carolina, all states that Johnson won thanks in part to black support.407  
For the 1964 election, the VEP and the SRC utilized their data to depict the rising 
strength of the black vote. “For the first time in recent history,” according to the SRC report, “the 
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two candidates for the Presidency of the United States offered a clear-cut, opposed view on the 
race issue.”408 The Republicans, long dependent on black support in the South, went with a lily-
white strategy, abandoning its historical ties to African Americans and embracing the racial 
demagoguery of Goldwater and southern segregationists. As more African Americans registered 
in the South, many white conservatives abandoned the Democratic Party. The SRC studied this 
historic shift, optimistic that with the rise of black political power, both parties would eventually 
discard racist tactics and court the African American vote in the future. The prediction was 
wrong, but on the 1964 election, the SRC correctly found that “Democrats and the nation’s 
majority owe a greater debt to the Negro electorate in the South than has so far been 
acknowledged.”409 
Having exhausted its funding, the VEP closed while looking forward to a chance to study 
its data. During the VEP’s last months, Randolph Blackwell and Barbara Whittaker resigned, and 
others began to move on from the VEP. Branton remained through April 1965, using the last of 
the funds to pay his salary and arrange the data. Two journalists with connections to the SRC, 
Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, would spend the next two years combing through the 
information to interpret the results. Their book, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The Arrival of 
Negroes in Southern Politics, released in 1967, served as the first VEP’s final report.410  
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 In his preface to Climbing Jacob’s Ladder, Leslie Dunbar wrote, “The voter registration 
campaign was not the whole of the civil rights movement, but it expressed it all.”411 Bus 
boycotts, sit-ins, Freedom Rides, and other nonviolent actions had spurred the movement 
forward, but what made those actions stick was voter registration. Civil rights demonstrations 
highlighted the injustice of segregation, and by turning their anger toward the pursuit of 
democracy, African Americans secured political privileges that had the potential to reorient 
society. The next year, the President would sign the Voting Rights Act of 1965 into law, made 
possible by the two and a half years of VEP-backed indigenous movements that proved African 
Americans wanted to vote. 
The VEP was crucial, according to Watters and Cleghorn, for it pushed “Negro 
registration off dead center, where it had been for most of the previous decade, and reestablished 
momentum.”412 During the late 1950s and early 1960s, southern black voter registration efforts 
were disorganized and disconnected from each other, having only marginal effects on local 
populations and doing little to challenge white political power. Many saw equal political 
participation as the key to achieving lasting civil rights. Philanthropists, race leaders, and DOJ 
officials came together at an opportune moment in 1961 to put together a plan for a united 
registration effort, one that led to the creation of the VEP and a two and a half year movement 
that reshaped the South. “The money,” the SRC declared, “was perhaps white. Everything else—
the planning, the decision-making, the skills, the devoted and hard work—was Negro.”413  
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CHAPTER 4: ‘BEHIND THE REVOLUTION’: THE COUNCIL FOR UNITED CIVIL 
RIGHTS LEADERSHIP, 1963-1967 
 
 
 On June 12, 1963, in the middle of the night, Mississippi’s NAACP field director, 
Medgar Evers, was shot outside his home in Jackson. One week later, meeting at the lavish 
Carlyle Hotel in Manhattan, 96 philanthropists and corporate executives met in New York City. 
These events appear unrelated, but inspired by Evers’s murder, Stephen Currier of the Taconic 
Foundation—the VEP’s principal backer—used the tragedy to fundraise for the civil rights 
movement. Currier gathered wealthy friends and colleagues from New York’s high society for 
breakfast where invited race leaders, including Martin Luther King Jr., James Farmer, and Roy 
Wilkins, appealed for money. They implored those in the Carlyle ballroom to donate to the 
struggle because their organizations needed money to expand. Their words had an effect, and 
many guests opened their checkbooks. The group collected about $100,000 that morning, and 
they pledged to raise $1,500,000 over the coming year. With this influx of cash, Currier and the 
leaders of the six major civil rights organizations—now commonly referred to as the “Big Six” 
including the National Council of Negro Women (NCNW)—created the Council for United Civil 
Rights Leadership (CUCRL—pronounced “kuck-rul”). They designed CUCRL to bring together 
the leaders of the major civil rights groups under one banner and raise money for the civil rights 
movement beyond voter registration and the VEP.414 
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Many historians mention CUCRL, but similar to their treatment of the VEP, few give the 
group much attention. CUCRL’s marginalization within the historical record is partially 
attributable to CUCRL itself, for members kept their meetings confidential. They met privately 
to coordinate tactics between organizations, discuss ideas, and to the extent that was possible, 
control the civil rights movement. In addition to Currier and his associates with the Taconic 
Foundation, CUCRL included Martin Luther King Jr. for the SCLC, James Farmer of CORE, 
Roy Wilkins representing the NAACP, Whitney Young of the NUL, Dorothy Height from the 
NCNW, and James Forman and John Lewis alternating as representatives for SNCC. Later, Jack 
Greenberg of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) and A. Philip Randolph joined. Beginning 
in February 1963, these leaders met informally at the Taconic Foundation to brainstorm ideas, 
but Evers’s death changed their relationship. Except for the NCNW, these agencies had been 
working together for over a year through the VEP, but the VEP operated independently of each 
and concentrated solely on voter registration in the South. While the VEP could only address 
disfranchisement, the major civil rights groups wanted to do more. Their alliance through 
CUCRL was pivotal in two major ways.415  
First, CUCRL served as a common meeting ground between leaders that held the civil 
rights movement together through broad coalition. Forming the VEP had brought them together 
in 1961, but since its implementation, they had seen less of each other since the VEP financed 
their organizations separately. Currier believed it was worthwhile to come together regularly in 
person. Often meeting in New York, they shared ideas, debated tactics, divvied out money, 
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ironed out grievances, pressured the White House on race issues, and helped plan the March on 
Washington. They listened to different points of view, and they reached compromises. While 
unity was the goal, working through CUCRL intensified conflicts between leaders. Meetings 
were often contentious, with big personalities clashing over major and minor differences. 
Desperate for additional funds, leaders consented to join the group, and although everyone was 
hopeful that their alliance would be mutually beneficial, disagreements plagued CUCRL from 
the beginning. Yet CUCRL bound organizations and its leaders together, creating a collective 
movement for civil rights on the eve of the March on Washington.  
Second, a study of CUCRL illuminates the attempt at top-down management of the civil 
rights movement. With little fanfare, the most powerful race leaders in the United States gathered 
in the same room with white philanthropists about once every four-to-six weeks to try to order 
events on the ground—private meetings “behind the revolution.”416 Malcolm X was one of the 
few alarmed by CUCRL at the time, and while some of his facts were wrong, he pointed out that 
white philanthropic money muted the militancy of the struggle. His criticisms were aimed at the 
1963 March on Washington, but his words highlighted how money influenced the movement. 
CUCRL tried to call the shots of the struggle, and its members used money to impose behavior, 
especially regarding SNCC. CUCRL could not control everything, but this behind-the-scenes 
maneuvering and decision-making helped dictate the course of the movement. From the more 
conservative NAACP, NCNW, and NUL to the more direct action-oriented CORE, SCLC, and 
SNCC, race organizations were tied together through large donations from wealthy whites. 
While the VEP funded registration work across the South, CUCRL tied the civil rights leadership 
together and tried to restrain militant activism within the black freedom movement. 
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 In their memoirs, Dorothy Height and James Forman remembered CUCRL differently. 
Height wrote of it with fondness as a space where “we developed a kind of mutual appreciation 
and respect, an uncommon meeting of minds.”417 But Forman, as a representative of SNCC, felt 
that when he attended a CUCRL meeting, it was as though “we were in a jungle—a jungle of 
civil rights hyenas.”418 Once the money ran out, Forman recounted, he knew CUCRL would 
break apart. He was right, but Height was not altogether wrong, either. Although relationships 
within CUCRL could be both contentious and affable, together, these leaders maneuvered the 
civil rights movement in pivotal ways. 
After a year sponsoring the VEP through the Taconic Foundation, Stephen Currier had 
become familiar with several race leaders, but he wanted to become personally involved in the 
southern movement. Currier believed that the civil rights struggle lacked cooperation between its 
major organizations. He had the idea of bringing together leaders to discuss larger problems of 
racism and civil rights. Too often, leaders and organizations faced these issues on their own, and 
even though each group employed different strategies, everyone had similar goals in mind. 
Currier wrote Roy Wilkins on February 4, 1963 inviting him to the Taconic Foundation office on 
February 18 to discuss “a plan which I should like to tell you about.”419 He also invited Farmer, 
King, Height, Young, and SNCC representatives. Together, they formed a study group—a 
precursor to CUCRL. 
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To hold the assembly together, everyone agreed to abide by certain rules. They consented 
to monthly meetings where only heads of organizations were allowed. No one could send a 
substitute. Since Currier was closest to Whitney Young, he tapped his friend to chair the group. 
To give their meetings substance, the group came up with a list of pressing issues, such as 
education, housing, and the criminal justice system. Each person chose a topic to research and 
present to the group. Everyone took their roles seriously. With this format, members learned 
from each other about multiple problems facing African Americans across the country. They did 
all of this in addition to their responsibilities to their own organizations. The forum was not only 
a time for personal education, but a chance to convince more foundations to support the 
movement through different avenues. “The point of the gathering was to begin to see how 
American philanthropy could be more supportive of black organizations,” recalled Height.420 
They met regularly from February through June 1963, up until the time of Medgar Evers’s death. 
“What was compelling,” remembered Currier’s assistant, Jane Lee Eddy, was simply that 
“everybody got to know each other.”421  
 When Currier heard about Evers’s death, he called Lloyd K. Garrison “to consider what 
might be done to deal with the crisis.”422 He then invited Young, Farmer, King and Wilkins to 
his office to talk about an appropriate response. Over the past four months, the group had shared 
information and ideas, but shaken by the tragedy, Currier was ready to act. In his invitation to 
King, Currier wrote, “As a citizen, I am prepared at this time to exert every effort to rally 
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substantial support from those who have not yet participated in a tangible way in the current 
crisis, as well as the few who have.” Handwritten in the corner, Currier told King, “I cannot 
overemphasize how important I think it that you be with us in this meeting, for your wisdom and 
your immediate participation.”423 Wilkins and Young were the only two who could attend the 
meeting on short notice, and they encouraged Currier to use his influence to win over wealthy 
people to donate to the movement. Currier immediately went to work. He knew that asking for 
money by telephone or letter was too impersonal because people could be noncommittal. In 
person, however, and capitalizing on the outrage over Evers’s murder, gathering people together 
in one room and asking for financial assistance had the potential to create a windfall for civil 
rights groups. In a telegram co-signed by Young, Wilkins, King, Farmer, Height, Greenberg, and 
Garrison, Currier announced an “emergency meeting to assess the situation and develop 
immediate ways and means for constructive and coordinated action.”424 Currier booked a 
ballroom in the Carlyle Hotel on East 76th Street the week after Evers’s death, and he invited 
over 100 philanthropists and corporate executives to attend a special breakfast to hear directly 
from activists. Race leaders were impressed with Currier’s organizational skills and genuine 
concern for the movement: “Currier really understands what is going on,” two of them told 
journalist Reese Cleghorn.425 After all of the invitations were sent, Currier had convinced 96 
people to attend the breakfast meeting. “Many people he [Currier] talks to are just ashamed of 
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some of the things happening in the South, and in the North,” Cleghorn reported.426 Playing on 
their guilt, Currier brought them into the Carlyle Hotel.427 
 On the morning of June 19, 1963 in the Carlyle Hotel, many of the wealthiest men in 
New York gathered to hear Martin Luther King Jr., Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, and other 
leaders speak about the civil rights movement. Although they covered different topics, the 
central message was the same: we need more money. These affluent men empathized with 
African Americans in the South, but they lived in a world apart, not quite grasping their plight, 
nor understanding the toll of Jim Crow on everyday life. The speakers tried to make them see 
black struggles more clearly. As the only woman in the group, Dorothy Height shared how many 
black women were imprisoned in the South and how police abused them. “At the end of the 
discussion,” recalled Height, “Whitney Young made it plain that all of us knew more about what 
needed to be done and how to do it than our resources would allow. ‘We are all hurting,’ he 
declared.”428  
 The moneyed crowed enthusiastically committed funds to the civil rights organizations. 
Many donated large sums on the spot, and others pledged more from their personal accounts and 
from the corporations or foundations they represented. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations 
promised money, as did Currier’s Taconic Foundation. After everyone left, money kept pouring 
in, totaling $565,000 by mid-July. By the next month, $800,000 had been raised, and those 
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involved promised another $700,000 by the following year. As the public slowly learned about 
these funds, rumblings began that the money came with strings attached. Reese Cleghorn, 
writing for the New Republic, tried to find out more. After speaking with those personally 
involved, he wrote, “It is not truly a case of infiltrating the revolution with money, the sponsors 
insist; it is just that money, as President Kennedy might say, is ‘a part of the great American 
tradition.’ If you are going to have a revolution, it might as well be solvent, and imbued with 
American know-how.”429 
 After acquiring donations, civil rights leaders created a shared program to dispense the 
funds among themselves. They were attached to one another already through the VEP, but they 
worried about tax-exemption since they had no intention of funneling the money into the VEP or 
using it only for voter registration. A few days after the breakfast meeting, the group gathered 
and formed the Council for United Civil Rights Leadership. CUCRL was a financial 
clearinghouse, but it was also a space for leaders to continue meeting together for monthly 
sessions. According to historian David Garrow, CUCRL became a “dual-purpose, supra-
organization”—one that allocated funds among its members and provided a “rubric for regular, 
structured interactions.”430 For tax purposes, the group established two separate entities. CUCRL 
would be the main organization through which the group identified, and it would be the 
designation for non-tax-exempt gifts. They also created the Committee for Welfare, Education, 
and Legal Defense (WELD) to house tax-exempt donations. Since education fell under the 
mantle of tax-exempt charitable giving according to the IRS’s Internal Revenue Code, donations 
going to the NUL, NCNW, or the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, which became a member of the 
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group soon after the breakfast meeting, were designated within WELD. These groups spent their 
donations on projects eligible for tax-exemption, abstaining from all types of political activism. 
The Field Foundation gave upwards of $100,000 to WELD.431 Contributions to CORE, SNCC, 
the SCLC, and the NAACP fell under CUCRL as non-tax-exempt.432  
 To split the money, the group came up with a formula that most, but not all, deemed fair. 
From the CUCRL coffers, each group received 10 percent of their total national budget from the 
previous fiscal year. That meant the larger organizations received the most from CUCRL. Out of 
the first $565,000 paid out between the seven groups, the NAACP and NUL received $125,000 
each, CORE and the LDF accepted $100,000 each, $50,000 went to both the SCLC and NCNW, 
and finally, SNCC took the last $15,000.433 The SCLC was entitled to more, but recent 
fundraising had been lucrative, and part of its share went instead to the NCNW, a smaller 
organization planning to use its funds to give scholarships to civil rights workers. While the 
majority of members were satisfied with the arrangement, SNCC representatives James Forman 
and John Lewis were not pleased. Without their presence or knowledge, they claimed, the others 
had configured the formula, and since SNCC operated on a small budget, it was entitled to a 
miniscule amount by comparison. Lewis blamed Wilkins, who saw him as someone only 
interested in the NAACP. “We were at the bottom of the barrel. We were considered the kids, the 
upstarts, and we were given peanuts compared with what the others received,” recalled Lewis.434 
Forman was angry that without consulting them, “a neat little formula by which a few crumbs 
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would be thrown to SNCC” was accepted without debate from the group.435 They accepted the 
small amount as better than nothing, and Forman or Lewis kept attending CUCRL meetings, but 
they never fully trusted the others in the group.  
 Giving SNCC a lower amount was a conscious decision on CUCRL’s part to limit the 
radical wing of the civil rights movement from gaining too much power. To the others in the 
group, SNCC was the most volatile and militant, led by students provoking white authorities in 
the most dangerous areas of the Deep South. But CORE and the SCLC engaged in nonviolent 
direct action too, and while members had faith in the leadership capabilities of Farmer and King, 
there was concern that any one group could upset the balance of the movement by striking out 
independently in a militant direction. A spokesperson for the group told the black press that a 
byproduct of CUCRL “will be to strengthen the democratic non-violent nature of groups 
participating in this, rather than letting them go off half-cocked.”436 Wilkins told Jet Magazine 
that CUCRL respected the autonomy of each group, “allow[ing] them to greatly expand their 
operations,” but that it “will hold regular meetings in an effort to assure responsible conduct in 
the rights movement.”437 With this quote, Wilkins betrayed the underlying intent of CUCRL. 
Years later, Whitney Young confirmed Wilkins’s sentiment, stating that CUCRL’s purpose was 
to protect the movement so it would not be “taken over by some of those fellows waiting in the 
wings.”438 
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CUCRL asked VEP director Wiley A. Branton to serve as “chief of staff.”439 Impressed 
by his leadership and financial management of the VEP, CUCRL wanted Branton to take charge. 
His experience made him the logical choice after having established a working relationship with 
philanthropists and race leaders over the past year, learning how to mediate disagreements and 
stick to strict budgets to maximize registration results through VEP projects. Branton served as 
CUCRL’s coordinator through 1964 while at the same time running the VEP. The VEP remained 
his primary mission, and although working with CUCRL was congruent to his main job, he 
brought over Leslie Dunbar’s assistant, Vernon Jordan, to be the VEP’s Acting Assistant 
Director beginning in September 1963. Branton flew to New York about once a month to study 
CUCRL finances and divide the money between organizations. One CUCRL member told 
reporter Pat Watters that Branton would essentially serve as “president of the Negroes in 
America”—a telling comment that reflected CUCRL’s self-image.440 
Branton’s presence within CUCRL made an immediate impact beyond splitting money 
between organizations. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 has recently passed, and leaders within 
each national agency were trying to interpret its finer points. One issue was whether or not 
activists had to be arrested while testing the desegregation of public accommodations in order to 
file a complaint to the DOJ. For years, direct-action protests had been effective tools of 
movement activists, resulting in both brief and long-term incarcerations across the South. But 
with the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Branton discovered after consulting with lawyers and DOJ 
officials, it was no longer necessary to carry on a protest to the point of arrest. “The mere denial 
                                                 
439 Jane Lee Eddy to Dorothy Height, March 9, 1991, Taconic Foundation Records. 
 
440 Watters, “Atlanta is in Forefront of Quiet but Momentous Move.” See also Branton interview, October 21, 1970, 
61; “7 Civil Rights Groups Choose Coordinator to Bolster Activity,” New York Times, August 16, 1963; “Wiley A. 
Branton To Knit 7 Rights Groups Together,” New Pittsburgh Courier, August 24, 1963; and Kilpatrick, There When 
We Needed Him, 102-103.  
 
 164 
of service gives rise to a cause of action when it can be shown that the denial was the result of 
racial discrimination,” Branton wrote to CUCRL members. “It would perhaps be good for your 
branches over the country to know this so as to avoid arrests which would require valuable time 
of our lawyers and increase our bail problems.”441 
 CUCRL’s moderating influence on the civil rights movement was also noticeable in 
planning meetings for the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom in 1963. Although 
CUCRL was not a direct, monetary supporter of the march, its members, including Currier, were 
part of strategy sessions. In his memoir, Farmer recalled A. Philip Randolph visiting a CUCRL 
meeting to explain his idea for the March on Washington and seek their support.442 Except for 
Wilkins, everyone was enthusiastic. During the summer of 1963, CUCRL members met several 
times with Randolph, Bayard Rustin, organized labor, and government officials to plan the 
march. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey wrote to Currier to discuss the march. Less than a week 
before the march, CUCRL met once again at the Carlyle Hotel to strategize. Just before August 
28, President Kennedy indicated his support for civil rights legislation, prompting leaders within 
CUCRL to pressure John Lewis to tone down his angry rhetoric he had planned in his speech 
aimed at the federal government. He complied, demonstrating the power CUCRL exercised 
within the civil rights movement.443 
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CUCRL’s influence on the March on Washington was less financial than it was strategic, 
pushing the mass demonstration as a peaceful protest without rankling the White House or 
Congress. The total budget for the march was $117,240, and even though labor groups donated a 
sizeable portion, Randolph, Rustin, and the planning committee had to come up with the money. 
Currier’s presence in planning meetings created speculation that he funded the rest. Louis Lomax 
spread a story that the Taconic Foundation donated $1,000,000 to the March on Washington. 
Suppressing the rumor, a Taconic Foundation spokesman announced, “Not one cent of Mr. 
Currier’s personal funds or of foundation money has gone for the march in any way, shape or 
form.”444 Agreeing with this statement, historian Paula F. Pfeffer wrote, “If the march committee 
were indeed assured of as much financial aid from Currier as rumor had it, Randolph would not 
have been so concerned about expenses.”445  
 Soon after August 28, CUCRL began fundraising on its own by selling a vinyl record of 
the March on Washington and buttons featuring equality signs. Currier himself designed a lapel 
button with an equality logo, sold for a dollar apiece in stores and at events. By August 1964, the 
buttons had raised $20,062.79.446 March on Washington organizers gave exclusive rights to 
CUCRL of the recordings from the day’s events, including all speeches and musical acts. 
CUCRL created an album—We Shall Overcome!: A Documentary of the March on 
Washington—featuring all performances, including King’s “I Have a Dream” speech. In a press 
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statement, CUCRL announced, “In making the exclusive grant, Dr. King pointed out that in this 
way all funds derived from record sales will be channeled directly into the civil rights 
movement.”447 At least three other labels illegally created their own albums featuring audio from 
the March on Washington, but the SCLC sued them, and soon CUCRL was the only organization 
producing the album through a partnership with Broadside Records. Released on October 5, 
CUCRL leaders coordinated with their own organizations to promote sales. Branton wrote John 
Lewis soon after its release with an update: “We believe that the spirit of the March—and your 
role in it—is movingly captured on this record. Most important, it will help keep the civil rights 
movement alive” by raising more money.448 Labor groups and churches sold the album for a 
reduced price of three dollars. In stores, albums sold for $3.98, raising money for CUCRL “to 
meet costs of the civil rights crisis.”449 While they hoped the record would become “the next 
national ‘million record seller,’” sales were low.450 The album raised money, but only a 
disappointing $14,344.50.451 In April 1965, Branton gave a final update to CUCRL members: 
“As you probably know, we did not do very well on our record album venture, and we still have 
approximately 5,300 record albums in the warehouse.”452 CUCRL’s attempt to raise their own 
money failed, making it more reliant on the goodwill of benefactors. 
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CUCRL almost disintegrated in late 1963 over an idea for a Christmas boycott. By 
demonstrating the purchasing power of African Americans, the SCLC had emphasized economic 
issues during the Birmingham movement earlier in the spring. King wanted a national boycott, 
which SNCC also supported, but fearing the strategy was a way for the SCLC to expand into the 
North and into NAACP and NUL territory, Wilkins opposed the idea. Even though King tried to 
assuage those misgivings, according to historian David Garrow, “Wilkins and other moderate 
figures worked behind the scenes to ensure that SNCC and SCLC’s national boycott idea would 
be rebuffed at the next meeting of CUCRL in New York on October 4.”453 To preserve the unity 
of the group, King backed down. Instead of an all-out Christmas boycott, CUCRL took a more 
conservative approach, creating a “Holiday Gift Fund” and encouraging people to donate at least 
five dollars to CUCRL that December. The Christmas campaign raised only $3,153.50.454 
 In late 1963 while CUCRL fundraised, Malcolm X called out the group. In his “Message 
to the Grass Roots” delivered in Detroit on November 10, 1963, he criticized Stephen Currier, 
CUCRL, and the March on Washington as a concerted effort by white men to moderate the 
movement. He oversimplified the June 19 breakfast meeting as Currier telling a room full of 
black leaders, “By you all fighting each other, you are destroying the civil-rights movement.”455 
Currier injected money into the movement, according to Malcolm X, changing its trajectory by 
putting white liberals in charge. The March on Washington was initially a grassroots-led black 
revolution, but in Malcolm X’s mind, Currier and CUCRL wrested control away from the 
                                                 
453 Garrow, Bearing the Cross, 299. 
 
454 CUCRL Cash Transactions Statement, August 12, 1963-August 6, 1964. See also ‘“Big 7’ of Civil Rights Have 
Unique Xmas Plan,” New Pittsburgh Courier, November 23, 1963; and “Rights Council Rejects Yule Ban,” Atlanta 
Daily World, October 8, 1963. 
 
455 Malcolm X, “Message to the Grass Roots,” November 10, 1963, speech at King Solomon Baptist Church in 
Detroit at Northern Negro Grass Roots Leadership Conference, in Malcolm X Speaks: Selected Speeches and 
Statements (New York: Merit Publishers, 1965), 15. 
 168 
people: “The white man put the Big Six at the head of it; made them the march. They became the 
march. They took it over.”456 Malcolm X termed it the “farce” on Washington, and in another 
speech in early December, he described the negative influence of white money: “This shrewd 
maneuver placed the white liberal and the Taconic Foundation in the position to exercise 
influence and control over the six civil rights leaders and, by working through them, to control 
the entire civil rights movement, including the March on Washington.”457  
Soon after Malcolm X’s comments, Stephen Currier distanced himself from CUCRL. 
The charges dismayed Currier, who did not see his involvement as an attempt to moderate the 
civil rights movement. In his mind, he was a neutral benefactor. Currier wrote to CUCRL 
members that he was happy to help raise money, but he did not want to “allow my involvement 
to generate public confusion as to the true nature of this Council” or to “permit my official role 
to serve as a pretext for attacks on the Council as a part of some white ‘conspiracy’ to ‘take over’ 
or ‘de-fang’ the civil rights effort.”458 Currier stepped back, at least publicly, while he remained 
an official part of the group. Wilkins spoke for the rest when he wrote Currier on New Years 
Eve, “Your prompt action, spurred by your conviction that something very specific had to be 
done following the Evers tragedy, led to the only forward-looking program that grew out of those 
months.”459 Even though Currier remained committed, he grew frustrated by the growing 
animosity within CUCRL, reaching a tipping point in September 1964 when the NAACP called 
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a meeting to discuss a “moratorium on demonstrations until after the November elections, [with 
Currier] feeling that the meeting should have been called through the Council.”460 Currier 
resigned, but the group insisted on keeping him around loosely affiliated as an associate.  
Even with its problems, CUCRL continued to meet and divide money between August 
1963 and 1966. King, Wilkins, Farmer, Height, Young, Forman, Lewis, and Greenberg were the 
principal collaborators. A. Philip Randolph joined later in 1965. Branton sent everyone a 
reminder a week or two beforehand with information on the location and time of meeting, often 
at the Carlyle Hotel or the Taconic Foundation office. In addition to the major donations inspired 
at the first breakfast meeting, the United Auto Workers contributed, as did other foundations and 
private individuals. Eliot D. Pratt, a rich Connecticut farmer and member of the American 
Friends Service Committee, gave the most at $200,000.461 King later gave CUCRL $17,000 of 
his Nobel Peace Prize award.462 Currier donated another $6,000 to CUCRL, along with an 
additional $6,000 each to CORE, the NAACP, the NAACP’s Crisis magazine, the SCLC, and 
$4,000 to SNCC.463 At a meeting on December 3, 1963, members voted to give SNCC 
$10,000—less than all other groups—illustrating yet again the group’s control by allocating only 
a fraction of its income to student activists.464 Donations kept arriving, and Branton and the 
group discussed how to divide the pot. Often, the process was painful because everyone wanted 
money, and each had a case that they needed it the most. Tempers sometimes flared, and Branton 
was called upon to make tough financial decisions. Dunbar recalled that Branton often returned 
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to Atlanta worn down after overseeing a CUCRL meeting in New York: “Wiley said that some 
of the sessions were pretty awful.”465 
 CUCRL gathered to discuss strategy, but each member was unique, and their 
organizations had philosophical differences. They lobbied Congress and the White House for a 
civil rights bill and declared the death penalty immoral. Occasionally, they released joint 
statements as CUCRL—a unified civil rights voice.466 But disagreements metastasized, and as 
much as CUCRL tried to influence the direction of the movement, it usually reacted to events on 
the ground rather than shape them. According to Whitney Young, CUCRL was “a place where 
people could talk through events which they were supposed to be in control of but actually 
weren’t.”467 Within their private meetings, James Forman charged other leaders with being too 
conservative, Wilkins belittled King and the SCLC for lacking substance, and everyone fought 
over money. While Farmer insisted CUCRL “was not a squabbling squad,” members were too 
far apart on most matters, creating as much division as collaboration.468 After many years, 
Farmer romantically remembered CUCRL as “the knights of the round table, but there was no 
King Arthur. Each one there was a leader and no one had a leader.”469  
 CUCRL became less effective once the VEP ended in late 1964 and Branton moved on, 
never reaching the full $1,500,000 goal. Attendance dropped, and meetings became infrequent. 
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At a CUCRL gathering on June 17, 1965 in which several members did not show up, Forman 
“asserted his feeling that Council meetings should be fully attended by all Council members. The 
attendance lack was deemed a bad investment of time for those in attendance if all members 
were not present.”470 By February 1966, $67,000 remained in CUCRL’s account, quickly divided 
between groups with no more coming in.471 In January 1967, Jack Greenberg sent word to all 
CUCRL members that “there are no more funds to be distributed” and that keeping CUCRL 
around was beginning to cost tax money. He and Young agreed that “procedures should be 
undertaken to legally liquidate” CUCRL, giving everyone two weeks to object.472 No one did, 
and without any media attention, CUCRL ended.473 
 Looking back, Whitney Young believed CUCRL reacted to events more often than 
shaped them, but taken as a whole, this coterie of leadership tried to impose their will on the 
movement. CUCRL was not as nefarious as Malcolm X portrayed it, but it tried to moderate the 
civil rights struggle. SNCC was isolated and deprived of funding. CUCRL helped shape the 
March on Washington. The SCLC’s idea of a nationwide Christmas boycott was shelved. 
CUCRL did not stop SNCC from functioning or dictate other SCLC policies, but the inner circle 
tried to keep control. Summing up CUCRL in his memoir with both humor and criticism, James 
Farmer calculated that, within the larger civil rights movement, members comprised “one-fourth 
leadership, one-fourth showmanship, one-fourth one-upsmanship, and one-fourth partnership.”474  
 
                                                 
470 CUCRL Meeting Minutes, June 17, 1965, Box 7, Folder 30, MLK Papers, King Archive. 
 
471 CUCRL Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1966, Box 7, Folder 31, MLK Papers, King Archive. 
 
472 Arthur Q. Funn to Martin Luther King Jr., January 30, 1967, Box 7, Folder 31, MLK Papers, King Archive. 
 
473 See Dickerson, Militant Mediator, 182; Weiss, “Creative Tensions in the Leadership of the Civil Rights 
Movement,” 45; Weiss, Whitney M. Young, Jr., 118; and Greenberg, Crusaders in the Courts, 398-399. 
 







CHAPTER 5: ‘VOTE-LESS PEOPLE ARE A HOPELESS PEOPLE’: THE SECOND VOTER 
EDUCATION PROJECT, 1965-1968 
 
 In February 1965, a few months removed from the end of the first VEP, Bayard Rustin 
published “From Protest to Politics” in Commentary. Famous for its characterization of the civil 
rights movement’s first decade as the “classical phase,” Rustin’s essay called for civil rights 
activists to begin focusing on party politics. The time had come, he wrote, to stop demonstrating 
in the streets. Nonviolent protest had united a movement and ended public discrimination, but the 
remaining challenges of racial and economic inequality could only be solved through political 
action. Rustin wanted to see activists get involved in local politics and steer the Democratic Party 
to the left, bringing together African Americans, union workers, and white liberals into a 
powerful coalition to counter the growing influence of the Right. While greater citizenship rights 
were now guaranteed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, African Americans still needed to fight 
for better education, healthcare, employment opportunities, housing, and voting access—none of 
which could be done effectively without political organization. “Here is where the cutting edge 
of the civil rights movement can be applied,” wrote Rustin. “We must see to it that the 
reorganization of the ‘consensus party’ proceeds along lines which will make it an effective 
vehicle for social reconstruction.”475 
 Those involved with the VEP and the SRC did not need convincing. A year before 
Rustin’s article appeared, Leslie Dunbar argued that the only way for the American South to 
overcome poverty and racial affliction was “to do something that would matter to the world, and 
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that is to become a rarity, a bi-racial community at peace with itself. It can do so, I think, only by 
integrating Negroes into its political processes.”476 For two and a half years, the VEP had worked 
to realize the political potential of southern African Americans by giving out hundreds of grants 
to grassroots campaigns registering people to vote. In the process, VEP staff worked with local 
activists, financed drives, collected data on disfranchisement, published reports, and helped 
register nearly 700,000 people before the 1964 election. Funded by progressive foundations, the 
VEP had a similar vision as Rustin: equip southern African Americans with the power to change 
their communities through political action.  
But by the time Rustin’s essay came out, the VEP was no longer operational, and many 
disagreed with Rustin that direct action had reached its full potential. Major events of 1965 
further isolated Rustin’s advice. Malcolm X was murdered; President Lyndon Johnson escalated 
the war in Vietnam; Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s controversial report, The Negro Family, 
exasperated African Americans by blaming black poverty on weak family units. On March 7, the 
march from Selma to Montgomery ended in chaos as police troopers attacked peaceful protestors 
on the Edmund Pettus Bridge. Bloody Sunday, as it came to be called, provided the motivation 
for President Johnson and Congress to usher the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6, but less 
than a week later, rioting broke out in Los Angeles. To many, militant direct action was needed 
more than ever, not less as Rustin advocated. 
While the VEP’s office sat closed for much of 1965, it’s parent organization, the SRC, 
continued to operate. As early as March, senior staff began exploring the possibility of re-
booting the VEP. They noticed the shift to black nationalism within the movement, but they also 
believed the time had come for increased political activism. The idea gained traction in August 
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after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965—a sweeping piece of legislation that 
protected the right to vote by dismantling literacy tests and promising federal intervention in 
counties that disenfranchised its citizens. But the Voting Rights Act did not automatically 
register anyone. The burden of registration still fell on individuals, and the SRC realized there 
would be a greater need for voter mobilization and education. Through the Voting Rights Act, 
the possibility now existed for southern African Americans to register en masse and seize the 
kind of political power outlined in Rustin’s essay.  
From 1966 through 1968, the second VEP equipped southern African Americans to 
compete for poll power through voter registration, citizenship education, and leadership training. 
The VEP did so by trying to manage the movement, and by funneling philanthropic money into 
local registration projects. Although Rustin’s vision of a progressive Democratic Party never 
materialized, the VEP contributed to the re-creation of a two-party South as African Americans 
gained voting strength and earned elected positions most often as Democrats, intensifying the 
white conservative exodus to the Republican Party.477 These changes occurred because the VEP 
continued to push voting rights as the main strategy of the civil rights movement. The VEP, 
Rustin, and many local and national civil rights leaders retained a faith in the American system 
of government. Realizing that voter registration was never the final objective, the VEP steered 
the civil rights movement forward by kindling black political action across the American South.  
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Building the Second VEP 
On March 15, 1965, President Johnson addressed the nation one week after Bloody 
Sunday in support of African American voting rights. “Many of the issues of civil rights are very 
complex and most difficult,” Johnson said. “But about this there can and should be no argument. 
Every American citizen must have an equal right to vote.”478 The civil rights movement’s latest 
nonviolent demonstration stirred the President to action, and he urged Congress to work with 
him to pass legislation to protect the right to vote. In his speech, he proposed striking down all 
barriers to the franchise. Johnson also promised federal registrars where state officials refused to 
enfranchise African Americans. His words encouraged civil rights activists, who for the first 
time heard the President offer a viable path forward to end disfranchisement. Five months later, 
the Voting Rights Act became law. 
Leslie Dunbar and Stephen Currier both tuned into the President’s address, and his words 
inspired them to re-establish the VEP. Having been involved in the VEP—Dunbar as executive 
director of the SRC and Currier as the VEP’s primary financier—they knew that legislation alone 
would not be enough to solidify black registration. For the Voting Rights Act to fulfill its 
promise, the VEP needed to come back. Dunbar wrote Currier the day after the President’s 
speech letting him know that staff at the SRC had been thinking about restarting the VEP with a 
new emphasis on citizenship education. Between 1962 and 1964, the VEP had focused on 
registration alone; the next step, with the promise of federal involvement, was to help create a 
knowledgeable electorate. Dunbar was considering reaching out to the Field Foundation, the 
Stern Family Fund, and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for renewed financial support, but he first 
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wanted to know Currier’s thoughts on further Taconic Foundation sponsorship. What was clear, 
Dunbar wrote Currier, was that “there is a special need for resumption of VEP-type activity.”479 
Throughout 1965, Dunbar and the SRC discussed ways to train black communities to 
translate their votes into power. In the SRC’s opinion, the missing key was citizenship education. 
The focus needed to be on participatory politics, but many black communities knew little about 
how governments actually functioned. After conducting a survey of leading civil rights, labor, 
and political figures to determine what a new voter education program should look like, the SRC 
recommended starting a new VEP with an emphasis on citizenship education. Quoting a 
common phrase from movement activists, the author of the report wrote, “vote-less people are a 
hopeless people. This means that outlawing discrimination against qualified potential voters is 
not enough. Getting them registered is not enough. The primary objective should be that they use 
their vote and use it wisely.”480 
In promoting registration activism in the wake of the Voting Rights Act, the SRC was 
also trying to counter arguments from black activists disillusioned with democratic solutions. 
Dunbar preached that direct action militancy was ineffective when detached from political 
strategies. One Ford Foundation representative wrote of Dunbar, “He has been telling 
demonstration-prone civil rights groups that they need to learn ‘that change has occurred, and 
that it no longer suffices merely to keep doing the same things over and over, however dramatic 
and apparently effective they may be.’”481 Echoing philanthropists and other civil rights leaders 
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who worried over the changing ideologies of SNCC and CORE, the SRC pushed to keep the 
civil rights movement unified around the pursuit of voting rights and black political power. 
While Dunbar helped plan a new VEP, he resigned from the SRC to manage the Field 
Foundation, moving into a role similar to Currier as a financier of the civil rights movement. As 
executive director, Dunbar would oversee numerous programs beyond the civil rights field, but 
the position would also allow him to ensure the VEP received philanthropic support. As Dunbar 
later recalled, “The first assignment I gave myself when I got to New York was to get VEP re-
funded.”482 During his years as SRC executive director, Dunbar had gained firsthand experience 
interacting with foundations and convincing them to invest in the civil rights movement. “I 
believe that I have a realistic view of how much and only how much money can accomplish” as 
well as “how limited [money] is,” Dunbar wrote a Field Foundation official soon after accepting 
the position.483 Knowing what more money could do, Dunbar sent around the SRC’s proposal for 
a renewed voter education program to foundations, but even though many found “virtual 
unanimity” on the need to restart the VEP, philanthropists were slow to promise funding.484 Even 
Currier seemed hesitant about recommitting the Taconic Foundation to the VEP once again. 
After the success of the 1962-1964 project and the promise of the Voting Rights Act, some felt 
that the mission had been successful. Dunbar made them see otherwise. With his new position, 
he first committed the Field Foundation to the new VEP. He then spoke with other 
philanthropists, including Currier, and convinced them to support the VEP once again. Even 
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though Dunbar had left the SRC, his move to the Field Foundation had been fortuitous, all but 
guaranteeing a new VEP with his influence within the world of philanthropy.485 
In December 1965, the SRC applied for grants to begin the re-imagined VEP. Dunbar 
was waiting for it at the Field Foundation, as were other philanthropists with whom he had talked 
to about the project. The SRC’s new executive director was Paul Anthony, a 37-year old white 
Virginian who had graduated from the University of Miami and had worked at the SRC since 
1956 as an administrative assistant and researcher. Anthony wrote Dunbar, “Here it is. This 
represents the best work of a lot of people here.”486 The SRC proposed another three-year VEP 
“to reach those persons in the region still unregistered and bring them and others more fully into 
the political life of their communities.”487 The VEP would continue to be non-partisan, holding 
to its tax-exempt status under the SRC. In addition to voter registration, the new VEP would also 
concentrate on citizenship education and leadership training to ensure a powerful black political 
presence in the South. According to the SRC’s research, around 2,300,000 African Americans 
were registered in the South, leaving some 2,000,000 more who had yet to take advantage of the 
Voting Rights Act. Over the next several months, the SRC received enough financial support 
from foundations to go forward with the VEP. For its first year, $100,000 came from the Field 
Foundation; $150,000 from the Taconic Foundation; $50,000 from the Rockefeller Brothers 
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Fund; $24,000 from the Ford Foundation; and $1,000 from the Marion Ascoli Fund. With 
$325,000 for the first year and the assurance of additional funding, the VEP took shape.488 
While Anthony and Dunbar did most of the planning, finding a new executive director 
for the VEP was crucial. Wiley Branton had excelled in that role, but since he had taken a federal 
job, the VEP needed someone new. Vernon Jordan became the top choice. First arriving at the 
SRC in 1963, Jordan worked as Dunbar’s assistant, and he later served as Branton’s acting 
assistant director for the VEP. For a while, Jordan was a candidate to replace Dunbar as SRC 
executive director, but he was young, and Dunbar was annoyed that Jordan quit the SRC to work 
for the Office for Economic Opportunity (OEO). But as plans for the new VEP came together, 
Jordan was the logical choice to lead the program. He agreed to leave the OEO and become the 
VEP’s executive director in October 1965.489 
Born on August 15, 1935, Vernon Jordan grew up in a middle class family in Atlanta. 
The Jordans lived in a neighborhood adjacent to Atlanta’s community of African American 
universities, and along with helping his mother cater professional conferences, Vernon grew up 
watching and interacting with black professors, attorneys, ministers, and community leaders. He 
came of age in a black metropolis, but his family’s roots were in rural Georgia, and they often 
took vacations to visit grandparents and cousins. On these trips, Vernon caught glimpses of the 
South’s racial order he did not often witness in Atlanta, such as his aunt telling him to call his 
white playmate “Mr. Bobby” when they reached adolescence. Vernon stopped playing with 
Bobby instead.490 
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After graduating from DePauw University, Jordan attended Howard University School of 
Law to train with the nation’s foremost civil rights lawyers. Jordan first became interested in 
politics and the civil rights movement at DePauw, but it was during a visit home to Atlanta 
where he heard Martin Luther King Jr. speak that roused him: “King’s words were so powerful, 
his delivery so inspired, that I knew right then and there that I was going to actively participate in 
the civil rights movement. There was just no doubt in my mind about that.”491 He moved to 
Washington, DC in 1957, and for the next three years, Jordan trained with other civil rights-
minded students preparing for a life using the law to challenge segregation. He graduated in 1960 
and moved back to Atlanta to begin his career.492 
Jordan’s first job out of law school was with Don Hollowell in Atlanta, a well-regarded 
civil rights lawyer who worked with the NAACP and LDF. For a year, Jordan traveled with 
Hollowell across Georgia to meet clients falsely accused of rape, violence, or for violating the 
rules of race. In 1961, Jordan helped Hollowell and the LDF defend Hamilton Holmes and 
Charlayne Hunter when they enrolled at the University of Georgia. Later that year, he was hired 
as the NAACP’s field director for Georgia. For about two years, Jordan crisscrossed Georgia 
helping set up new NAACP chapters, leading membership drives, encouraging old branches to 
become more active, and promoting voter registration campaigns. Excelling at his job, he caught 
the attention of Leslie Dunbar in the spring of 1963, who asked Jordan to be his executive 
assistant at the SRC. Jordan jumped at the chance.493 
Under Dunbar, Jordan travelled the South, researched civil rights issues, wrote reports, 
communicated with various activists and organizations, helped with fundraising, and developed 
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relationships with foundations. He also aided Wiley Branton and the VEP during its final year by 
filling in when Branton was in New York overseeing CUCRL meetings. After the first VEP 
ended, Jordan took a job with the OEO, but after the Voting Rights Act passed, Jordan thought 
that a renewed VEP could be even more effective than the first. Years earlier when Jordan 
worked for the NAACP, his supervisor, Ruby Hurley, had taught him that segregationists only 
understood two things: “the dollar and the ballot. Those interested in maintaining white 
supremacy worked hard to keep blacks away from both.”494 When Paul Anthony asked Jordan to 
return to the SRC and lead the second VEP, he had no hesitation. He would use the dollar to 
acquire the ballot. 
After Jordan agreed to serve as director beginning on December 1, news began to spread 
that the SRC was restarting the VEP. Alan Gartner, CORE’s community relations director, wrote 
Anthony, “We are very pleased that the Southern Regional Council plans to continue voter 
registration work using the VEP model.”495 “Since the demise of the old voter project,” Gartner 
later told Jordan, CORE had continued its registration work registering about 29,000 in 1965, but 
with the VEP, it could do more.496 Just before the year ended, Martin Luther King Jr. wrote 
Jordan, “We were very pleased with the manner in which VEP operated in the past years, and we 
found this quite helpful to our total movement.” The Voting Rights Act, King continued, “means 
very little in view of the limited government action, and our situation remains essentially 
unchanged in the majority of southern states.”497 John A. Morsell, the NAACP’s director of 
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branches, told Jordan, “There is no question as to the immense value of SRC’s previous voter 
registration project.” Although the NAACP’s experience with the first VEP “was marked 
occasionally by misunderstanding” due to the “cumbersome system” of finances whereby the 
VEP sent money to the national office to distribute to local branches, much had been 
accomplished. The NAACP was currently only doing registration work in Alabama, Mississippi, 
South Carolina and Texas, “but the restriction to these four states is solely a reflection of the 
limited resources upon which we can draw at this time.”498 Without the VEP, the major race 
organizations had to scale back their registration fieldwork. News of its return was greeted with 
excitement from those who saw firsthand the benefits of the first VEP.  
Once Jordan rejoined the SRC, he put together a small staff for the VEP. They continued 
to share office space with the SRC on Forsyth Street in downtown Atlanta. He hired Thaddeus 
Olive as the administrative assistant to focus on finances and grant disbursements. Olive and 
Jordan had attended high school together, and since Jordan needed an accountant he could trust, 
Olive was an ideal choice. The research director was Marvin Wall, responsible for studying 
registration statistics and writing reports. Nobbie Morgan was Jordan’s secretary. Later on, the 
VEP hired more office help, student interns, and a field director. But for now, Jordan and 
Anthony were content to keep VEP office personnel small to maximize the amount they could 
dispense to registration campaigns.499  
Months after the Voting Rights Act had gone into effect, Nicholas Katzenbach, the 
United States Attorney General, criticized race organizations for not doing more to register 
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southerners. Civil rights activists were in turn upset that the DOJ was slow to send in registrars 
and had not placed enough counties under federal supervision believed to disfranchise black 
citizens. As Jordan planned an early 1966 start for the VEP, he learned that Katzenbach wanted 
to help with the official kick-off. Instead of feeling honored, Jordan was skeptical of 
Katzenbach’s intentions. VEP staff feared Katzenbach’s goal was to soften criticism aimed at his 
office. Jordan also believed any public mentions of specific foundation grants, as Katzenbach 
wanted to do, would be inappropriate. But Jordan sensed an opportunity. Jordan was against any 
program that made the Attorney General the center of attention at the VEP’s expense, but he was 
open to Katzenbach delivering a speech on the federal government’s support for voting rights. It 
would be a chance to hear directly from the Attorney General in a room packed with race 
activists demanding that the DOJ do more to enforce the Voting Rights Act.500 
While planning for the Attorney General’s speech, the SRC announced the new VEP to 
the press on February 18, 1966. Emphasizing that both the Republican National Committee and 
Democratic National Committee had once again endorsed the VEP as a non-partisan venture, the 
VEP’s goal was to register the estimated 2,000,000 unregistered African Americans in the South. 
The VEP would work alongside the major civil rights groups, but it promised to heavily invest in 
grassroots organizations. From lessons learned between 1962-1964, the VEP realized the right to 
vote was only the first step to political empowerment.501 
On February 28, 10 days after the VEP’s announcement, over 300 civil rights leaders 
gathered in Atlanta to hear the Attorney General speak on voting rights. Katzenbach heaped 
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praise on the first VEP, which was “even more remarkable considering that it came entirely 
before the Voting Rights Act struck down so many of the barriers.” Since August, he told them, 
around 300,000 African Americans had registered, including 51,000 in Mississippi, 56,000 in 
Alabama, and 53,000 in Louisiana. While the Voting Right Act put checks in place to make sure 
states could no longer disfranchise people, Katzenbach told his audience that the onus to register 
people was on the civil rights organizations. The DOJ was doing its part by responding to 
complaints, sending in registrars, and making sure literacy tests and poll taxes were no longer in 
use. Now, activists needed to move unregistered people to their county’s registrar office and 
have them sign up—a simple act, he suggested, since the legal hurdles were gone. Echoing 
Bayard Rustin, if only vaguely, he said it was time for the civil rights movement to “turn from 
protest to affirmation.”502 
The audience was not happy. Katzenbach received only minor applause when he stepped 
off the stage. Reporters surrounded leaders afterwards to hear their opinions. Not only were 
movement activists displeased that the Attorney General did not promise additional federal 
registrars, but they were also irritated that he blamed their race organizations for not doing more 
to register people. Although Katzenbach indicated his office was doing all that it could to help, 
race leaders disagreed, and they thought it was wrong for him to suggest that private groups were 
responsible for registration. To them, it felt as though the federal government was distancing 
itself from the civil rights movement, content to let the Voting Rights Act speak for itself without 
doing more to implement it. “He [Katzenbach] put the burden right back on us,” one SRC 
member told the New York Times.503 Audience members were also put off by Katzenbach’s 
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comments that protest tactics were no longer appropriate. Martin Luther King Jr. told the Atlanta 
Constitution, “There has been too much caution in sending out registrars. In some cases, I think 
we will have to demonstrate.”504  
Katzenbach’s comments indicated to Jordan that the VEP was necessary now more than 
ever. The government was content to let the VEP do its work for them, just like it had between 
1962-1964. Jordan had not expected any more out of the DOJ this time around, but now that it 
was obvious, he was ready to move the VEP forward and begin supplying grants to registration 
campaigns across the South. In a thank-you note sent to Katzenbach’s office the day after his 
speech, Paul Anthony wrote, “I think we have every reason to believe that the occasion was a 
very successful one in terms of what we hoped to accomplish.”505 If anything, the path was clear: 
the VEP and its grantees, not the government, would register southern African Americans. 
Months later, as VEP projects were beginning, Jordan spoke to Atlanta’s black 
community at the Butler Street YMCA explaining the broader goals of the renewed VEP. “The 
Negro voter has never been an accepted or welcomed participant in the political process in the 
South,” he said. “Rather, he has been a victim of the process, an object of contempt, scorn, 
defamation, humiliation, vilification, exploitation, and dehumanization.” But the situation was 
changing, even though white registration still outpaced black. He reminded his audience that 
between 1952 and 1962, the black southern vote grew by only 400,000 people, but between 1962 
and 1964 under VEP programs, nearly 700,000 black men and women had registered. And since 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act, thousands more had registered. But that was not enough. 
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“Registration and voting are mighty instruments of power, but they are only instruments and not 
ends in themselves,” Jordan told them. The VEP’s aim was not to register people, but to help 
African Americans achieve political power in a way they never had before.506 
Managing the Movement 
By financing registration projects across the South, the VEP at once empowered local 
communities while attempting to manage the civil rights movement by promoting participatory 
democracy. An interested person or group would submit an application to the VEP to help 
sponsor a project, often as a one or two-page summary, along with ideas for voter registration 
fieldwork and citizenship education, such as canvassing and workshops. The more specific the 
proposal, the better. Often if a proposal was too vague, Jordan let them know so they could 
revise it before rejecting it outright. Beginning in 1967, the VEP’s field director, Weldon 
Rougeau, often traveled to meet those asking for assistance to get a sense of the people, the area, 
and the chances for registration success, offering counseling along the way to improve their grant 
requests. Sometimes when multiple proposals came from different groups from the same region, 
the VEP combined them into one project.507 
Vernon Jordan was aware of the power he had within the civil rights movement at the 
time, whose position “made me kind of a chancellor of the exchequer. This was a heavy 
responsibility, and I took it very seriously.”508 Looking back, Jordan believed that the 
competition for money that the VEP offered increased the efficiency of the civil rights movement 
by making local and national groups more accountable. “Everyone soon learned that is wasn’t 
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enough to just have a good heart and good intentions,” wrote Jordan in his memoir. “They had to 
present a viable plan to get the funds and they had to successfully execute the plan if they wanted 
more to undertake other projects.”509 Not only did the VEP enable movements to go forward 
throughout the South, but its strict regimen for grant recipients to meet their goals, document 
results, and be frugal with the money also forced local activists to be successful. Money 
produced results.510 
 Over the next three years, the VEP supplied at least 403 grants to local campaigns in 11 
states, spending $580,065 on grassroots projects.511 VEP partners used the funds to blanket their 
communities with canvassers and car pools to move people to the registrar’s office and register 
to vote. The VEP kept accurate registration statistics per project during 1966, but not in 1967 and 
1968. VEP grants went to chapters of the NAACP and SCLC, but most went to independent 
organizations. In 1966, the VEP sent $1,925 to the Pensacola Improvement Association, which 
registered 590 people. The Lynchburg Voters League in Virginia received $2,475 and registered 
1,376 people; the Calhoun County Voters League in South Carolina used $250 to register 268; 
and the Fort Valley Citizens Education Commission spent $1,000 to register 305 community 
members. In 1967 and 1968, VEP grants continued to fund diverse registration projects across 
the South, including the Screven County VEP in Georgia, the Sunflower County VEP in 
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Mississippi, and the Northampton County Voters Movement in North Carolina. VEP grants 
coated the South, ensuring local activists had resources to compete for power.512  
One of these 403 VEP grant recipients was the Auburn League of Women Voters in 
Alabama. Alice Alston submitted a grant application to the VEP soon after funds became 
available. In Lee County, she wrote, many African Americans were illiterate, no black man or 
woman had ever held an elected position, and the registrar’s office was only open on the first and 
third Monday of every month, except for special occasions. To assist black voters in her county, 
she wanted to rent voting machines and have people practice using them. The League would 
train them on how to use the machines, taking steps to help people overcome their fear of 
embarrassment for not knowing how they operate or how to read candidate names.513 She only 
asked for $200, which the VEP approved on March 11.514 In June, the VEP answered a grant 
request from the Lee County Voters League for $1,200 for a six-week registration program, 
working together with the local League of Women Voters.515 Following the drive, the VEP gave 
an additional $775 to the Auburn League of Women Voters to record elementary-level television 
programs about voting. Using the grant money to book a studio, write scripts, produce the film, 
and publicize, they created three shows seen by an estimated 33,000 people. Seven television and 
radio stations aired their programs, teaching people how to vote and why it was important. By 
July, the Auburn League of Women had registered around 2,500 people.516 
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Another VEP grantee was the North Carolina Voter Education Project (NCVEP). The 
VEP helped set up state VEPs in Arkansas, Louisiana, and South Carolina—umbrella 
organizations uniting several independent campaigns—but the NCVEP was unique because it 
was a product of the North Carolina Fund (NCF) as much as the VEP. The NCF began in 1963 
under Governor Terry Sanford, combining funding from the OEO and other federal departments 
with private grants to support 11 anti-poverty programs across the state between 1963 and 
1968.517 In 1966, black leaders in North Carolina expressed interest in forming a political 
training group through the NCF. George Esser, the NCF’s director, connected with Vernon 
Jordan to see if the idea could be realized through the VEP. In February 1967, meeting with 
dozens of black leaders from across the state in Durham, Jordan gave advice for setting up the 
NCVEP. He recommended keeping the NCVEP small with one director and a small budget to 
organize voter registration campaigns, citizenship education classes, and leadership training 
institutes more often and in more places than the VEP could do on its own. Jordan instructed 
them to apply for a VEP grant as soon as possible. They requested $30,000, but deeming the 
amount to high, the VEP instead allocated $13,000 to the NCVEP to pay for a full-time director 
at $7,500, a secretary for $2,600, and the rest for office supplies and travel costs. Under director 
John Edwards, a young NCF worker from Durham’s Operation Breakthrough, the NCVEP 
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announced it’s goal to go “after the potential voters who, for one reason or another, never have 
registered.”518 
The NCVEP led five registration campaigns and sponsored a conference in 1967. 
Edwards traversed the state spending VEP and NCF money helping communities orchestrate 
registration projects. A three-week effort in Martin County registered around 900 people. In 
Rocky Mount, 1,400 people registered after the NCVEP helped sponsor citizenship clinics. Up to 
400 people registered in Goldsboro and another 600 in Kinston. In Robeson County, 
approximately 4,500 people registered once the local government appointed deputy registrars to 
visit the homes of African Americans and Lumbee Indians to sign them up on the spot. On July 
22, the NCVEP led its first Leadership Training Conference in Durham with nearly 500 
participants featuring speakers and holding workshops on indigenous leadership, election laws, 
and voter mobilization.519 
Not every VEP-sponsored project was successful. The VEP committed $8,100 to the 
Northern Virginia Voter Education Project, but after learning funds may have been used to 
picket Alexandria’s police headquarters, the VEP withdrew its grant. Before then, the group had 
accomplished minimum registration results, and Jordan felt that it had become a waste of 
resources. Plus, as Paul Anthony told the Washington Post, “We’re extremely careful that none 
of our funds go for partisan political activities or for direct action.”520 
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Along with financing campaigns like the Northern Virginia Voter Education Project, the 
NCVEP, and the League of Women Voters in Auburn, Alabama, part of the VEP’s management 
role within the civil rights movement meant interacting with the five major organizations. Of the 
five that had been valuable during the first VEP, only two remained in close partnership with the 
VEP: the NAACP and the SCLC. CORE’s leadership planned to be involved with the second 
VEP, and CORE had received funding for three projects in Louisiana in 1966, but those were the 
last grants to CORE before turning its attention to the North. Jordan asked Floyd McKissick, 
James Farmer’s successor as CORE director, if CORE had any more interest in VEP work. Ruth 
Turner, CORE’s executive secretary for its Cleveland branch, returned his query by asking if the 
VEP could sponsor registration work in Cleveland, but Jordan informed her that the VEP’s work 
was confined to the South.521 The NUL’s base was also in the North, and while the VEP funded a 
handful of projects for its few southern branches during the first VEP, Jordan did not expect the 
NUL to play a major role again. But he reached out to the NUL’s southern regional office 
offering the chance at some funds. In 1967, the VEP awarded the NUL with $6,600 for 
citizenship education programs in Jacksonville, Florida and Hobson City, Alabama, but that was 
the extent of the relationship.522 SNCC was even less involved. During this period, SNCC 
underwent a transformation in leadership and ideology, embracing black nationalism and 
distancing itself from other civil rights groups. But SNCC still needed money. In July 1965, 
SNCC had applied for a $119,000 grant from the Taconic Foundation, but finding SNCC’s plans 
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too vague, Taconic denied the request.523 After the VEP re-launched, SNCC made “one or two” 
grant applications to the VEP, but they “were not well conceived and therefore not funded.”524  
 The VEP maintained an association with the NAACP and the SCLC, but tensions over 
control and management sometimes kept them at a distance. Back in December 1965, Jordan and 
John Morsell had discussed the VEP supplying NAACP chapters directly instead of through the 
national office. Jordan wrote Wilkins on March 9, 1966 after 18 NAACP chapters had so far 
appealed directly to the VEP for funds. He assured Wilkins that “no branch of the NAACP 
would be funded by VEP without the approval of either [John M.] Brooks or [W.C.] Patton,” the 
NAACP’s two national leaders for voter registration and education.525 Wilkins was satisfied, but 
Gloster Current, the NAACP’s director of branches, was not. Current worried that money going 
straight to chapters damaged the national office’s power, and he fired off an angry memo to 
Wilkins and Morsell on the day Jordan’s explanation arrived: “[Jordan] ought to know better and 
I am surprised that he is seeking this method to divorce our units from National Office 
control.”526 But Current’s opinion was rejected, and the NAACP allowed for its branches to 
communicate directly with the VEP under Brooks’s and Patton’s supervision. Between 1966 and 
1969, the VEP funded dozens of NAACP campaigns, maintaining a working relationship with 
the national office throughout its tenure. Writing to thank Jordan at the end of 1966 for the 
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VEP’s support of NAACP branches, Morsell quipped, “There appears to have been only one 
fault to find: you didn’t have enough money to give us.”527 
The VEP’s partnership with the SCLC was even more strained after accusations that the 
VEP was unfair. Martin Luther King Jr. focused on the national scene and left the daily work 
between the SCLC and its branches to his executive staff. The SCLC’s director of voter 
registration was Hosea Williams. The VEP approved several SCLC-related projects in 1966, but 
Williams demanded more. On April 22, he telephoned Jordan about extending VEP money to an 
SCLC project in Savannah. But Jordan refused, saying that the VEP was already working with 
the NAACP branch in Savannah. Williams “responded immediately with a great emotional 
outburst and accused the [Voter Education] Project of being unfair” and declared an end to the 
SCLC’s partnership with the VEP.528 Jordan refused to cancel the agreement unless he heard 
from Williams’ superiors, which he never did. Over the next few years, the VEP funded SCLC 
projects in Alabama, Georgia, and Virginia. In 1969, Williams led a protest outside the VEP’s 
office with picket signs reading “Vernon Jordan—An Educated Uncle Thomas” and “SRC’s 
VEP is a fraud.”529 Unbeknownst to the picketers, Jordan arrived and stood with them to learn 
why they were upset without anyone recognizing him. Williams was angry that the VEP had 
denied the SCLC $29,000 for a one-day registration drive and accused the VEP of financial 
mismanagement. The VEP thought the request was outrageous, and instead of confronting 
Williams about it in the street, Jordan mailed off a copy of the proposal to the Atlanta 
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Constitution. The protests stopped right away, and Williams submitted a more reasonable request 
that the VEP granted.530 
Managing the civil rights movement also required the VEP to expand its research agenda 
for the benefit of the general public. During the summer of 1966, the VEP released two reports 
based on Marvin Wall’s early research. The first was released one week after James Meredith 
was shot on the second day of his solo march from Memphis to Jackson. Meredith survived, but 
the act of violence was one of many that continued to plague the South. As research director, 
Wall had been working on a study of violent acts carried out against African Americans since the 
Voting Rights Act went into effect to demonstrate that the law itself had not ended white 
supremacist intimidation against registration workers. At least 16 documented incidents had 
occurred since August 1965. In Greenwood, Mississippi, 16 year-old Freddie Lee Thomas died 
after a car struck him while he was walking on the side of the road. His half-brother was 
convinced that Freddie had been targeted “to discourage Negro voter registration efforts.” In 
Barnwell, South Carolina, four canvassers affiliated with a local project were attacked and one 
stabbed by a gang of 15 to 20 white men. After collecting complaints for federal registrars in 
Laurel, Mississippi, an NAACP leader’s house was peppered with shotgun blasts. Vernon 
Dahmer, a 58 year-old leader in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, died after a firebombing on his home 
after leading a registration drive. Five miles south of Colerain, North Carolina, a five-foot cross 
was burned next to the house of a woman active in Bertie County registration work. These acts 
were not only evidence that white violence against African Americans had not stopped, but that 
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the pursuit of black political power was proving successful, triggering the most brutal of 
segregationists to lash out.531 
 A month later, the VEP released “The Effects of Federal Examiners and Organized 
Registration Campaigns on Negro Voter Registration” to prove that the most politically active 
counties were those with both VEP projects and federal examiners. After nearly a year of the 
Voting Rights Act, examiners had gone into 41 counties in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina and had registered 122,905 people. Even though the Voting Rights Act had also 
placed Georgia, Virginia, and 26 North Carolina counties under watch, no examiners had yet 
arrived in those areas. Wall documented that counties with both federal examiners and VEP 
programs had the highest percentages of black registration. The next highest numbers came from 
counties with only federal examiners, followed by those with just VEP projects. Counties with 
neither had the lowest figures. In Alabama, for example, Marengo County had both federal 
registrars and a VEP financed program where 5,535 out of 7,791 African Americans had 
registered, about 71 percent. Autauga County had only federal examiners, and 2,275 out of 3,651 
had registered, or 62 percent. A VEP registration project in Sumter County resulted in 3,369 out 
of 6,814 African Americans registered, but that was only 49 percent without examiners. And a 
typical county without either was Clarke County, where 2,495 out of 5,833 had registered, about 
43 percent. In total for Alabama, 69 percent had registered in counties with both examiners and 
the VEP, 64 percent with only examiners, 58 percent with only the VEP, and 45 percent without 
either.532 Results were similar in the other three states, with Mississippi the furthest behind. By 
the end of the summer, southern black registration stood at 2,620,359, compared to 14,309,704 
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of the white population—52 percent and 70 percent of those eligible, respectively.533 Based on 
hard evidence, Wall logged proof of the efficacy of federal examiners and the VEP, as well as 
the distance still to go. 
The VEP continued to amass information on disfranchisement, and in 1968, the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights borrowed heavily from VEP data in its 256-page study 
“Political Participation” chronicling the impact of the Voting Rights Act. Utilizing VEP studies 
and statistics, the Commission determined that while black registration and voting had increased, 
numerous barriers still existed that prevented African Americans from full political engagement. 
Since November 1966 when the study began, Commission attorneys and staff members visited 
55 counties in 10 states to review black political conditions. They came away with a picture of 
the South far from political equality. White conservatives held onto political power by diluting 
black votes, erecting barriers for black candidates, gerrymandering, turning elected positions into 
appointive ones, interfering with black poll watchers, and outright discrimination. The 
Commission also noticed that neither the Republican nor Democratic Party had made a full effort 
to bring African Americans into their organizations.534 Vernon Jordan called the report “well-
written, well-documented, and carefully prepared,” and along with its authors, called on the 
government to address these issues. Federal help combined with black registration could end 
these injustices. For Jordan, the solution was simple: “It has been our observation that the 
hostility and deviousness of white officials usually decrease as Negro voting registration 
increases.”535 
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Between 1966 and 1968, the VEP also translated its research and observations into 
booklets designed for citizenship education and distributed them among its grantees. Among 
them were “How to Conduct a Registration Campaign” and “Know Your Georgia Government.” 
Patricia Collins, a sophomore at Spellman College and a summer intern with the VEP in 1967, 
researched and wrote the manual on registration work. At 19 pages, the booklet was compact, yet 
thorough enough to serve as a primer for any group to sponsor their own drive. “A registration 
campaign in full swing is exciting to watch,” Spellman wrote, but “doesn’t happen 
automatically.”536 Collins advised finding an energetic director with good organizational skills, 
dividing areas between canvassers, documenting results, sticking to a budget, studying the laws, 
using local issues as motivation, carpooling to the registrar’s office, booking churches for mass 
meetings, and finding babysitters. Canvassing was the key. She also counseled readers to realize 
that people often do not admit they are unregistered, so canvassers should be persistent but 
understanding.537 
In “Know Your Georgia Government,” the first of several state-specific civic guides, the 
VEP explained the structure of the local and state government in 23 pages. The VEP found that 
many people voted without having a clear sense of the responsibilities of many offices. This was 
not only true for newly registered African Americans, but all voters, regardless of race. Sections 
on city, county, and state government, the governor’s office, the Legislature, the state 
constitution, law-making, courts, juries, as well as major issues such as education, welfare, and 
taxes, all explained to the reader what their votes could influence. “Having a vote means you 
                                                 
 





have power—power to help decide who is going to run your city, your county, and your state. 
Whom you elect determines the sort of government, good or bad, you will have.”538 
The VEP’s efforts in voter registration, research, and citizenship education paid off in the 
1966 mid-term elections. 20 black candidates won seats in state legislatures and many more 
assumed various county posts. Lucius Amerson won the sheriff’s race in Macon County, 
Georgia, believed to be the first black sheriff in the South during the twentieth century. Three 
African Americans were elected to the Texas State Legislature, including Barbara Jordan. In 
North Carolina, African American voters helped the progressive Nick Galifianakis win the fifth 
congressional district seat in the U.S. House. Demonstrating a willingness to support whichever 
party best served black interests, between upwards of 90,000 African Americans voted in the 
Arkansas gubernatorial race against the segregationist Democrat candidate and for Republican 
Winthrop Rockefeller, giving Rockefeller the victory. Black precincts in Memphis went 
overwhelmingly for the Democrat Ray Blanton, providing the margin to defeat Republican 
James Hurst in Tennessee’s seventh district. In Lowndes County, Alabama, the Black Panthers 
ran independent candidates, although they lost every race. In Mississippi, an NAACP member in 
Jefferson County won a school board seat by a vote of 225 to 113, becoming the state’s first 
black county official since Reconstruction. And significantly, in Dallas County, Alabama, 
African Americans voted out Sheriff Jim Clark—the face of white supremacy in Selma. During 
an election that witnessed the resurgence of conservatism across the United States, and while 
whites held on to most seats in the South, a new black political force also took shape.539 
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To foment this rising black political power, the VEP drew heavily on its philanthropic 
supporters, but a year into the second VEP, tragedy struck the Taconic Foundation. Since 1961, 
Stephen Currier had been one of the VEP’s anchors of support, but in January 1967, he and his 
wife Audrey disappeared on the way to the Virgin Islands.540 Eulogies poured in about the 
Currier’s support for the civil rights movement. Although Stephen had become more comfortable 
in the media, the Curriers had remained unknown to the general public. “What Stephen and 
Audrey Currier have meant to the civil rights movement in this country has never been 
adequately described,” Gertrude Wilson wrote in the New York Amsterdam News.541 In the 
Washington Post, Robert Baker wrote, “He [Stephen] saw his role as a catalyst for solving 
problems—one of them was money—in the civil rights movement. His actions steadied the 
major civil rights groups at a time of despair and growing distress.”542 One of Currier’s strengths 
had been to build coalitions, whether through the VEP, CUCRL, or other foundations. According 
to a friend, ‘“Currier believed it was not healthy philanthropy to build dependency on one 
source,’” and he succeeded in bringing foundations together to support diverse causes.543 
Although many Americans were unfamiliar with the Taconic Foundation and the Curriers, race 
leaders had come to know him well. Whitney Young wrote, “They were white in complexion, 
but saw this as an accident of birth—not as a symbol of advantage, privilege or superiority over 
other human beings of different color.”544 
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The deaths of Stephen and Audrey Currier sent the VEP into a mild panic because the 
Taconic Foundation was in no position to carry on business as usual. Paul Anthony asked David 
Hunter at the Stern Family Fund for assistance, explaining “Their tragic death has changed 
things considerably and it is out of the question that Taconic could continue this support.”545 In 
1966, the Taconic Foundation had given $150,000 to the VEP. Now, the VEP needed to make up 
the money elsewhere to meet the 1967 budget. Through the next several months, the VEP 
worked to expand its philanthropic base. The Ford Foundation gave another $24,000, and the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund donated $50,000. The Field Foundation did the most to make up for 
Taconic’s loss, with Dunbar initiating a $150,000 grant. The VEP also received $50,000 from the 
Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, $25,000 from the New World Foundation, $10,000 from 
the New York Foundation, and $1,645 from individual donations. In total, the VEP took in 
$310,545 for 1967.546 
In 1968, the VEP took in its highest total ever at $437,500. To ensure the VEP’s 
solvency, Jordan and Anthony reached out to various foundations for continued support. Leslie 
Dunbar remained a crucial ally of the VEP since leaving the SRC for the Field Foundation, and 
he again donated $150,000 for the VEP in 1968. Able to count on the Field Foundation, the VEP 
entered 1968 confident of winning other donations. By the end of the year, it had received 
another $24,000 from the Ford Foundation, $10,000 from the New York Foundation, $4,000 
from the North Carolina Fund, $15,000 from the Mary Reynolds Babcock Foundation, $2,500 
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from the Abelard Foundation, and $2,000 from private donors. The Taconic Foundation, still in 
the process of recovering after the loss of the Curriers, gave $5,000. In total, the VEP had 
acquired less than in previous years, but enough to get by. But in April, a horrific tragedy 
inspired another contribution. The VEP and the rest of the nation grieved at the loss of Martin 
Luther King Jr. after his murder on April 4. In memory of King’s achievements, the Field 
Foundation gave another $225,000 to the VEP as part of a larger donation to civil rights groups. 
Now with $375,000 from the Field Foundation alone, the VEP took in a total of $437,500 for 
1968. Conscious of King’s advocacy for black political power as “a lever for social and 
economic change,” the VEP worked to realize his vision.547 
Black Power and Leadership Training 
The second VEP operated during the early Black Power era, but rather than embrace the 
ideology of black nationalism as some disenchanted activists did, the VEP imagined black power 
as a strategy for local leaders to win political elections. The VEP promoted leadership training as 
effective black power, that when combined with voter registration and citizenship education, 
electing African Americans to local, state, and national offices offered the best path to political 
empowerment. In July 1966 during a planning meeting between VEP staff, foundation 
representatives, and civil rights leaders, the subject of black power came up. According to a 
Taconic Foundation official in attendance, “There was a lengthy discussion on the implications 
of ‘black power’ and the VEP project. All of the people who are close to the southern scene 
agreed that this is more of a slogan than a movement. They agreed that it is a very appealing 
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concept and could become a movement with the right leadership.”548 Jordan never publicly 
criticized black power activists for their embrace of black nationalism, but the VEP interpreted 
black power as engaged politics. When Kwame Ture (formerly Stokely Carmichael) and Charles 
V. Hamilton published Black Power in the fall of 1967, Jordan and others at the VEP studied the 
text. Black Power was more of a meditation rather than a blueprint, and its section on the 
Lowndes County Freedom Organization (LCFO) offered an analysis on voting that the VEP 
agreed with. “The act of registering to vote does several things,” wrote Ture and Hamilton. “It 
marks the beginning of political modernization by broadening the base of participation. It also 
does something the existentialists talk about: it gives one a sense of being.”549 
To realize black power, the VEP hosted a series of leadership training conferences 
between 1966 and 1968. These meetings were rooted in history. Jordan and other black leaders 
knew what happened last time African Americans rose in political influence in the South. “In the 
years after Reconstruction came a dark period called Redemption,” wrote VEP staff. “During 
this period, white Southerners turned back the clock and reasserted their control over the lives of 
black people…A second Redemption is unthinkable if the region—and the nation—is to survive 
as a multi-racial society.”550 The VEP committed itself to preventing a second Redemption. To 
do so, the VEP supported the South’s newly elected black officials. Whether as a state legislator, 
chancery clerk, school board member, county commissioner, sheriff, constable, justice of the 
peace, mayor, or any local position, most people had not served in elected office before. Unlike 
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funding individual projects, Jordan believed that leadership training necessitated bringing people 
to the VEP. During late 1966, the VEP first tried out the idea. 
On December 29 and 30, 1966, the VEP hosted a seminar for state legislators. The VEP 
had no model on which to base such a conference, and it wanted to try out this idea without 
media scrutiny. “VEP chose not to publicize the Seminar, so that all discussions could be off-the-
record and frank,” summarized Paul Anthony in his year-end report.551 Dr. Vivian Henderson, 
President of Clark College, spoke on “Southern Economics and Public Policy.” Jack Greenberg 
of the LDF, with whom the VEP partnered for the seminar, lectured on how state legislators 
could help their constituents. State Senator Leroy Johnson from Georgia and State 
Representative A.W. Willis from Tennessee led a workshop on “effective law making.” The next 
day, State Senator Barbara Jordan from Texas and State Senator Horace Ward from Georgia led 
an informal discussion on strategies that worked in their chambers. In total, 11 legislators who 
attended were from Georgia, while six came from Tennessee, and three from Texas. 
Representatives from the Democratic National Committee, the Republican National Committee, 
the United Auto Workers, the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education, and the United 
States Commission on Civil Rights attended as well.552 “The seminar was one of VEP’s most 
successful and exciting undertakings of the year,” Jordan wrote Leslie Dunbar. “The seminar 
sustained our belief that leadership training is important and valuable to all segments of the 
Negro community in the South.”553  
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The next training conference took place at Clark College in July 1967 for local 
government officials. A total of 34 elected officials attended, representing multiple offices and 
states from around the South. The VEP paid for their travel and lodging, and it organized several 
workshops such as “Practical Problems of Negro Councilmen” and “Problem Areas of Urban 
Government.” Bayard Rustin gave the keynote address, sending a message that “the civil rights 
struggle is now a matter of practical politics—not, as in the past era of demonstrations, one of 
ideological absolutes.”554  
Six months later, the VEP held another leadership seminar for Mississippi officials. At 
the time, few African Americans held elected positions in the state, but as more registered, they 
stood poised to swell in number since Mississippi had the highest black population percentage in 
the United States. Anticipating the rise of black political power in Mississippi, the VEP invited 
all of the state’s black officials. Out of 22 people, 18 came from 10 counties, holding positions 
such as county supervisor, constable, justice of the peace, chancery clerk, and coroner. They held 
question-and-answer sessions with VEP staff and speakers, sharing ideas about how to govern 
with confidence. Reminding them of the past, Jordan told them, “We must avoid the perils that 
befell your predecessors in the Reconstruction era.”555 Bayard Rustin delivered the main address, 
entitled “An Overview of the Negro in the Political Process.” He challenged them to govern for 
their black and white constituents alike, and to entrench the ideals of the civil rights movement 
into legislation. Repeating familiar themes, Rustin told the eighteen officeholders, “What we 
need to do is to force the American society to re-evaluate its values...That will not be done in the 
                                                 
554 Cheryl Chisholm, “Officeholders Meet at Clark,” VEP News 1, no. 3 (August 1967); and Agenda, Local 
Government Seminar, Clark College, July 27-29, 1967, Folder “Southern Regional Council: Voter Education 
Project, 1967-1971,” Taconic Foundation Records. 
 
555 W.F. Minor, "Newly Elected Mississippians Told To Be On Guard," New Orleans Times Picayune, December 
15, 1967. 
 205 
streets. It will be done in the city halls, the state legislatures, in the national Congress and in the 
White House.”556  
In between the Clark College conference and the one in Mississippi, hundreds of African 
Americans ran for office in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Virginia. In Louisiana, 252 black men 
and women campaigned for positions, along with 40 in Virginia and 32 in Mississippi. On 
Election Day, 28 won in Louisiana, 22 in Mississippi, and six in Virginia. Each state also had 
one black candidate win a seat in the state legislature, bringing the total to six states in the South 
with at least one African American serving in the highest branch of state government. While the 
majority of candidates lost, the VEP looked at these results in a positive light, providing further 
evidence of a historic political shift in the making. After all of the results were in, Marvin Wall 
found a connection between VEP projects and locations with black candidates. “As might be 
expected,” he wrote Jordan, “there is a high correlation between counties in which the Voter 
Education Project has funded projects and counties in which Negroes are running for office and 
being elected to office.”557 
Over the next year, the VEP hosted several more seminars for elected officials in 
Louisiana, North Carolina, South Carolina, Florida, and Alabama. During the 1968 primary 
season, over 250 black men and women appeared on ballots for various posts in local and state 
races. Anticipating the highest total ever of southern black elected officials after Election Day, 
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the VEP judged that a major conference for the entire South was necessary. Naming it the 
Southwide Conference for Black Elected Officials and booking space in Atlanta from December 
11-14, 1968, Jordan invited every known black official and candidate in the South with a 
personalized invitation promising that the VEP would pay travel expenses. Applying to the 
Taconic Foundation for additional funds for the conference, Jordan wrote, “We feel…that it is a 
natural extension of the VEP’s role to convene these officeholders…for an exchange of views 
and for discussion of the future.”558  
While the VEP planned the Southwide Conference, Jordan turned his attention to the 
1968 presidential race. President Johnson had announced on March 31 that he would not 
campaign for another term, worn down by the Vietnam War, a splintered Democratic Party, and 
the growing strength of Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy in the primaries. Most African 
Americans supported Kennedy, but his assassination on June 6 deflated their excitement about 
the election, mixed with the lingering grief over Martin Luther King Jr.’s death in April. 
Violence in Chicago tarnished the Democratic National Convention while delegates chose Vice-
President Hubert H. Humphrey as their presidential nominee. On the Republican side, former 
Vice-President Richard Nixon resurrected his political career and held off a challenge from 
Ronald Reagan to earn the presidential nomination. Former Alabama Governor George C. 
Wallace ran as an independent catering to reactionary whites across the country. Compared to 
the other candidates, Humphrey was liberal, but African Americans doubted his sincerity on civil 
rights after black newspapers printed photographs of him embracing Georgia’s segregationist 
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Governor Lester Maddox on the campaign trail. Sizing up all three candidates in The Nation, 
Jordan noted that unlike in 1960 and 1964, “the Southern Negro has the franchise but no choice.” 
African Americans were lukewarm at best about Humphrey, and they took Nixon’s and 
Wallace’s calls for law and order as thinly veiled racism. Jordan acknowledged that Nixon would 
probably win, but he also warned the country to stop overlooking southern black voters. African 
Americans were poised to win elections across the South—evidence of actual black power.559 
On November 5, 1968, southern African Americans demonstrated their poll power in 
hundreds of state and local races. Echoing the strategy of Bayard Rustin, Jordan spoke at an 
Associated Press convention ten days after the election: “We did not speak with sit-ins and 
demonstrations, boycotts or court action. Nor did we voice our grievances…through civil 
disobedience or violence. We spoke to America at the ballot box.”560 According to VEP 
research, around two-thirds of registered African Americans in the South voted, usually for 
Democratic candidates. In Texas, the black vote helped secure Humphrey’s lone win in the 
South. Elsewhere, at least 107 African Americans won their contests. 12 African Americans 
were elected to the Legislature in Georgia, 19 as justices of the peace in Alabama, 15 to the 
Election Commission in Mississippi, five on city councils in Arkansas, and three to local school 
boards in Louisiana. Others won races for magistrate, constable, town marshal, board of revenue, 
and city recorder in several states. In total, 385 black men and women now served in elected 
positions within the eleven southern states. Nixon’s victory drew little praise from African 
Americans, but gains in local elections demonstrated black political power.561 
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With the election results tallied, the VEP concentrated on the Southwide Conference for 
Black Elected Officials. Out of 385 eligible people, 189 attended the four-day seminar in 
Atlanta. CBS and NBC sent television crews to film highlights, and major newspapers printed 
stories about the historical significance of the gathering. Not since Reconstruction had so many 
elected African Americans been in one room. On the conference’s opening night, Jordan 
welcomed them with a warning: “The Negro officeholder is being observed closely by both 
races. Some of the watching eyes are friendly, but many are hostile.”562 He sympathized with 
them as leaders bearing the weight of unfair expectations from their constituents when they were 
new to government. “Black voters often feel that officeholders should produce instantly, almost 
magically, all those benefits and services that had been denied down through the years by callous 
white officials.”563 
Roaming the conference halls and peering into workshops, Reverend John Morris, the 
SRC’s coordinator for special projects and an Episcopalian minister, found the Southwide 
Conference sessions “very much alive with discussion.”564 Seminars offering practical advice for 
school board members, law enforcement officers, state legislators, and multiple city and county 
officials lasted for hours and generated many new ideas. Notable speakers at the conference 
included Attorney General Ramsey Clark, Mayor Gordon Hatcher of Gary, Indiana, 
Congresswoman Shirley Chisholm from New York, Georgia State Representative Julian Bond, 
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Reginald Hawkins and Eva Clayton from North Carolina, and Lawrence T. Guyot Jr. of the 
Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. Ultimately, according to Morris, the “chief success” of 
the conference was simply that “for the first time, the region’s black elected 
officials…assembled together.”565 
Black power was as an important theme of the Southwide Conference. Rooting the 
ideology in black electoral power, the VEP encouraged those in attendance to apply black power 
to politics in a way that Bayard Rustin suggested. Shirley Chisholm, the first African American 
woman elected to Congress, told the crowd, “Black power is concerned with organizing the rage 
of black people” through political activism.566 In his keynote address, former SNCC 
communications director and Georgia State Congressman Julian Bond told the crowd to be proud 
that their constituents placed enough faith in them to give them their vote, and to take it as a sign 
that most African Americans still believed in political solutions. Quoting the words of 
Reconstruction-era black politicians who were stripped of their positions a century earlier, Bond 
stated, “Their words are 100 years old, but their thoughts and ideas are as fresh as tomorrow. If 
each of us can approach his job with one half the fire and fervor that these…men did, then we 
will have vindicated the trust our constituents put in us.”567 Agreeing with the tone of the 
conference, the Atlanta Constitution editorialized, “‘Black power’ is a much and often misused 
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slogan…But what happens when black power is achieved—when Negroes are elected to office? 
Then the focus of interest must shift from power to responsible use of power.”568 
After four days of speeches, networking, and workshops, the Southwide Conference 
ended with black elected officials more confident about their roles in government. After 
returning home, many wrote the VEP with sincere thanks. Sheriff Lucius D. Anderson of Macon 
County, Alabama, the South’s lone black sheriff, expressed his gratitude.569 State Representative 
Albert W. Thompson of Georgia wrote that the Southwide Conference was “one of the richest 
and most rewarding of my entire life.”570 Norfolk City Councilman Joseph A. Jordan Jr. thanked 
the VEP for moving “towards liberating the Southland.”571 V.A. Edwards, a Board of Revenue 
Commissioner in Macon County, Alabama, wrote Jordan thanking the VEP for “making it 
possible for the newly elected officials…to make a better adjustment than was done in the earlier 
days of Reconstruction.”572  
With 1968 turning out to be the VEP’s busiest year, Jordan and the SRC renewed the 
VEP for a third time through 1972. The second VEP had proven that the Voting Rights Act alone 
was not enough to solve black disfranchisement. The task was far from finished, and the VEP 
wanted to continue its work through voter registration, education, and leadership training. At an 
SRC conference, staff members discussed the possibility of disassociating the VEP from the 
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SRC, securing its own tax-exemption so the VEP could “do more than just be a backer” and 
become an active civil rights group.573 They proposed a new policy for its grants to only go to 
counties with less than 50 percent of its black population registered and require local groups to 
raise matching funds. For the four-year project, Jordan created a budget worth $500,000 per year, 
and he sent the proposal to various foundations. Eclipsing its previous grants to the VEP, the 
Ford Foundation committed $250,000 for 1969. The Taconic and Field Foundations also 
responded with interest. Taconic was noncommittal but hinted at future support, while the Field 
Foundation pledged $125,000 for 1969 with a promise to consider three annual renewals. Leslie 
Dunbar, the VEP’s constant supporter, wrote Jordan with news of the Field Foundation’s 
assistance: “We are happy to have been a part, and to continue being one, of this program that 
has meant so much to all of us.”574 
More than any other organization, the VEP fostered and managed the rise of post-Voting 
Rights Act black poll power in the South. In three years, the VEP funded at least 403 local 
projects concentrating on registration, citizenship education, and leadership training in 11 states. 
Black registration grew from 2,689,000 in mid-1966 to 3,112,000 by the end of the summer in 
1968, an increase of 423,000 people, about 14 percent.575 Although the VEP was not responsible 
for every registrant, it ensured that activists had access to resources that encouraged community 
members to register, vote, and get involved in local politics unlike ever before. Encapsulating the 
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opinions of others, John Morsell wrote Vernon Jordan in March 1969 thanking him for the 
VEP’s support to the NAACP over the last several years: “The funds which VEP has made 
available to us via the route of direct grants to branch campaigns have often spelled the 
difference between some action and no action at all.”576 Recalling his time with the VEP years 
later in his memoir, Jordan wrote, “There was never any doubt in our minds that we were doing 
some of the most vital work in the South. Those newly registered and voting black people would 
change Southern politics forever.”577 
Although it intended to last another four years through 1972, the VEP’s progress ruptured 
in 1969. According to Paul Anthony, “Through much of the year, in dramatic testimony to its 
effectiveness, VEP was engaged in a struggle for its life. At the end of the year, VEP’s future 
remained clouded.”578 That struggle was due to the debate surrounding tax reform, in which 
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CHAPTER 6: ‘THE BIGGEST BIASED REGISTRARS OF ALL’: THE TAX REFORM ACT 
OF 1969 AND THE ATTACK ON THE BLACK VOTE 
 
Representative Wright Patman, a populist New Dealer from Texas who had served in the 
House of Representatives since 1929, finally felt vindicated. On February 18, 1969, he sat as the 
first witness before the House Ways and Means Committee to offer his opinion on big 
philanthropy, an opinion he had been trying to share for over a decade, although few had paid 
attention. “Are the giant foundations on the road to becoming political machines?” he asked the 
Committee members. For years, Patman had criticized the exponential growth of philanthropic 
foundations and how their tax-exemptions deprived the federal government of revenue. Under 
generous IRS guidelines, foundations had avoided paying taxes, and while philanthropists 
claimed these exemptions freed them to spend generously on projects intended to benefit society, 
Patman was convinced that the majority harbored their money and cheated the American people. 
At times, Patman’s evidence had bordered on the conspiratorial, but within the last two years, 
conservatives started paying attention to his claims. They saw something more insidious than tax 
shelters, especially within the Ford Foundation, which in their opinion, was the most liberal of all 
major foundations. Patman saw it too, and in his opening statement, wondered aloud to his 
fellow House members, “Does the Ford Foundation have a grandiose design to bring vast 
political, economic and social changes to the nation in the 1970s?”579 
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During the late 1960s, conservatives attacked philanthropic foundations. They did so out 
of fear, believing that many foundations had grown too large, powerful, wealthy, liberal, and 
supportive of the civil rights movement and black power. The assault began in late 1967. Earlier 
that summer, the Ford Foundation gave a $175,000 grant to CORE for voter registration 
fieldwork in Cleveland, Ohio. Months later, Carl Stokes won the city’s mayoral race, becoming 
the first African American mayor of a major metropolis. CORE was not involved in Stokes’s 
campaign, but conservatives saw a connection. Without evidence, conservatives in Congress and 
in the press believed the Ford Foundation had meddled in politics and helped elect the first 
African American mayor of a major city. Over the next year and a half, more stories surfaced 
about alleged tax abuses by foundations. Many liberals and populists were upset alongside 
conservatives, converging with a larger national debate over taxes and whether or not 
philanthropy paid its fair share in society. This cross-ideological, collective outrage against 
foundations shielded conservatives and enabled them to weaken the civil rights movement.580 
Many Americans believed their country was descending into chaos during the late 1960s, 
and big philanthropy was only part of the problem. President Lyndon B. Johnson’s policies 
within his War on Poverty were beginning to unravel as he sunk his attention and political capital 
into expanding the Vietnam War. Riots broke out in Newark, Detroit, and other cities. The 
Democratic National Convention in Chicago turned violent, only months removed from the 
assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr. and Robert F. Kennedy in 1968. Richard Nixon and 
George Wallace appealed to white conservatives through their presidential campaigns, 
engineering a racialized populist anger across the United States. Part of that frustration took aim 
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at liberal foundations, who conservatives claimed fomented social rebellion in cities like 
Cleveland.   
Conservatives took advantage of popular indignation toward big philanthropy to 
undermine African American voting power. They did so through the Tax Reform Act of 1969, a 
long, complex law that was the product of 10 months of legislative wrangling between the 
United States House of Representatives, Senate, and Treasury Department. The bill eliminated 
loopholes for the rich while easing taxes for most Americans by updating regulations on bonds, 
credit, charitable deductions, and income tax. Most Americans were in favor of tax reform, and 
while the law addressed hundreds of separate taxation policies, Section 4945 did something else. 
Within this portion of the bill, Congress outlined restrictions for philanthropic foundations that 
gave money to voter registration campaigns. Southern conservatives in Congress were 
responsible—those once proud to identify as segregationists. To defund organizations working to 
register African Americans, conservatives led by Senator Russell Long of Louisiana and Senator 
Herman Talmadge of Georgia accused tax-exempt foundations of illegally influencing politics 
when sponsoring voter registration activities. Most Americans agreed that tax-exempt 
philanthropies should not be involved in politics, but Senators Long, Russell, and their allies 
enflamed the issue by exaggerating the extent to which foundations supported such projects. 
Through the Tax Reform Act of 1969, conservatives compromised the money supply to civil 
rights groups conducting registration campaigns. 
Caught in this firestorm was the Voter Education Project. While the VEP remained 
operational in 1969—funding 98 projects and helping increase southern African American 
registration by 136,000 to a record high of 3,248,000—the tax debate distracted executive 
director Vernon Jordan, frightened philanthropic supporters, and put the VEP’s future in 
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jeopardy.581 The VEP and its allies lobbied against the tax reform bill, helping forge a 
compromise of sorts. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 allowed for the continuation of tax-exempt 
philanthropic support to the VEP and similar organizations, but under strict rules. The new 
restrictions meant that the VEP would have to spend an inordinate amount of time fundraising, 
diversifying its financial support, and stretching its resources. Philanthropists became much more 
cautious when dealing with civil rights agencies, and foundations instituted much tighter 
oversight. The SRC and VEP separated to preserve separate tax-exemptions, cutting the VEP off 
from its parent organization and support system. The close relationship between philanthropy 
and the VEP diminished, and as the money became more difficult to acquire, voting rights 
activity stalled across the South.  
Conservatives such as Senators Long and Talmadge did not care, for by compromising 
philanthropic support to the VEP, they intentionally undermined the civil rights movement. To 
them, the VEP was part of the problem, empowering black political activism across the 
American South. After the Voting Rights of 1965, African Americans registered in greater 
number than ever before, and since the South had remained a one-party region for nearly a 
century, they joined the Democratic Party. White conservatives were alarmed, not only because 
black enfranchisement changed the racial complexion of the Democratic Party, but to them, the 
civil rights movement had harmed society, not improved it. Yet the legislative successes of the 
civil rights era and changing moods within the country prevented conservatives from using the 
same racist tactics and language that had served them so well over the past century. Using the tax 
reform debate as an under-the-radar tactic, conservatives learned to employ race-neutral and tax-
oriented language to mask their underlying motives to attack civil rights and black power. 
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Borrowing from Nixon’s racially coded appeals to the silent majority, conservatives claimed 
they wanted to stop foundations from tampering with elections, but they were also trying to 
prevent the civil rights movement from going any further.  
The VEP survived the Tax Reform Act of 1969, but it was never the same. Neither was 
the larger civil rights movement in the American South since grassroots organizations like the 
Houston County Voters Committee in Georgia, the Jefferson Davis County Voters League in 
Mississippi, and the McCormick Civic League in South Carolina lost crucial financial and 
educational support from the VEP. The diminished capability of the VEP accelerated the loss of 
enthusiasm and local activism surrounding black voting rights, and the southwide movement for 
the ballot began to wither away. 
The Fight Against Philanthropy 
 The conservative assault against foundations stretched back almost two decades. In 1952, 
Representative Edward E. Cox of Georgia led a House investigation to determine if “tax exempt 
educational and philanthropic foundations are financing un-American and subversive 
activities.”582 Cox and his allies believed foundations had connections to communist 
sympathizers. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, foundations funded more social science 
research within the United States and abroad, projects that often pointed out problems of 
inequality. In particular, Cox considered the Carnegie Corporation’s work with the United 
Nations as unacceptable, recalling Carnegie’s previous support to Gunnar Myrdal during the 
1940s. Myrdal was a Swedish sociologist whose influential 1944 publication, An American 
Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy, chronicled racism in the South. 
Carnegie’s relationship to Myrdal underscored conservative mistrust of big philanthropy. During 
his investigation, Cox also called executives of the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations to give 
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testimony on their philanthropic ventures to promote integrated schooling in the South. In an 
editorial for the Chicago Defender, NAACP executive secretary Walter White argued that the 
purpose of the Cox Committee was “to intimidate all foundations so that they would be afraid to 
contribute funds for the advancement of civil rights and equal justice for Negroes in the 
South.”583 Less than three weeks later, Cox died. His committee had been unable to find any 
evidence of subversive activities by foundations, and without Cox, the committee disbanded.584 
 Conservatives in Congress had taken note of Cox’s allegations, and less than a year later, 
Congressman B. Carroll Reece of Tennessee formed a new committee to continue investigating 
tax-exempt foundations. Reece had more to scrutinize than did Cox. In 1953, the Fund for the 
Advancement of Education and the Fund for the Republic, two projects established under the 
Ford Foundation, began studies of segregated education that disturbed southern Congressmen. 
Calling the Cox Committee “soft,” Reece promised more action to study how tax-exempt 
foundations supported propaganda “to influence public opinion for the support of certain types of 
ideologies that tend to the left.”585 But Reece’s study came at a time when the country and 
national press were wary of Senator Joseph McCarthy’s alleged communist conspiracies. The 
Washington Post poked fun at Reece soon after hearings began by calling him “mischievous” 
and arguing that another committee to inspect foundations was “wholly unnecessary, stupidly 
wasteful of public funds and can serve no purpose save intimidation.”586 Public opinion and 
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House leadership were against Reece, and he abandoned the inquiry before foundations even had 
the chance to respond.587  
 While the Cox and Reece Committees had little immediate impact, they planted in the 
mind of conservatives the belief that foundations were leftist, powerful, and mysterious with tax-
exempt privileges. And foundations took notice. “[I]f not part of a vast communist conspiracy,” 
writes historian Alice O’Connor, “the big foundations were undeniably part of a fairly insulated, 
at least moderately liberal, heavily Ivy League, and, yes, interlocking corporate-government-
university elite.”588 Philanthropy’s secrecy, coupled with allegations from the Cox and Reece 
Committees, gave conservative writers plenty of material to draw on. Through the rest of the 
decade, popular right-wing authors such as René A. Wormser and Harold Lord Varney accused 
the Ford Foundation of insidious, left-wing activity.589 The backlash against Ford caused its 
leadership to scale down its grants to projects that might appear controversial, including shutting 
down its Gray Areas urban program and the Fund for the Advancement of Education. As 
historian Olivier Zunz sums up, “The Cox and Reece congressional investigations failed to 
convict the liberal foundations, but they put them on alert.”590 
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In 1961, around the time when Stephen Currier was pushing for greater philanthropic 
support for civil rights, Representative Wright Patman launched what would become an eight-
year campaign against alleged philanthropic tax abuse. Patman’s views on government were 
opposite from Cox and Reece, but like his conservative colleagues, he accused foundations of 
financial manipulation. He suspected that most foundations were nothing more than facades of 
altruism that horded wealth. The year before Patman began his inquiry, Business Week published 
an advice column asking its affluent readers, “Have you ever thought about setting up a ‘family 
foundation’?” It made sense, the magazine suggested, because “if properly set up…it pays no 
federal taxes at all; yet it can be kept entirely under the control of its founder and his family.”591 
This type of message alarmed Patman, and as chair of the House Select Committee on Small 
Business, he reviewed over 500 foundations searching for a pattern of tax abuse. During his 
years of investigation, he did uncover abuses—most notably the CIA’s control of the National 
Student Association—but errant research and a penchant for exaggeration undermined Patman’s 
broader call for philanthropic reform. His work had a cumulative effect, and he published eight 
reports during the decade. In 1964, Patman pushed the Treasury Department to investigate 
foundations, but the Treasury found that most abuses were negligible and that small foundations 
were the main culprits, not major ones like Ford and Rockefeller. Yet Patman—“the most 
indefatigable of the populist gadflies on Capitol Hill”—would not relent, calling for a 25-year 
limit on foundations, greater oversight, and an easier way to strip them of tax-exemption.592 
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 As government officials and the general pubic became more aware of Patman’s 
accusations against tax-exempt foundations, the New York Times broke the story of CORE’s 
$175,000 voter registration grant from the Ford Foundation on July 14, 1967. Calling Ford’s 
grant “an unusual move” to a “so-called militant civil rights group,” reporter Douglas Robinson 
noted that CORE had become “an increasingly vocal champion of the black power concept.”593 
Robinson also observed that Mayor Ralph S. Locher refused to discuss whether or not the grant 
would help his opponent Carl Stokes in the upcoming Democratic primary. The money was for 
non-partisan registration drives and community programs, but right away, the grant raised 
suspicions of political activity by a major foundation because of its timing to the election. Black 
newspapers did not help, with headlines such as “$175,000 Ford Grant To Help Put Stokes in 
Office” and “CORE’s Ford Grant Could Help Get Stokes Elected.”594 On October 3, Stokes 
defeated Locher by 18,736 votes and went on to win the race, becoming the first black mayor of 
a major American city. Many looked at the Stokes campaign with suspicion for the role the Ford 
Foundation may have played. Philanthropic support for voter registration work was nothing new, 
but Ford appeared to have crossed a line by getting involved in a particular city during an 
important race. The possibility of foul play was enough to raise suspicion that if foundations 
wanted to, they could involve themselves in more elections to manipulate outcomes through tax-
exempt donations.595 
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 Over the next year, more stories broke about alleged foundation abuses. McGeorge 
Bundy, who took over as President of the Ford Foundation in 1966 after serving in the Kennedy 
and Johnson Administrations, pushed Ford in an increasingly ambitious direction that funded 
controversial projects. In particular, the Ford Foundation financed a school reform project in 
Brooklyn that smacked of political interference, and it awarded eight former staff members from 
Senator Robert F. Kennedy’s presidential campaign with travel grants worth $131,000 to help 
them recoup after his murder. The national press reported on these stories, reflecting the Ford 
Foundation’s growing reputation as too cozy with liberals and a provocateur of social change. At 
the same time, Americans were becoming restless about taxes in general. While inflation 
continued to climb, the Johnson Administration had increased income taxes in 1967 to fund the 
Vietnam War. One of the final acts of the Treasury Department under Johnson had been to 
release a report that detailed over 200 people taking advantage of tax loopholes. In February 
1969, the Treasury Department was flooded with nearly 2,000 letters demanding reform. With 
Americans angry about tax abuse and distrustful of foundations, a change in the White House 
afforded a convenient time for both Republicans and Democrats in Congress to move forward 
with comprehensive tax reform.596 
 On January 29, 1969, the House Ways and Means Committee announced it would begin 
hearings in February to reform federal tax laws. Chairman Wilbur D. Mills, a Democrat from 
Arkansas who wielded enormous influence within the House, told the press that his committee 
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wanted nothing less than a “comprehensive reform package,” indicating that investigating tax-
exempt foundations was high on their priority list.597 In between his announcement and the first 
hearing on February 18, the story broke about the Ford Foundation aiding former Robert 
Kennedy staffers, solidifying in the mind of conservatives the opinion that foundations needed 
stricter controls. Reminding readers of all recent abuses, Laurence Stern of the Washington Post 
labeled Ford and similar foundations the “philanthropic-industrial complex.” But to Stern, the 
most egregious offense was CORE’s Cleveland grant from Ford, which “expanded voter 
registration in the slums, a venture that was presumed to have helped ensure the victory of Carl 
B. Stokes in 1967.”598 Before the first witness had been called, it was clear that big philanthropy 
was the primary target.599 
 The first witness was Wright Patman. On February 18, he took center stage before the 
House Ways and Means Committee, pleased that the federal government was finally looking into 
philanthropic tax abuse. According to his research, somewhere between 22,0000 and 30,000 
foundations existed, with around $20,500,000,000 in total assets. Philanthropy had grown too big 
without proper federal checks, Patman claimed, and his proposals were meant not “to destroy 
foundations, but to reform them.”600 He recommended a 20 percent tax on investment income 
and a 25 year limit on all foundations. Alan Pifer, president of the Carnegie Corporation, likened 
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the proposals to “a remedy tantamount to using a jack hammer to crack a walnut.”601 But in 
Patman’s mind, while some foundations gave to important causes, many more “don’t do much 
for the nation except serve as tax evasion devices for the very rich. But they’re so loaded with 
money that no one dares touch them—except me.”602 
 The next day, Representative John J. Rooney, a Democrat from New York, fanned 
Patman’s accusations by claiming that a foundation had funded his opponent during his last 
campaign. “I am the first known member of Congress,” Rooney declared in his testimony, “to be 
forced to campaign for reelection against the awesome financial resources of a tax-exempt 
foundation.”603 Without providing evidence, Rooney accused Frederick W. Richmond, a wealthy 
coffin manufacturer based in Manhattan, of using his Richmond Foundation to move $250,000 
into several Jewish neighborhood groups in Brooklyn that functioned as ward clubs for his 
opponent. Richmond denied the allegations, but Rooney’s message had its intended effect. 
Already distrustful of philanthropic ventures into politics, House members thought Rooney’s 
allegations sounded plausible, even without proof.604 
 The day after Rooney’s testimony, McGeorge Bundy appeared before the House Ways 
and Means committee to represent the Ford Foundation. During four hours of questioning, 
Bundy was belligerent and defensive, hardening the will of the committee to strike at 
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foundations in the new law. Committee members from both parties brought up allegations of 
improper Ford Foundation grants, such as CORE’s work in Cleveland, school reform programs 
in New York City, and travel grants for Robert Kennedy’s former staff. Where was the line, they 
asked Bundy, between educational grants and political advocacy? These were tax-exempt funds, 
they reminded him, and should not be used on anything that could be taken as political. Bundy 
defended the work of the Ford Foundation, but with too much arrogance for the committee to 
stomach. Responding to a line of questioning from Representative John W. Byrnes regarding the 
criteria the Ford Foundation uses to determine its grantees, Bundy stated testily, “We do it case 
by case or program by program, Mr. Byrnes.”605 He claimed each grant was educational and not 
intended to shape public policy. But it was how Bundy delivered the message that was 
remembered, not the substance of what he said.606 
 Through several more weeks of testimony, committee members heard from 
philanthropists, tax experts, and government officials in preparation for writing the bill’s first 
draft. Tightening controls on foundations was just one part of the larger bill, but foundations 
were the main target. Those called before the committee kept reinforcing the need, whether on 
purpose or not. Former IRS chairman Mortimer Caplan called for greater oversight, while 
Nelson Rockefeller III tried to dismiss the allegation that the entire philanthropic model was 
unjust. But when Rockefeller mentioned that he had not paid income taxes since 1961 because of 
generous write-offs, he “brought the committee bolt upright and sent newspapermen racing for 
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the telephones.”607 The next day, the Chicago Tribune printed the story on its front page: 
“Rockefeller Bares: No Tax on His Income.”608 The evidence kept piling up, and foundations 
could not mount a credible defense. On April 22, President Nixon gave a speech on tax reform 
promising that “exempt organizations, including private foundations, would come under much 
stricter surveillance.”609 Two days later, the House Ways and Means Committee ended hearings 
with Mills predicting that a draft version of the bill would be ready in August.610  
As Congressmen began writing the law, distrust for foundations swelled. In April, the 
American Conservative Union circulated an influential pamphlet throughout Congress, and in 
May, a scandal involving Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and the little-known Wolfson 
Foundation solidified American opinion against big philanthropy. The American Conservative 
Union, a lobbying firm that originated out of Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential defeat, 
published “The Financiers of Revolution” by a Senate staff attorney named Allan C. Brownfeld. 
In it, Brownfeld outlined all recent accusations made against the Ford Foundation, arguing “tax-
exempt foundations do, in fact, engage in partisan political activities, and on a grand scale.”611 
While “The Financiers of Revolution” passed hands in Congress, William Lambert broke a story 
in Life Magazine about Supreme Court Justice Abe Fortas and his ties to Wall Street financier 
Louis Wolfson and the Wolfson Foundation. Although the details remained murky, Lambert 
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proved that Fortas received a check for $20,000 from the Wolfson Foundation in 1966 for 
unspecified reasons. Almost a year later, Fortas returned the money, but only after Wolfson was 
indicted for stock manipulation, for which he was later imprisoned. Lambert implied that 
Wolfson had paid his friend Fortas to help with his legal situation. Nixon and Chief Justice Earl 
Warren pressured Fortas to resign rather than face impeachment, and he turned in his letter on 
May 15. The situation could not have come at a worse time for the foundation community. As 
House members were drafting legislation, theories about the Ford Foundation’s political 
intentions were eclipsed by the all-too-real example of Fortas and the Wolfson Foundation.612 
Crippling the Vote by Compromising the Money 
As popular distrust of foundations grew and House members drafted the law behind 
closed doors, civil rights leaders began expressing concern over tax reform. Up until that point, 
the VEP and its allies had stayed quiet, not wanting to draw extra attention to the relationship 
between foundations and voter registration projects. But when it became clear that foundations 
would be affected, race leaders started speaking out. Whitney Young telegrammed President 
Nixon and copied Mills with the message that restraining foundations would mean hampering 
voter registration efforts, thereby damaging the civil rights movement. Young raised the specter 
of black power and insisted that registration work kept radical tactics at bay: “By channeling 
black citizens’ anger and frustration into voting through non-partisan programs we have been 
able to make this a more constructive alternative than those methods proposed by more violent 
revolutionists.”613 Roy Wilkins wrote to Representative Emmanuel Celler to argue that by 
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limiting support for black voter fieldwork, “the registration of Negro citizens to vote would be 
crippled so badly that, in effect, the Administration and the Congress would be the biggest biased 
registrars of all.”614 
Wilkins’s letter to Celler was in response to the Treasury Department’s recently released 
proposals for tax reform. While the Treasury Department would not write the law, the Treasury 
wanted the House Ways and Means Committee to take its recommendations into consideration. 
In a press statement, Treasury stated that it wanted to “prohibit private foundations from 
themselves engaging in voter registration drives or other activity affecting political 
campaigns.”615 But using ambiguous language, Treasury hinted that it would be possible for 
foundations to continue supporting registration work if combined with public funds. Treasury 
offered no explanation for how the proposal would work, nor did it promise that House members 
would implement the suggestions into their legislation. “It is a tremendous outrage,” Vernon 
Jordan commented to a journalist.616 Responding to Young’s telegram, Deputy Assistant 
Treasury Secretary John S. Nola wrote that their proposal “would not prevent or inhibit private 
foundations from making grants to publicly supported charitable or educational organizations 
even though their activities included…conduct of voter registration drives.”617 Assistant 
Treasury Secretary Edwin S. Cohen specifically mentioned the VEP as the type of organization 
that would be permitted to continue receiving philanthropic grants. But other parts of the press 
release made it read like all support for registration work must end because each project had the 
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potential to influence an election. Treasury staff kept contradicting themselves while the House 
wrote the actual law in private, and they agitated civil rights leaders who wanted straight 
answers. “Stripped of its finery,” editorialized the Washington Post, “it is disclosed as an attempt 
to forbid the voter registration drives which produced such stunning political upsets in 
Cleveland…where only white folks used to go to the polls.”618 
On May 27, the House Ways and Means Committee ended some of the intrigue by 
releasing a statement about drafting the tax reform legislation. Increasing the anxiety of Jordan, 
Wilkins, Young, and other civil rights leaders, the statement read in part, “No private foundation 
is to be permitted to directly or indirectly engage in any activities intended to influence the 
outcome of any election (including voter registration drives).”619 Jordan and others had their 
answer. Cutting through the political doublespeak, it was clear that all civil rights groups 
receiving funding for registration work would have their support rolled back. The VEP’s very 
existence was in question because African American voter registration was its main purpose.  
Since the VEP’s beginning in 1962, its leadership had avoided the media spotlight to 
safeguard its tax-exemption, but with the VEP endangered, Vernon Jordan took the lead among 
civil rights leaders advocating against the ban. Capitalizing on long-standing relationships with 
newspapers, the VEP fed information about how the proposed legislation would damage its 
mission. The Washington Post ran articles centering on the VEP and how the tax bill would stifle 
projects that were designed to bolster American democracy by widening the electorate. John W. 
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Gardner, for example, reported that the VEP “has conducted voter registration drives over the 
past seven years, and has done so without the slightest partisanship.”620  
While members of the press defended the VEP, Jordan lobbied his contacts within the 
world of philanthropy to speak out against the proposed restrictions. Anne Blaine Harrison and 
Vernon Eagle from the New World Foundation wrote Mills explaining that some reforms were 
necessary, but not to voter registration work. Harrison and Eagles also informed Mills that 
philanthropic support had been crucial to the civil rights movement: “We are sure you will agree 
that such [registration] activities do not contravene the will of the Congress, having in mind the 
Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On the contrary, it 
appears that our activities have helped to carry out the very purposes envisaged by these 
Acts.”621 The leadership of the Field Foundation, including Leslie Dunbar, wrote Mills to suggest 
they were more amenable to limiting the lifespan of foundations than giving up registration 
sponsorship: “We find it hard to see why any voter registration, at any time, in any place, for any 
motive, is not in the pubic interest, and we would exclude foundation support from only those 
voter registration drives which make an overt appeal to partisan interests.”622 And Jordan also 
sent Mills information about the VEP, hoping to assuage any doubts about its necessity.623 
As Jordan concentrated on the endangerment of voter registration funding, heads of 
foundations worried about the entirety of the coming tax reform bill. Before 1969, major and 
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mid-sized foundations had been loosely affiliated through the Council on Foundations, an 
umbrella organization established in 1949, and later the Foundation Group, which compiled 
research on philanthropy. Foundations operated on their own, but the impending tax crisis drove 
them together. Soon after the House Ways and Means Committee began hearings, foundation 
executives gathered to discuss cooperative strategy. On July 14, fearful of a proposed five 
percent tax on all investment income, representatives from the Ford, Danforth, Sloan, 
Commonwealth, Carnegie, and other foundations met in New York to discuss the situation. They 
believed that Congress would enact a devastating bill on philanthropy due to a few small 
foundations abusing financial loopholes, and because of the Ford Foundation’s sponsorship of 
registration activity. They also thought that the Ford Foundation inaccurately symbolized all 
large-scale philanthropic work, and that for the time being, each foundation ought to stop making 
grants “that seemed to be connected with the more militant types of activity in the civil rights 
field and the ghettoes.”624 While the philanthropic community lacked the “machinery for 
cooperative action,” these leaders allied in anticipation of the coming federal legislation.625 
After two months of silence, the Ways and Means Committee finished the bill, and the 
House of Representatives approved H.R. 13270 on August 7 by a vote of 394 to 30. The bill 
stipulated that no more than 25 percent of a registration project’s budget could come from a 
single tax-exempt philanthropic source, and that groups undertaking such projects must operate 
in at least five states at once to protect against charges of partisanship in particular races. While 
benign on the surface, these two conditions alarmed civil rights leaders. While the VEP had 
operated in 11 states, the added pressure of the five-state provision meant that it would always 
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have to ensure that simultaneous operations were ongoing in at least five states at once. The 25 
percent rule was more disconcerting. While the VEP had applied for and won grants from several 
foundations, the bulk of the funding in recent years had come from the Ford Foundation, well 
exceeding 25 percent of the total budget. The VEP had never before paid attention to balancing 
percentages between foundations, glad to receive as much support as possible from any source. If 
the House version of the bill were to become law, it threatened to make the VEP’s job of raising 
money and balancing figures much more difficult. All other civil rights agencies would be 
affected as well. In a letter to the New York Times, Roy Wilkins wrote, “Regardless of the 
language, the proposals before the Congress in the so-called tax reform bill to bar the use of 
foundation funds for voter registration are principally anti-black.”626 Wilkins thought that some 
members of Congress were unaware of the voter registration implication, but believed other 
members were purposefully defunding the civil rights movement. To him, Congress “proposes to 
crush the rising participation of Negro voters in the election process under the guise of regulating 
the foundations.”627  
After the House approved H.R. 13270, it went before the Senate Finance Committee, 
where during hearings between September 4 and October 8, conservatives mounted a blatant 
attack on black voting rights by disputing the legality of philanthropic support. Race leaders 
suspected partisanship during the House portion of the debate, but the actions of Senators Russell 
Long and Herman Talmadge confirmed their fears. Long, Talmadge, and other Senate 
southerners had opposed civil rights legislation throughout their careers, but after the Voting 
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Rights Act of 1965 passed, it appeared that they had lost. But they kept fighting, and the tax 
reform debate gave them cover to oppose civil rights surreptitiously by stopping the flow of 
money. A long piece in the National Review by Jeffrey Hart came out the same week when 
hearings began that claimed foundations operated as a “shadow government” fomenting “social 
aggression” in cases like Cleveland, an opinion shared by congressional conservatives.628 Long 
and Talmadge’s aim was not to disenfranchise African Americans—they had already lost that 
fight. But as Democrats, they wanted to preserve their power in the party while limiting the 
political capacity of foundations. As more African Americans registered, they voted as 
Democrats since it was the only well-organized party in the South. And as more African 
Americans voted as Democrats and ran black candidates in local elections, the Democratic Party 
inched toward the left. Opposing the funding for black voter registration was Long and 
Talmadge’s final effort to conserve their ideal of the Democratic Party.629 
On September 4, Senator Long, chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, opened the 
first day of hearings by promising his committee would discuss foundations—“a special target of 
this tax reform bill.”630 He expected to hear from some 300 witnesses before his committee 
would edit H.R. 13270. The first witness was the new Treasury Secretary David M. Kennedy. 
Concerning foundations, Kennedy recommended that the Senate lower the House’s proposed 7.5 
percent tax on all income to two percent. Kennedy described the tax as too harsh on foundations. 
While some Senators questioned Kennedy on specifics, Talmadge pressed him on the perpetuity 
of foundations. “Insofar as I know,” Talmadge stated, “a foundation is the only thing in the 
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world that is permanent in scope. Individuals die, corporation charters expire and must be 
renewed, all life on earth and vegetation die,” yet foundations live on.631 The Nixon 
Administration had thought about recommending a twenty or twenty-five year limit on all 
foundations, Kennedy explained, but decided against including it within the Treasury 
Department’s proposals to the House. Talmadge knew the Ford Foundation was 33 years-old. By 
pursuing the question, he and his conservative colleagues indicated their interest in adding a 
death sentence in their version of the tax bill. 
Over the next month, the Finance Committee concentrated on other aspects of the tax 
reform bill, saving the foundations for last. While they waited, Vernon Jordan and Paul Anthony 
drafted a statement defending philanthropic funds for the VEP. Explaining the SRC and VEP’s 
commitment to nonpartisanship, they argued that proposals in the House version were unfair 
because they insinuated the VEP’s work could influence specific elections. While the VEP 
sponsored nonpartisan voter drives, it also benefitted the public good by collecting data, 
publishing reports, and providing citizenship education across the South. Anthony and Jordan 
were especially concerned about the House’s proposals on capping funds from sources at 25 
percent and dictating that groups like the VEP operate in at least five states. There were “still 
relatively few foundations which are willing to support programs of social reform,” they argued, 
but “occasionally an unusually imaginative foundation has the courage and foresight to support 
exclusively, or almost exclusively, a new group which has promise and a sound idea.”632  
The Taconic Foundation had been such a supporter of the VEP, and John Simon, who 
took over as President after the deaths of Stephen and Audrey Currier, sent a statement to the 
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Senate Finance Committee defending philanthropic support of registration work. Writing, “to 
bring to your attention an apparently unintended adverse effect upon the [Southern Regional] 
Council,” Simon reminded the Senators that the VEP had held a special tax-exempt ruling from 
the IRS since 1962, and he defended its nonpartisan mission as vital to the growth of American 
democracy.633 The five state requirement would be drastic, and offering a compromise, he 
suggested they lower the number to three. But like Jordan and Anthony, Simon contended that 
the 25 percent stipulation would prove devastating since it would be “almost impossible for any 
new voter registration programs to be undertaken.”634 The VEP might be forced to refuse funds 
from foundations if they could not generate matching grants from other sources, a liability that 
would impede its effectiveness with millions of unregistered voters remaining in the South. 
Michael Harrington, the celebrated left-wing journalist, picked up on the story and wrote 
about how conservatives were hiding their true intentions of upending black voting rights 
through tax reform legislation. “Although these provisions are phrased in dry, legislative jargon,” 
he wrote, “they translate out into plain English as an attack on the democratic rights of the least 
powerful people in the land.”635 He implied that most Americans were not seeing the big picture. 
While adjusting tax laws could benefit the poor by forcing the wealthy to pay higher income 
taxes, impeding philanthropic support for African American voter registration would harm 
society. While such activities had been nonpartisan, “conservatives [had] noticed an obvious 
pattern. When the minorities and the impoverished finally gain access to the political process, 
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they tend to favor civil rights and liberal economics.”636 Attempting to reach liberals who viewed 
the impending tax reforms in a positive light, Harrington stressed its negative consequences. 
One such liberal—albeit not on race—was Wright Patman. Viewing the tax reform 
debate as a veteran New Dealer and not as a progressive on civil rights, he was more intent on 
curbing foundation power than protecting the source of funds for groups like the VEP. When the 
Senate Finance Committee convened on October 3 to begin hearings related to philanthropy, 
Patman testified with conspiratorial air, “I do not believe we really know the vast amount of tax 
dollars lost to this Nation by tax avoidance through the vehicle of privately controlled tax-
exempt foundations.”637 For a decade, Patman’s colleagues had not taken him seriously, but now, 
they lauded his foresight. Long and Talmadge praised his career and investigations into 
philanthropy, and they listened to Patman’s long statement on the unchecked power of 
foundations. Conservatives appreciated Patman’s single-minded pursuit of foundations, and his 
populist tendencies gave credibility to their argument that philanthropy avoided paying its fair 
share in society. 
But foundation executives disagreed. Since earlier in the summer, leaders from dozens of 
foundations had coordinated preparation of their testimony in the Senate hearings. Their aim was 
to avoid overlap and to lay out every reason why tax-exempt philanthropy was important to civic 
life. J. Irwin Miller, president of the Cummins Foundation, responded to Long by saying 
foundations that hoarded family wealth to avoid taxes were few in number. Proposals for taxes, 
restrictions, and penalties on all philanthropy was unfair and would “take the risk-taking out of 
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giving.”638 J. George Harrar from the Rockefeller Foundation, Alan Pifer of the Carnegie 
Corporation, and David Freeman representing the Council on Foundations echoed Miller’s 
message: “we very strongly fear that the results of a tax upon private philanthropy would be 
negative in terms of human progress and our ability to contribute to it.”639 And McGeorge 
Bundy—much more courteous before the Senate than he had been before the House—indicated 
that foundations filled gaps left by the government and corporations. When Talmadge or Long 
brought up voter registration projects and charged that philanthropies had moved into the 
political realm, foundation executives countered by saying that if such grants focused on 
nonpartisan campaigns, they strengthened rather than undermined American democracy.640 
While philanthropic executives focused on the big picture of tax reform, civil rights 
advocates centered on the necessity of external funding to increase African American voter 
registration. But only three people had the opportunity to speak before the Senate Finance 
Committee on this topic—Whitney Young, Paul Anthony, and Lucy Benson from the League of 
Women Voters. Benson raised concerns about the House bill being too vague about what 
constituted a partisan voter registration campaign. Anthony, accompanied by Vernon Jordan and 
SRC lawyer Joseph Haas, summarized their earlier statement on the importance of the VEP. But 
it was Whitney Young who gave the most powerful testimony. Part of the tax reform bill, 
according to Young, “had the direct result of making the black community particularly feel that it 
is a hostile bill, a bill that suddenly came into fruition with a purpose as much to intimidate as to 
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legislate.”641 Foundations were already showing signs of cutting back. “There is some evidence 
that foundations will become again very cautious, very conservative,” Young testified.642 And 
their money was needed now more than ever, because without it, black militants would win. 
Such activists decried political solutions, Young suggested, and depriving institutions like the 
VEP of their funding would indirectly aid black radicalism. “You and others ask the black 
community to be responsible,” Young testified, “but you do not give us the resources with which 
we can assume responsibility.”643 
Young’s message failed to move Long, Talmadge, and their conservative allies, who 
moved to add a “flat prohibition against foundations’ financing of voter registration drives.”644 If 
this version passed into law, the VEP would shut down and all other civil rights organizations 
would be compromised. Race leaders were outraged, and Jordan re-doubled his efforts lobbying 
against the law. The same day of the Senate’s proposal, Jordan wrote and sent out mass mailings 
to political friends of the VEP, including Senator Edward M. Kennedy and Senator Daniel K. 
Inouye. Conservatives had proposed the change, but it would not be voted on until October 31. 
The VEP spent three days lobbying Congress, collecting debts from journalists to elevate the 
story in the press, and communicating with other race leaders and foundation executives to 
expose the pending consequences. While conservatives guarded their words about motives, 
Jordan was quick to label their tactics as racist and worried that others in Congress were not 
seeing the potential danger. Under the guise of tax reform, conservatives were undermining 
southern black voting power. “Make no mistake about it,” Jordan warned. “Black people in the 
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South cannot continue to make the sort of registration gains they need to make without organized 
registration programs.”645 
The VEP’s message resonated, and concerned citizens petitioned Senators to change their 
minds. Nate Welch, a member of the board for the Southern Regional Council, wrote Talmadge 
that the southern African American “voter registration effort will be virtually halted if the 
proposed legislation is enacted.”646 President Wallace L. Young Jr. of the New Orleans NAACP 
urged Long to drop the proposal: “Such drives increase in practice the theory of a democracy 
which involves all the people.”647 Once again, conservatives on the Finance Committee were 
unmoved, and they passed the resolution to ban all tax-exempt funding for voter registration 
projects by a vote of 13-4. The Committee also went forward with a proposal to cap the lifespan 
of all foundations at 40 years. While the VEP and civil rights leaders worried about the ban on 
voter campaigns, foundation executives panicked that their entire world was about to crash, 
paying less attention to voting rights concerns.648 
While the Senate Finance Committee spent the next several weeks amending the 
legislation, Jordan kept mobilizing opponents. In a mass letter drawing attention to the “little-
noticed recommendation” with “an insidious racist thrust aimed at inhibiting emerging black 
political power,” Jordan tried to help people see beyond the obvious need for tax reform to the 
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clandestine attempt to upend civil rights gains.649 Roy Wilkins rallied NAACP chapters around 
this message, and sympathetic journalists wrote that the Finance Committee’s revisions would 
leave the VEP “penniless and impotent.”650  
Jordan also dealt with concerns from his foundation supporters. The Council on 
Foundations had reconvened following the Finance Committee’s recommendation of a 40-year 
death sentence, and executives were terrified that their foundations were doomed. Not only were 
they worried about their foundations, they were also scared personally, for the tax legislation 
carried with it strict penalties for executives who used tax-exempt funds to sponsor political 
activities. Foundations could be penalized up to 100 percent of the offending grant if 
misappropriated funds were not returned within 90 days, and executives could be additionally 
liable for up to 50 percent of the grant value.651 These philanthropists felt overwhelmed by the 
complexity of the law and the threat of personal penalties, and they were cautious about 
provoking Congress any further. As they worked on a statement, Jordan pressed them to include 
language denouncing the proposed ban on registration support. Jordan kept pushing, and Eli 
Evans of the Carnegie Corporation tipped him off that the Council on Foundation’s response 
would dispute the registration prohibition. “Please note it [their statement] includes voter 
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education and mentions Southern Regional Council,” Evans wrote Jordan. “It wasn’t easy.”652 
Evans’s message implied that many executives wanted to leave the issue of voter registration out 
in hopes of placating Congress. Their response to Congress stated that a group like the SRC 
“represents a major contribution to the maintenance and improvement of the American system of 
democratic government.”653 
After the Senate’s harsh version, the House’s earlier bill began to look much sweeter. The 
Council on Foundations recommended that the Senate turn back to the House’s provisions rather 
than an outright ban. Jordan also came to see the House’s version as the lesser of evils, and he 
began promoting its re-adoption. Senators Ralph Yarborough, a Democrat from Texas, and Hugh 
Scott, a Republican from Pennsylvania, drafted an amendment to accomplish that goal—to 
nullify the Finance Committee’s proposal and return the tax legislation closer to the original 
House version. On December 1, they introduced what became known as the Yarborough-Scott 
Amendment to H.R. 13270. It included a more lenient application of the House’s original ideas, 
including a requirement that organizations receiving tax-exempt funds for registration work 
conduct campaigns in more than one state, have at least three philanthropic supporters, and 
receive no more than 40 percent from one source. The Senate Finance Committee’s actions, 
Yarborough and Scott stated, “harms all Americans, [and] would destroy such universally 
approved organizations as the League of Women Voters Education Fund and the Voter 
Education Project.”654 Jordan wrote to each Senator, urging approval of the amendment.655 
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On December 4, the Senate adopted the Yarborough-Scott Amendment by a vote of 52-
36. Calling the vote “a very significant victory,” Jordan praised those Senators who saw the 
value of nonpartisan voter registration fieldwork.656 But Talmadge complained that the 
amendment was too vague concerning the meaning of “nonpartisan.” In his mind, the Ku Klux 
Klan, John Birch Society, and Black Panther Party could all claim nonpartisanship and receive 
tax-exempt funds for registration projects. Talmadge also objected to the more-than-one-state 
requirement, citing it as much too easy to overcome.657 Three days after the amendment passed, 
Senator Paul Fannin put together a hasty counter-amendment to forbid all tax-exempt registration 
fieldwork, but it failed. It appeared as though conservatives had lost, and for the time being, the 
VEP and its supporters celebrated a successful lobbying effort. The chairwoman of the League of 
Women Voters thanked Jordan: “It seems a little presumptuous for me to thank you for all you 
did for us—since obviously the Voter Education program of the Southern Regional Council was 
the really significant and critical matter at stake—but we’re pleased to have benefitted, too.”658 
But Talmadge, Long, and their conservative allies had one more play. Capitalizing on 
their deep knowledge of congressional rules, they waited until after the Senate had approved the 
tax bill and it went to conference committee to resolve disagreements between both chambers 
and finalize small details before going to President Nixon. Between December 15 and 19, Senate 
and House members negotiated terms and straightened out the language of H.R. 13270. Before 
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the committee met, David E. Rosenbaum of the New York Times explained the shadowy 
proceedings: “Their negotiations will be in private session, with neither the press, the public nor 
even other members of Congress allowed in the conference room, and the proceedings of the 
meetings will never be published.”659 During these closed-door sessions, conservatives pushed 
the Yarborough-Scott Amendment terms back to the original House version—five or more states 
at once, and no more than 25 percent from one foundation for voter campaigns. The more 
generous terms of one state and 40 percent were raised without any explanation. In his account 
of the conference committee, Rosenbaum had written, “In theory the conferees argue for the 
provisions of the bill passed by their chamber. In practice, they have considerable latitude.”660 
What took place within the conference committee will never be known, but somehow, Long, 
Talmadge, and their allies took one last shot at philanthropies and voter registration projects. On 
the day the committee began meetings, Talmadge wrote Jordan, signaling his resolve: “I am 
sorry that you and I cannot agree on this issue...I have always felt that voter registration drives 
are the very essence of politics and I do not believe that Foundation money should be used to 
promote a candidate or a party.”661  
After the conference committee finalized the legislation, the House approved the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 by a vote of 381-2, and the Senate did so by 71-6. With overwhelming 
bipartisan support, it went to President Nixon to be signed into law. He did so on December 30, 
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enacting a comprehensive tax reform package that addressed income tax, bonds, stocks, 
loopholes, and philanthropy.662  
Right after the bill went into law, the SRC suspended all VEP activities. While the VEP’s 
philanthropic benefactors worried about all aspects of the law, the restrictions on voter 
registration unnerved civil rights leaders. McGeorge Bundy circulated a memorandum among 
Ford Foundation trustees that the law’s constraints required “re-examination of our relations to 
the Southern Regional Council and the League of Women Voters.”663 With their futures 
uncertain, SRC and VEP staff met with lawyers to determine what to do next. After some debate, 
the SRC and VEP decided to separate. Lawyers counseled that if the VEP continued to spend 
tax-exempt philanthropic dollars on voter registration, the entire SRC would be subject to the 25 
percent rule. On January 22, 1970, Anthony and SRC lawyers met with IRS representatives in 
Washington to seek advice. Soon afterward, the SRC worked with VEP staff to set up VEP, Inc. 
in accordance with IRS tax-exempt policy. Around the same time, Vernon Jordan announced he 
was stepping down from his role as VEP executive director to lead the United Negro College 
Fund. On May 14, the IRS approved the independent tax-exemption of VEP, Inc., and under its 
new executive director, former SNCC chairman John Lewis, the VEP reopened with hopes of 
picking up where it had left off.664 
                                                 
662 Eileen Shanahan, “Tax Bill Signed; President Vows Balanced Budget,” New York Times, December 31, 1969. 
 
663 McGeorge Bundy to Ford Foundation Trustees, December 24, 1969, Series 2, Box 19, Folder 240, Office of the 
President, Office Files of McGeorge Bundy, Ford Foundation Records. On foundation executives discussing how 
the new law might impact their work, see “Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969,” Proceedings of 
Conferences Held on February 17, 1970, at Kansas City and February 23, 1970, at New York City (New York: The 
Foundation Center, 1970).  
 
664 Memorandum, Paul Anthony to Supporting Foundations, February 27, 1970, Folder “Southern Regional Council: 
General Program, 1958-1964” Taconic Foundation Records; Vernon E. Jordan Jr. to Leslie Dunbar, February 23, 
1970, Box 2T71, Folder “SRC, Inc. (VEP) fall 1968, Field Foundation Archives; and “Jordan Takes UNCF Post; 
Lewis New VEP Director,” VEP News 4, no. 1 and 2 (February 1970). 
 245 
But the VEP would be different after the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Long, Talmadge, and 
conservatives had won: they had compromised the financial security of the southern civil rights 
movement. They were unable to preserve their lily-white Democratic Party, but their efforts in 
the tax debate undercut the VEP’s momentum and destabilized the pursuit of black poll power in 
communities across the South. David F. Rock, one of the VEP’s lawyers, wrote later in 1970 that 
the law “served as a vehicle for angry elements in Congress who regarded their interests as 
somehow jeopardized by Voter Registration drives.”665 The law had changed, and the VEP was 
forced to change with it. While Lewis refused to let the VEP go under, its funding became 
erratic, and its impact on the civil rights movement lessened as its resources stretched thin. And 


























                                                 







CHAPTER 7: ‘TAKING WHAT WE WON TO THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION’: THE 
VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT AND THE PROMISE OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT, 1970-1992 
 
 On the tenth anniversary of the March on Washington, the VEP released a statement 
quoting executive director John Lewis: “I think that black Americans and the nation itself has 
lost something in the course of the past ten years.”666 Gone was the fiery SNCC chairman, who a 
decade earlier gave headaches to civil rights leaders when he wanted to use the rally to criticize 
the Kennedy Administration for its inaction on race relations in the South. His comment revealed 
an acute awareness of the political reality facing African Americans in 1973. As the leader of the 
VEP, Lewis felt as though his organization was one of the few still fighting for a civil rights 
revolution. While African Americans had won equal rights the previous decade through federal 
legislation, the energy that had bolstered their cause had ebbed. Economic recession, stagflation, 
mistrust of the White House, the subsiding of the Black Power movement, a fracturing of the left 
over identity politics, and a growing lack of interest on the part of white liberals for civil rights 
made matters worse. Weighing these factors, Lewis bemoaned the loss of a united southwide 
movement when asked if another March on Washington was possible in 1973: “We need that 
kind of spirit, that kind of movement today…But another March on Washington? I don’t think 
so. I just don’t think so.”667 
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 Under John Lewis, the VEP set out to fulfill the unmet expectations of the civil rights 
movement. “We are now involved in taking what we won to the logical conclusion,” Lewis 
stated, by registering voters, teaching them about citizenship, and motivating them to pursue 
local political power.668 By the end of 1970, 3,357,000 southern African Americans had 
registered out of an estimated 5,016,100, nearly 67 percent who were eligible. Never before had 
so many African Americans been registered to vote in the South, but these statistics were 
misleading. While the number of registered voters was high, only 644 African Americans held 
political offices in the South—a record total, but still miniscule when compared to whites. White 
registration was over 16,000,000 by the end of 1969.669 Through its research, the VEP monitored 
the pulse of black political power, convinced that more work was necessary if the civil rights 
goals expressed during the previous decade were to be reached.  
 But while the VEP had clear goals in mind and did what it could to promote black 
political power, problems that began with the Tax Reform Act of 1969 snowballed, and the VEP 
was not as effective as it had been during the 1960s. After six months of suspended operations, 
the VEP re-opened in mid-1970 after separating from the SRC, but financial insecurity plagued it 
from then on. Not only did the VEP detach from the SRC, but philanthropic foundations, worried 
about new tax restrictions, also became extra cautious when giving money to causes involving 
voter registration. And when foundations did give, they required much greater oversight. The 
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VEP continued to receive funds from Ford, Rockefeller, Field, and other foundations, but their 
support fluctuated, forcing the VEP to constantly balance donations to meet the 25 percent rule. 
As a result, the VEP expanded its staff and grew into its own bureaucracy as it conducted 
fundraisers and spent energy soliciting donations to meet financial demands. During the 1960s, 
the VEP remained small with only a handful of staff so that it could funnel most of its money 
directly to grassroots organizations. Starting in 1970, it no longer had this luxury, and local 
groups received less VEP support. As a consequence, the larger civil rights movement in the 
American South lost its momentum. 
 The civil rights struggle did not end in 1970, but the united southwide movement for 
African American voting rights did. The VEP tried to keep it together for another two decades, 
but the Tax Reform Act of 1969 inhibited its ability to do so effectively. During the late 1950s, 
civil rights leaders made the decision to focus on voting rights. The tactic proved effective, and 
with help from the VEP, black communities across the South joined in a mass movement 
throughout the 1960s. The ballot gave African Americans an objective goal, and once they 
achieved easier access through the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the VEP helped continue the 
movement by pushing for black political power. But the Tax Reform Act of 1969 undid this 
unity by hampering the VEP. As a result, poll power activism declined, even as black registration 
increased and more African Americans were elected to office. Voting became less community-
driven. Whether they lived in a rural county or major city, black southerners felt connected to a 
movement bigger than themselves when they registered and voted. That feeling receded during 
the 1970s.  
 The VEP’s story after 1969 is not one of declension, for that interpretation blames black 
southerners for the loss of a united movement. Rather, the fault lay with congressional 
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conservatives who intended to undermine the VEP through the Tax Reform Act of 1969. By 
disrupting the relationship between philanthropy and black voter registration projects, 
conservatives won a major victory against the civil rights movement. With the VEP weakened, 
the southwide movement receded. Even as black political power grew through higher registration 
rates, conservatives countered their growth by mastering the ability to gerrymander and isolate 
African American voters into contained districts. Without the VEP financing as many local 
campaigns and educational conferences, black southerners were at a disadvantage to compete on 
an equal political playing field. The VEP had shored up a massive social movement, but 
conservatives dismantled it. 
 And yet, the VEP lasted for another two decades, trying to fulfill the promises of the civil 
rights movement. John Lewis led the VEP until 1977, when he decided to run for Congress. 
During his tenure, the VEP continued to give grants to local registration projects, supported 
college service centers through 1972, targeted young people after the adoption of the Twenty-
Sixth Amendment, conducted research, and printed educational materials. Along with Julian 
Bond, SNCC’s former communications director and State Representative in Georgia, Lewis went 
on dozens of voter mobilization tours to encourage communities to keep registering and voting. 
The VEP also helped create the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) in 
1974 to register Latino voters across the Southwest. When Lewis resigned, he thought the VEP 
was on stable ground, but its next director, Vivian Malone Jones, resigned after little more than a 
year after being diagnosed with cancer. A string of executive directors followed, and even with a 
brief revitalization of activities between 1982 and 1984 under Geraldine Thompson, the VEP 
diminished in scope. In 1984, the Field Foundation evaluated the finances of the VEP at 
Thompson’s request and found “very serious problems,” including mismanagement and poor 
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records for its few remaining registration programs.670 The following year, the Atlanta 
Constitution published a story about the report, ruining the VEP’s reputation. The VEP never 
recovered. In February 1992, the VEP received its final grant from the Ford Foundation totaling 
$65,000 to transfer its mass of records to the Atlanta University Center’s Robert W. Woodruff 
Library. Then, the VEP closed.671 
Adjusting to the Tax Reform Act of 1969 
 After the Tax Reform Act of 1969 passed, the SRC suspended all VEP activities to 
decide how to comply with the new restrictions. While Vernon Jordan had already tendered his 
resignation to lead the United Negro College Fund, the VEP staff sat in limbo while tax lawyers 
debated next steps. IRS officials convinced SRC lawyers that the safest path would be for the 
SRC and VEP to separate. “The Council is not limited to the amount of income it may receive 
from another private foundation,” wrote Anthony, “so long as that income is expended on tax-
exempt activity within one year of receipt. If, however, the Council engages in voter registration 
campaigns…it is the opinion of counsel that the entire income of SRC is subject to the [25 
percent] limitation.”672 Paul Anthony and the SRC leadership feared entanglement with the 
VEP—that if they remained conjoined, the SRC’s finances would be dragged down along with 
the VEP. On January 31, SRC lawyers filed paperwork with the IRS to create the Voter 
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Education Project, Inc. Without a leader and uncertain about the future, VEP staff did not 
object.673  
 Years later, Leslie Dunbar recalled the split between the SRC and VEP as something that 
“did not have to be done.” He blamed it on the ignorance of SRC lawyers and on Paul Anthony’s 
self-interest. In the immediate aftermath of the Tax Reform Act, lawyers were unclear about the 
legislation’s many complexities, and the SRC’s council advised it to err on the side of caution by 
disassociating from voter registration. Dunbar also believed foundations and the IRS pressured 
Anthony to disconnect from the VEP to maintain their associations. “I think, at that time,” 
remembered Dunbar, “they [SRC] may have felt that this was not legally necessary, but maybe 
politically necessary in relationships with IRS.” Plus, Anthony and Jordan did not get along, and 
Dunbar believed that Anthony did not want to have to work with the VEP’s next leader. “Paul 
had had the problem of Vernon. He could not control Vernon. Vernon was a better known person 
than he, and becoming more so. I don't think Paul wanted to have to [also] take responsibility for 
John Lewis.”674 On February 24, VEP, Inc. filed for its own corporate charter, and the new board 
of directors unanimously approved John Lewis as its first executive director. Three months later, 
the IRS approved VEP, Inc. as a 501(c)(3), the IRS classification for an independent, non-profit, 
tax-exempt organization. Although they continued to share office space on Forsyth Street for the 
next year, the VEP and SRC became independent of one another, a move that ultimately 
weakened both.675 
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 As the VEP moved toward autonomy, foundations surveyed the altered landscape after 
the Tax Reform Act and considered the future of voter registration grants. The Ford Foundation, 
the Field Foundation, and other philanthropies told Lewis that they remained committed to 
funding the VEP, but the 25 percent provision complicated their ties. “The Foundation’s 
commitment to you and the VEP is, if anything, stronger than ever,” Basil Whiting, a Ford 
Program Officer, assured Lewis. But the Ford Foundation needed to decide on new policies 
because of the Tax Reform Act, and Whiting wrote, “[W]e are not sure what that will be yet but 
will inform you.”676 Ford wanted to closely monitor the VEP and review its policies for funding 
non-partisan registration campaigns. After he heard that the SRC had stopped all VEP activities 
in the wake of the tax legislation, Dunbar wrote Anthony that he was “disturbed to learn that 
voter registration activity ceased the first of January,” especially since 1970 was an election 
year.677 But Dunbar also feared the law’s implications for the Field Foundation, and he asked 
lawyers for clarity on tax-exempt funds used for registering voters. They recommended to 
Dunbar that “as a matter of protecting itself [Field Foundation] against a possible claim of the 
Internal Revenue Service for liability to the tax imposed by section 4945,” it should be cautious 
and specific that its donations only be used for non-partisan activities.678  
 The 25 percent requirement compromised the VEP’s finances. After the VEP and SRC 
separated, both organizations worked with foundations to move money that had originally gone 
to the SRC into the new VEP, Inc. This process highlighted the difficulty of raising money and 
balancing figures between foundations to meet the 25 percent rule. In 1968, the Ford Foundation 
                                                 
676 Basil J. Whiting to John Lewis, June 16, 1970, Frames 48-49, Reel 177, SRC Papers. 
 
677 Leslie W. Dunbar to Paul Anthony, March 3, 1970, Box 2T94, Folder “VEP 2nd fall 1969,” Field Foundation 
Archives. 
 
678 Lawyers at Paul and Weiss to Leslie W. Dunbar, June 18, 1970, Box 2T94, Folder “VEP 2nd fall 1969,” Field 
Foundation Archives. 
 253 
had committed $590,000 to the VEP over three years, but “in accordance with the ‘twenty-five 
percent rule,”’ wrote Assistant Secretary William H. Nims to McGeorge Bundy, “it is 
recommended that the Foundation contribute only $120,000 of the amount originally 
allocated.”679 The Field Foundation gave $72,920 instead of the originally promised $125,000 
for 1970. Dunbar alerted Lewis, “I think it is premature to specify just how we should proceed in 
the future.”680 The Rockefeller Brothers Fund had not donated to the VEP during 1969 “due to 
pending tax reform legislation,” but gave $50,000 for 1970 and another $50,000 for 1971—small 
amounts that they hoped would prompt the VEP to reach out to other potential backers.681 By 
August, the VEP had received nearly $131,000, but it could only speculate about how much the 
Carnegie Corporation, New World Foundation, Irwin-Sweeney-Miller Foundation, Aaron E. 
Norman Fund, and other past supporters would give. Lewis feared it might have to forfeit money 
if the 25 percent balance could not be met. “If these arrangements…are not carried out,” Lewis 
wrote Anthony, “the result will be a serious crippling of the VEP.”682  
 John Lewis was well aware of the financial threat facing the VEP, but his life had been 
full of challenges up to this point. Born on February 21, 1940, Lewis grew up on a rural farm in 
Pike County, Alabama. His parents had been sharecroppers, but in 1944, they purchased 110 
acres for $300. Lewis spent his childhood and adolescence working on the farm alongside his 
nine siblings. They were poor, and they lived in a world of strict segregation. When he was 11, 
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he went with his Uncle Otis on a trip to Buffalo, New York, and when he returned to Alabama, 
the racial inequality of his home county was clearer than ever. He loved some aspects of farm 
life, but his passion was school and readings books. By reading everything he could, he learned 
about the world outside Pike County. He studied the Brown v. Board of Education decision, 
which inspired him to imagine Alabama as a place without segregation. In 1955, he heard Martin 
Luther King Jr. preach on the radio, hearing for the first time about the social gospel. Later that 
year, Emmett Till was murdered, and it shocked Lewis to know that someone near his age could 
be killed without consequence. The next year, two days after he preached his first sermon at the 
age of 16, his great uncle, Thomas Brewer, an NAACP leader in Columbus, Georgia, was shot 
seven times and died. Black community members believed the store owner who murdered 
Brewer—who was never indicted—had ties to the Ku Klux Klan. These violent events, plus the 
bus boycott in Montgomery and Alabama’s Attorney General banning the NAACP, inspired 
Lewis to apply for membership at the local whites-only library. He was denied, but he had his 
first taste of nonviolent protest. Soon after, he won acceptance to attend college at the American 
Baptist Theological Seminary, and he moved to Nashville, Tennessee in 1957.683 
 In Nashville, Lewis learned how to protest and fight for civil rights—skills that served 
him during the sit-in movement, as a Freedom Rider, as a founding member of SNCC, as 
chairman of SNCC for three years, and later, as the VEP’s third executive director. As a 
freshman, Lewis tried to start an NAACP chapter on campus, but the president discouraged him 
due to the seminary’s ties to the Southern Baptist Convention. The following year, he met James 
Lawson, a student at Vanderbilt Divinity School who led community workshops in nonviolence 
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based on Mahatma Gandhi’s philosophy that challenged British colonialism. In November 1959, 
he and other Nashville students began sit-in tests in downtown department stores, and after four 
students in Greensboro captured national headlines in February 1960, the Nashville movement 
gained momentum. Later that year, Lewis helped organize SNCC, and the following year, he 
went on several Freedom Rides, endured physical attacks, and served prison time on Parchman 
Farm in Mississippi. As SNCC’s chairman, Lewis oversaw the expansion of the student-led 
organization into rural communities urging locals to register. He helped coordinate Freedom 
Summer in Mississippi in 1964, and he was beaten bloody on the Edmund Pettus Bridge in 
Selma on March 7, 1965. During his tenure with SNCC, he received support from the VEP. In 
May 1966, Stokely Carmichael was elected as SNCC’s chairman. Two months later, Lewis left 
SNCC after it became clear to him that the organization’s embrace of black nationalism and the 
ouster of its white members signaled a turn away from its founding principles. He went to work 
for Leslie Dunbar and the Field Foundation in New York for a year, then returned to Atlanta to 
head the SRC’s Community Organization Project until March 1970, when he accepted the job to 
lead the new VEP, Inc.684 
John Lewis and the VEP, Inc. 
 John Lewis still believed in politics as the primary battlefield of the civil rights 
movement. In a VEP fundraising letter, he wrote, “The goal of a truly representative government 
is still distant. If we fail to realize how incomplete this movement is now and do not attend to the 
remaining needs, the accomplishment thus far may turn out to be empty achievements.”685 By 
July 1970, the VEP had already received over 200 applications from local groups wanting 
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support to conduct voter registration drives. In their minds, too, the civil rights movement was 
ongoing. VEP staff and board members met for three days in Capahosic, Virginia to discuss the 
future, acknowledging that southern African Americans were not content with the status quo and 
needed the VEP. During their retreat, they discussed strategy, programs, and how to comply with 
the Tax Reform Act. Along with Lewis, VEP staff comprised Thaddeus Olive as administrative 
assistant, Marvin Wall as research director, and Janet Shortt as administrative secretary—all 
holdovers from the previous VEP. Charles Rooks, Marilyn Adamson, and Patricia Madsen 
joined in support roles. The VEP also retained a lawyer. With enough funds to begin, the VEP 
salvaged the election year and began financing dozens of grassroots campaigns in the South.686 
By the end of 1970, the VEP had spent $210,513 on 100 projects in 11 states. The 
Citizens Coordinating Committee of Daytona Beach received $1,200. The Southwest Georgia 
Voter Education Project in Albany earned $1,800. The San Patricio and Bee County Voter 
Registration Council in Texas received $1,500. These and the other 97 projects helped push 
black registration in the South to 3,357,000—an increase of 212,000 since November 1968. By 
the end of the year, an estimated 644 African Americans held elected positions.687 The VEP did 
all of this on a smaller budget. Lewis pulled in a total of $292,017, but he had hoped for much 
more. By the end of 1970, seven foundations had donated to the VEP, supplemented by five 
religious and civic organizations giving small amounts. The Ford Foundation had promised 
$125,000, but based on all other giving, it had to reduce its contribution to $73,000—24.9985 
percent of the VEP’s budget.688 
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Between 1970 and 1976, the VEP sponsored at least 449 local registration campaigns 
across the American South.689 The movement in Thomas County, Georgia was one of those. 
Through a VEP grant worth $700, the local NAACP launched a six-week registration campaign 
in May and June of 1972. The VEP had supported a similar project in Thomas County in 1966, 
resulting in 1,600 new black registrants. Curtis Thomas, the director of the registration effort, 
wanted to recreate the enthusiasm of the 1966 drive. Recently, according to Thomas, the black 
community had grown indifferent toward voting, made worse by complaints that the county had 
taken many people off the rolls without explanation. Thomas organized volunteers to canvass the 
county and drive elderly people to the courthouse. He even convinced the county to appoint 
temporary black and white deputy registrars with the power to register people in their homes. 
VEP funds allowed him to print flyers, organize car pools, and pay for food for his volunteers. 
He described one 90 year-old woman who lived 20 miles from the courthouse: “She might come 
into town on Saturday to shop, but the courthouse was closed and nobody had encouraged her to 
go register. So she was happy that she could register. We found a lot of 65 and 70 year-olds who 
were just waiting for us to come along.”690 The NAACP also boycotted local businesses during 
the campaign to push for more African Americans to be hired. Members printed bumper stickers 
that read, “Save Your Bucks, Use Your Ballot—Register and Vote.”691 John Lewis, Hosea 
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Williams, and Shirley Chisholm visited and spoke at mass rallies. After six weeks, 1,300 had 
registered. Lenzie Adams, a resident of Pavo, described how black voting power had pushed 
elected officials to pave roads, put in sewers, and improve the lives of Thomas County’s African 
American citizens: “We got these streets, street lights, and paved roads by voting—it was our 
vote. This is what you have to look at—how all these things came about.”692 
To keep assisting places like Thomas County, Lewis knew he needed to expand the 
VEP’s ability to raise its own capital. But by devoting more time and energy to fundraising, the 
VEP became less efficient. The VEP had always relied on philanthropic support alone, enabling 
it to concentrate on moving money quickly into the hands of activists. To meet the demand, 
Lewis hired more staff and created a fundraising division within the VEP. Between 1970 and 
early 1977 when Lewis resigned, the VEP developed several fundraising programs, but each one 
siphoned away employee energy and resources that could have gone directly to grassroots 
organizers if philanthropic support had been higher.  
During the 1970s, the VEP coordinated direct mail campaigns, and unlike conservatives 
such as Jesse Helms who mastered the strategy, the VEP spent more than it accumulated through 
the effort. In October 1970, Lewis hired Shirley Cooks to coordinate direct mailing for the VEP. 
In April 1971, she sent out around 15,000 letters costing $2,250, and by June, the VEP had taken 
in $11,000 from about 1,000 people donating in small sums. Within each envelope, Cooks 
included a letter and brochure about the VEP. In the fall, Lewis decided to professionalize 
fundraising and hired Grizzard Advertising to handle direct mail. Grizzard upped the VEP’s 
mailing capacity into the hundreds of thousands, and over the next year, the VEP sent color 
brochures and letters to people across the United States. A fundraising letter signed by a diverse 
                                                                                                                                                             




cast of supporters, including Julian Bond, Fannie Lou Hamer, Senators Edward Kennedy and 
Jacob Javits, Governors Winthrop Rockefeller and John West, President of Duke University and 
former Governor Terry Sanford, and Sheriff John Hulett of Lowndes County, Alabama, 
informed readers that “foundation support for VEP has been restricted by the 1969 Tax Reform 
Act” and that the VEP had been unable to fund over 50 applications in 1971.693 By June 1972, 
Grizzard’s strategy had netted the VEP over $44,000, but it had cost the VEP $58,460.64 to hire 
the firm. To make matters worse, another firm that Lewis had hired to expand its mailing list had 
computer problems, and for over a year, the VEP’s contact list was inaccessible. In late 1973, 
Lewis contracted another advertising firm in New York to handle direct mail, but by the 
following summer, less than one percent of people had responded, giving less than $16,000 after 
the VEP had paid nearly $12,000 to the firm. The year 1977 was worst of all—$87,000 spent 
while netting $31,000. In seven years, the VEP lost more than it made on direct mail.694 
 The VEP courted other potential donors through benefit dinners and by appealing to 
corporations, but neither initiative proved lucrative. The VEP hosted its first benefit dinner in 
1974 with Senator Edward Kennedy as the featured speaker. Over 800 people attended and spent 
50 dollars per plate, hearing Kennedy praise black political participation with “the Voting Rights 
Act [acting] as their protector and the Voter Education Project as their shepherd.”695 The VEP 
invited union officials and corporate executives to the dinner as well, including representatives 
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from the United Auto Workers, the AFL-CIO, Coca-Cola, and Delta Airlines. Lewis remained 
hopeful that some of these unions and businesses would fund the VEP, but long-term support 
was negligible. The VEP hosted two more benefit dinners in 1975 and 1976 with high-profile 
speakers Senator Jacob Javits and Governor Jimmy Carter. While the events generated 
immediate capital, including around $50,000 from the Carter dinner, they were not a long-term 
solution.696 
 A major reason why the VEP needed more money was its new emphasis on print, radio, 
and television advertisements. Under Vernon Jordan, the VEP pushed citizenship education as a 
prerequisite for greater African American political power, and Lewis believed that in addition to 
grassroots investment, popular media could reach millions more about the power of the ballot. 
The idea gained a stronger foothold within the VEP after ratification of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment on July 1, 1971, lowering the voting age to 18 nationwide.697 With millions of 
young people now eligible to vote, Lewis wanted to make sure African American youth knew 
what to do. Lewis suspended the newsletter VEP News, except for the occasional update, and 
instead concentrated on mass appeals to the public. Soon after taking over the VEP, Lewis hired 
Atlanta artist Herman “Kofi” Bailey to create an attention-grabbing poster. Bailey came up with 
“Hands That Pick Cotton Now Can Pick Our Elected Officials,” illustrating one black hand 
picking cotton, and another dropping a ballot into a box. Lewis recalled, “10,000 copies were 
made and distributed all through the South, where they wound up on the walls of beauty parlors 
and barber shops, schools and churches.”698 Later in 1970, the VEP recorded its first radio ad and 
paid for it to run on 70 stations in the lead-up to the mid-term elections.699 
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 The VEP recognized that voter registration “sometimes seems mundane and non-
glamorous,” and it drew on popular culture to resonate with people.700 Under communications 
director Archie Allen, the VEP utilized radio, television, and flyers during election years 
throughout the 1970s. In 1972, the VEP worked with an Atlanta advertising firm to create 30-
second color television commercials in English and Spanish with the theme, “Don't Crush Your 
Chances for Change. Register and Vote.”701 That same year, VEP radio spots were broadcasted 
on over 300 radio stations, and Allen purchased newspaper space and mailed flyers across the 
South. Four years later, the VEP hired another firm for its biggest media blitz ever. The VEP 
hired characters from television series such as All in the Family, Maude, and Chico and the Man 
for six television advertisements and more radio spots encouraging people to register and vote. 
Over 150 television stations aired the commercials. The VEP spent another $54,000 on a single 
flyer: an image of Muhammad Ali ready to strike, reading, “It's your fight. Vote. It's the greatest 
equalizer.”702 
 To energize registrants, John Lewis went on dozens of voter mobilization tours with his 
friend Julian Bond. Their first tour came in June 1971 to Mississippi, where they made 39 stops 
in 25 counties over nine days. Lewis and Bond spoke at mass rallies in churches, schools, 
colleges, and out in the open, and for every community visited, their message was “that they 
were not alone in their struggle. We did not tell them who to vote for or what political party to 
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join, but simply that they could begin to control their own destiny by registering to vote.”703 One 
memorable stop occurred in Belzoni, Mississippi, a place once known for its racial violence. At a 
mass rally, a white man came up to Lewis, extended his hand, and said, “I’m the mayor and I 
want to welcome you here.”704 Cognizant of the growth in the number of black voters in the 
town, the mayor behaved in a way that would have been rare a decade earlier. Not only did 
African Americans have an opportunity to gain political influence, but their civic presence also 
altered race relations for the better.  
Lewis, Bond, and other VEP staff visited all 11 southern states in 1971 and 1972, and 
they continued making trips throughout Lewis’s tenure to stimulate black voting power. Many 
places conducting a community-wide registration project were in rural counties, cut off from 
other civil rights activists. These tours were meant to inspire and link African Americans 
together across their states—to impart to them the confidence that their vote had the potential to 
change the political and racial order of their hometowns. Whites no longer carried out mass 
violence against African Americans trying to register, but after a tour of Mississippi in 1975, 
Lewis concluded that intimidation was still a reality in the South: “At several of the meetings and 
rallies in Mississippi we heard people saying the boss man told them they didn’t need to vote, 
they didn’t need to register. People on the farms, the plantations are afraid to come in to 
register.”705 
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 Alongside local projects, the VEP supported black elected officials, whose number across 
the South had risen to 388 in 1969 and would grow to 873 in 1972.706 As an extension of the 
Southwide Conference in December 1968, the VEP established five service centers for local 
officials on five historically black college campuses—Tougaloo College, Clark College, 
Southern University, Talladega College, and Miles College. The VEP designed these centers to 
be in-state resource hubs “on the procedures, duties, and responsibilities of their positions” and 
“libraries of knowledge for helping officials take advantage of federal programs.”707 These 
centers hosted their own conferences, worked with state leaders, and brought political scientists 
in academia together with grassroots politicians. The Carnegie Corporation donated $200,000 for 
three years, and the Ford and Aaron E. Norman Foundations later contributed. For a brief time, 
these service centers provided crucial assistance for African American elected leaders in state 
politics where their presence unsettled and angered long-serving white Democrats.708  
At the Tougaloo College service center, Taunya Banks became a force within Mississippi 
politics. A recent law school graduate of Howard University, Banks served as the director of the 
center, where she recruited undergraduate volunteers, hosted workshops, wrote political manuals, 
and contacted the DOJ when whites discriminated against black candidates and officials. The 
center provided a home base while Banks also traveled the state to meet with black elected 
officials. Banks worked with people in Bolton, Mound Bayou, and Edwards to make sure 
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aldermen were seated without resistance. She counseled Geneva Collins from Claiborne County, 
who served as the state’s only African American chancery clerk. Banks stayed informed about 
changes to election laws, and she contacted African Americans when their offices were affected. 
By thwarting white officials hoping to keep African Americans officials in the political dark, 
Banks ensured they remained part of the political process.709 
 While Banks was an effective leader at Tougaloo College until she resigned in mid-1970, 
the other service centers struggled, and the VEP terminated the program in mid-1972. The 
service centers were expensive to maintain, and staff spent much of their energy simply trying to 
get the word out about their presence. In Louisiana, for example, local officials could not find the 
time to travel to Baton Rouge for advice at the Southern University center. The staff at the 
centers was small, and they could not cover an entire state whose black elected population grew 
every year. The issues kept growing, and service center staff had to become experts on school 
desegregation, prison reform, public programs, welfare, taxes, and election laws. Officials began 
seeking out service centers less as the enthusiasm from the 1968 Southwide Conference waned 
and as locals concentrated on their own community’s problems with less attention to a wider 
movement. In 1972, the VEP decided to end the program and concentrate elsewhere.710 
 Since the days of Wiley Branton’s leadership, the VEP had tried forging relationships 
with Latino voters to expand minority voting power, but this strategy gained new momentum 
under John Lewis. During Vernon Jordan’s tenure, the VEP began reaching out to Chicano 
activists about potential registration projects in the Southwest. Several visited the VEP’s Atlanta 
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headquarters to glean ideas about starting a Latino-focused VEP, including Willie Velásquez. A 
committed political activist for Mexican-Americans since the early 1960s, Velásquez co-founded 
La Raza Unida in Texas, but left after he became convinced that an independent, ethnically-
singular party would win few electoral contests. Soon after taking over the new VEP, Lewis 
began funding Mexican-American registration projects in Texas and worked with Velásquez to 
set up a separate organization with IRS tax-exempt privileges. In early 1974, they finally 
succeeded, and in May, the Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) received 
its charter and set up its headquarters in San Antonio.711 
 As its own organization, the SVREP operated separately from the VEP, but the two 
organizations stayed in regular communication as Velásquez built up the Latino vote in Texas, 
New Mexico, Arizona, Colorado, Utah, Nevada, and California. The SVREP started small by 
conducting voter registration campaigns in Texas, but quickly expanded across the region.  The 
SVREP received funding from several donors with ties to the VEP, including the Field 
Foundation, Rockefeller Brothers Fund, and the United Auto Workers. In 1976, the group 
sponsored almost 50 projects aimed at registering Latinos and educating them about their 
citizenship rights. “While many Americans are celebrating the Bicentennial Anniversary of their 
participation in American government,” Velásquez said in a joint statement with the VEP, “we 
are still working so that Blacks, Spanish-Speaking, and Native Americans can have a voice and 
full participation in the social, political, and economic arenas [of the United States].”712 That 
                                                 
711 Articles of Incorporation, Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP), Box 14, Folder 1, Branton 
Papers; and SVREP Board Meeting Minutes, January 17, 1975, Box 14, Folder 1, Branton Papers. See also 
Memorandum, Ed Stanfield to Paul Anthony, Re: “Possibility of an SRC-Type Agency in the Southwest,” 
December 4, 1967, Box 2T79, Folder “VEP Fall 1967,” Field Foundation Archives; VEP Annual Reports for 1970, 
1972, and 1974; and “The Voter Education Project: A Concise History 1962-1979,” 1979. On Willie Velásquez, see 
Juan A. Sepúlveda Jr., The Life and Times of Willie Velásquez: Su Voto es Su Voz (Houston: Arte Público Press, 
2003); Márquez, Democratizing Texas Politics, 97-98; and Kiko Martinez, “The Legacy of Willie Velásquez,” La 
Prensa, September 28, 2003.  
 
 266 
year, the SVREP helped register 161,500 Latinos across the Southwest. Over the next decade, 
the SVREP would organize hundreds of registration campaigns, conduct research, publish 
reports, and file dozens of suits challenging redistricting. “It’s similar to what happened in the 
South with blacks,” Velásquez told the Washington Post in 1977. “The same thing is happening 
with Latinos except we’re a couple of years behind.”713 
 Even as the VEP expanded, its finances remained continually in flux due to the 
unsteadiness of philanthropic support. At a symposium in Washington, DC in late 1971, 
executives from scores of foundations gathered to assess the impact of the Tax Reform Act of 
1969. Ruth C. Chance, the executive director of the Rosenberg Foundation, summarized her 
colleagues’ feeling that the legislation had forced them to “enter on a period of caution.”714 
James L. Kunen from the Meyer Foundation concurred, saying that the law will “divert us. It will 
divert us from the pressing problems that we ought to be paying attention to,” such as urban 
renewal, housing, education, and civil rights.715 Howard R. Dressner from the Ford Foundation 
addressed how the legislation affected large and small foundations. While Ford and its peers had 
the resources and staff to assess whether each grant application met with the standards of the Tax 
Reform Act, smaller foundations did not have that capacity, and so “they [play] it safe simply by 
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not recommending this or that proposal to the trustees.”716 From the topics covered at this 
symposium, foundation executives were adapting to the law, but they recognized new limitations 
on social reform grants—such as to the VEP. To some extent, their worries were self-fulfilling 
prophecies, but their newfound conservatism came from a genuine fear of IRS repercussions 
should they violate the Tax Reform Act. 
 The VEP’s relationships with foundations changed as a consequence of the law, 
complicating their finances and requiring greater oversight that constricted its work during the 
1970s. This was most evident through the VEP’s partnership with the Ford Foundation. At a 
May 1971 meeting with VEP staff, Bryant George of the Ford Foundation said, “The IRS 
watches the Foundation very closely and therefore VEP in turn will have to be monitored to 
assure the Foundation that it is adhering to the law.”717 Ford promised a new hands-on approach 
if the VEP wanted to continue receiving major grants, including Ford staff visiting local projects 
that drew on VEP money, observing VEP staff in the office, reviewing printed materials to 
ensure nonpartisanship, and monitoring the VEP’s overall effectiveness.  
 One event in 1974 threatened to rupture the relationship between the VEP and the Ford 
Foundation. In April, Lewis went on a voter mobilization tour in Alabama with Julian Bond and 
Hosea Williams during the gubernatorial race in which incumbent George Wallace was drawing 
unprecedented support—even from segments of the black community. A reporter with the New 
York Times covered the story, writing that Lewis, Bond, and Williams “told black Alabamians in 
half a dozen cities and towns that a vote for George Wallace was a traitorous step backward.”718 
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The story reached Ford Foundation executives who were concerned enough to launch a full-scale 
investigation of the tour to see if the VEP had violated its grant conditions by engaging in 
partisan politics. Ford representatives brought VEP staff into the foundation’s New York 
headquarters to review grant policies. Lewis maintained that he had done nothing wrong and that 
the journalist has misinterpreted several details. He stood up for his actions, saying that many 
African Americans were confused about the election after several black mayors, including 
Tuskegee’s Johnnie Ford, endorsed the former segregationist when he appealed to black 
communities as a changed man. Ford’s lead investigator determined “certain liberties may have 
been taken which, in light of the highly sensitive status of VEP, were both unfortunate and, 
possibly, inappropriate,” but recommended no further action beyond a stern reproach.719 
The VEP continued to receive funding from a handful of other foundations, but balancing 
figures for the 25 percent rule was difficult, compounded by the economic recession that 
weighed on the United States during the 1970s. Between 1971 and 1973, the VEP kept 
increasing its budget as it won more contributions, but it stretched its resources thin as it 
expanded its programs. By 1974, the money started drying up. “The VEP’s entire range of 
financial supporters, from individual donors to foundations, is suffering from the recession,” 
Lewis wrote Dunbar.720 Stock values dropped, and since many foundations had their wealth tied 
up in markets, foundations scaled back their philanthropy. The Ford Foundation alone lost 
                                                 
719 Memorandum, Hugh Price to Harry Dodds, Re: Investigation of VEP Voter Registration Rallies in Montgomery 
and Selma, Alabama on April 21-22, 1974, May 28, 1974, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 6, National Affairs Division, 
Vice-President, Office Files of Mitchell Sviridoff, Ford Foundation Records. See also Memorandum, John Lewis to 
Harcourt Dobbs, Re: VEP Alabama Trip, April 21-22, 1974, May 31, 1974, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 6, National 
Affairs Division, Vice-President, Office Files of Mitchell Sviridoff, Ford Foundation Records; and Memorandum, 
R. Harcourt Dodds to Howard R. Dressner, Re: Investigation of VEP Voter Education Rallies in Montgomery and 
Selma, Alabama, July 9, 1974, Series 1, Box 30, Folder 6, National Affairs Division, Vice-President, Office Files of 
Mitchell Sviridoff, Ford Foundation Records. 
 
720 John Lewis to Leslie W. Dunbar, December 4, 1974, Box 2S409, Folder “Voter Education Project: 75-19, Fall 
1974,” Field Foundation Archives. 
 269 
around 1,000,000,000 dollars in total assets in 1974. The VEP felt these reverberations. Lewis 
laid off five staff members in late 1974, after a year plagued by money shortages in which the 
VEP sponsored only 16 registration projects. Speaking at the Butler Street YMCA in Atlanta, 
Lewis told the crowd, “the current economic recession threatens to wipe out the social and 
political gains” of the civil rights revolution.721 Paul West, a reporter with the Atlanta 
Constitution, followed up on the story and interviewed foundation executives who sounded the 
alarm about how much they would be able to give to civil rights groups. “Hard times may do 
more damage to the civil rights movement in one year than resistance by white supremacists did 
in twenty,” West concluded.722 
 Amid financial trouble, Lewis appeared before both branches of Congress in the spring of 
1975 to advocate for congressional renewal of the Voting Rights Act. He listed the benefits of 
the legislation, but also took the opportunity to blast the Tax Reform Act of 1969 for impeding 
the work of the VEP and undermining the Voting Rights Act. “The Congress,” Lewis explained 
to House members, “with one hand, removed some of the barriers to the ballot; four years later, it 
turned around and, with its other hand, placed a serious restriction on private financial support to 
achieve the franchise.”723 Lewis recognized that he was there to comment on the Voting Rights 
Act, but he could not separate the two pieces of legislation, for one curtailed the other and few 
seemed to know or care. He blamed the Tax Reform Act for limiting the VEP’s finances the past 
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two years, forcing him to lay off staff members and reduce assistance to communities trying to 
organize registration campaigns.724  
 A major consequence of the Tax Reform Act impeding the Voting Rights Act, Lewis told 
Congress, was the rise of gerrymandering. Conservative legislators in states across the South had 
become adept at redistricting, nullifying the rise of black political power by isolating African 
American neighborhoods. But because the VEP struggled to operate, it did not have the 
resources to study and counter partisan redistricting. Lewis argued that conservative strategies to 
gerrymander defied the Voting Rights Act and were ongoing: “These violations…did not occur a 
decade ago. They happened last year, last month, yesterday, and there is no indication that they 
will cease in the foreseeable future.”725 Beyond redistricting, conservatives found ways around 
the Voting Rights Act. “Every conceivable tactic has been used by the southern states to violate, 
oppose, circumvent, and ignore both the letter and spirit of the Voting Rights Act,” Lewis told 
the Senate Judiciary Committee.726 For example, Mississippi in 1972 created a new voter 
application form that the federal government did not bother to challenge that required people to 
write down their license plate number, list any crimes, record all properties, and indicate where 
they worked and went to church. If the federal government would not do anything about these 
disfranchisement tactics, Lewis explained, the VEP would try, but the tax law impeded its reach. 
In August, Congress extended the Voting Rights Act to 1982, but did not address Lewis’s 
concerns about gerrymandering, state intransigence, or the Tax Reform Act of 1969.727 






726 VEP Press Release, April 9, 1975, Box 2S409, Folder “Voter Education Project: 75-19, Fall 1974,” Field 
Foundation Archives. See also Janet Wells, “Voting Rights in 1975: Why Minorities Still Need Federal Protection,” 
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 Lewis turned his attention to keeping the VEP afloat during the recession. The VEP 
struggled in 1975, funding only 25 registration projects even as the number of southern black 
elected officials rose to 1,588.728 The next year, still operating as “lean and hungry,” the VEP 
benefitted from excitement over the presidential race and spent $78,786 on 87 registration 
projects.729 Jimmy Carter appealed to African American voters in the South, and they rewarded 
him with over 95 percent of their votes for President. With over 3,500,000 African Americans 
registered in the South, their influence was “the most decisive and influential single exercise of 
minority political power in this century,” the VEP reported.730 In South Carolina, for example, 
around 200,000 African Americans voted for Carter, and he won the state by about 90,000 votes. 
In all 11 southern states, the VEP conducted “spot-checks,” estimating that 60-70 percent of 
registered African Americans voted.731 
The Decline of the VEP 
With $88,534 in the VEP’s account, John Lewis resigned in January 1977 to run for 
Congress, confident that the VEP was stable. But Lewis’s absence disrupted the VEP in ways he 
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could not predict. Archie Allen served as interim director, but he lacked the charisma and 
leadership of Lewis. The Ford Foundation hired a firm to conduct a review of the VEP shortly 
after Lewis left, and it discovered internal friction between staff members, a lack of grants made 
to local groups, and paralysis of its research wing. By April 1977, the VEP still had not reviewed 
the 1976 elections. Ford representatives worried about the VEP’s future without Lewis, and 
although some within its National Affairs Division thought the only way for the VEP to survive 
would be for Ford to exert more influence, they decided “to sit tight for now.”732 But Ford staff 
members were anxious to find a new leader for the VEP, fearful that no current staff members 
were up to the task. Without an ambitious leader, the VEP was in peril. “The demise of VEP 
would be a great loss to the South,” lawyer Harry J. Wexler wrote. “It is one of a very few civil 
rights organizations that is widely respected for its overall performance.”733 
 In July, VEP board members named Vivian Malone Jones as executive director. In 1965, 
Jones became the first African American graduate of the University of Alabama. She had grown 
up in Mobile and attended Alabama A&M College, but after it lost accreditation, she decided to 
enroll at the University of Alabama with help from the NAACP. Governor George Wallace 
barred her and James Hood from entering Foster Hall on June 11, 1963 before federal troops 
arrived to ensure their enrollment. Jones graduated with a degree in business management. After 
she graduated, she earned a job as a research analyst with the Civil Rights Division, and later, 
she directed the Civil Rights and Urban Affairs Division of the Environmental Protection 
Agency in Atlanta. On August 1, 1977, she became the fourth executive director of the VEP.734 
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 Vivian Malone Jones was an accomplished organizer, but after a little more than a year 
with the VEP, she resigned due to poor health. Between the summers of 1977 and 1978, Jones 
tried to keep the VEP solvent, stressing in a fundraising letter from November 1977 that “our 
cash flow has been depleted.”735 She cut programs, but did so reluctantly. “Sophisticated tactics 
designed to deny equal rights” were also increasing throughout the South, extinguishing the drive 
among many to remain politically active.736 In Dallas, for example, the VEP estimated that 
around 30,000 African Americans would soon be purged from voter roles after the county began 
a “recertification process.”737 She reduced programs for 1977, but promised the VEP would 
increase its activity—pending funds—for 1978. But stronger financial support was not 
forthcoming, and Jones began receiving cancer treatment around mid-1978. She resigned later in 
the year, forcing the VEP’s field director, Sherrill Marcus, to take over as interim executive 
director.738  
 In 1979 and into the 1980s, the VEP remained operational, but it was only a fragment of 
what it once was. Soon after taking control over the VEP, Marcus released a press report 
summarizing the VEP’s past and present situation. “The political empowerment journey requires 
money, manpower, organization, and leadership,” he wrote. “During the past sixteen years, VEP 
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has possessed organization, and leadership; but often, it has had insufficient amounts of 
money—when money is scarce, manpower is scarce.”739 At a VEP board meeting the following 
month, members concluded that “floundering programs, staffing, and lack of new funding 
became critical in the fall of 1978.”740 But they were not ready to close down the VEP. Wiley 
Branton, Vernon Jordan, and John Lewis pledged their support to find another executive director, 
as did the Ford Foundation. With an estimated deficit of $55,000 in February 1979, the VEP 
became inactive until a new leader emerged.741 
 Over two years passed before the VEP board decided on a new executive director. 
Geraldine Thompson had a long track record of public service to the city of Atlanta and to the 
NAACP, making her a good fit in the eyes of VEP board members, Ford Foundation 
representatives, and former VEP executive directors. Raised in Memphis, Thompson graduated 
from Le Moyne College in Syracuse, New York and returned to the South to work on the 
campaigns of Andrew Young for Congress in 1972 and Maynard Jackson for mayor of Atlanta in 
1973. She worked in the mayor’s office as Special Assistant for Community Affairs between 
1974 and 1976, and later served as Associate Director of the Atlanta branch of the NAACP. 
Before accepting the position with the VEP, she served as Regional Administrator for Region 
Four of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. She knew resurrecting the VEP 
would be challenging, but she committed to “use every resource available to transform that 
American ideal [of full political representation] into reality.”742 
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 Under Geraldine Thompson, the VEP underwent a small renaissance between 1982 and 
1984, but it accrued heavy debt that precipitated its end. The VEP appeared to have recovered 
during that span, receiving large grants from the Ford Foundation, Field Foundation, and others. 
The VEP funded 50 projects in 1982 and another 85 in 1983, with a projected budget of 
$450,000. Thompson also expanded the VEP to aid campaigns focusing on women, including 
workshops in multiple states to encourage women to run for office and vote. But even as the 
VEP increased its programs, philanthropic supporters wanted assurance of its solvency. At 
Thompson’s request, the Field Foundation conducted a six-week review of its operations and 
finances. Instead of assuaging doubts, Francesta Farmer and Ruby Martin, the two who 
conducted the review, documented numerous operational and financial discrepancies within the 
VEP. They reported that 85 percent of the VEP’s budget went to administrative costs, and the 
rest went to local projects. But the VEP had no bookkeeper, no actual budget, no work plans for 
employees, no concrete goals, no research protocols, and almost nothing in its bank account. 
They found the VEP to have no clear strategies for increasing minority political participation, 
and they criticized the VEP for failing to outline future plans. Worse, the VEP was failing to 
capitalize on Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaign. Jackson was speaking throughout the South 
exciting local communities about black voting power, but the VEP played no role in helping 
local people register after his campaign stops ended.743  
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In 1985, the Atlanta Constitution obtained a copy of the Field Foundation’s report and 
published on the VEP’s financial problems. The article wrecked the VEP’s reputation in Atlanta, 
within the civil rights field, and with philanthropic foundations. Peter Scott, the journalist who 
broke the story, wrote, “VEP does not appear to have any systematic strategies or programs to 
increase voter registration/education among minorities.”744 While Thompson disputed parts of 
the report, she acknowledged that much of it was true, including salary increases for herself and 
some staff. Scott reached out to executives within the Field and Ford Foundations, and both told 
him they were reconsidering their relationship to the VEP. The next year, the VEP lost its Field 
Foundation funding, and Thompson laid off 11 staff members, leaving only herself and her 
deputy director.745 By the summer of 1986, Thompson had resigned, and the VEP was in 
shambles with no one left on staff. A Ford Foundation report concluded that poor leadership was 
to blame, along with unrealistic budget aims and unfulfilled promises to local groups requesting 
funds. The VEP also “suffered severe cash flow problems,” the report’s author, Tonya Lewis, 
wrote. “Because of matching requirements and the uncertainty in arrival of funds, VEP could not 
accurately predict the amount of money it would have at any given moment.”746 
Even with financial problems and a ruined reputation, the VEP held on through the early 
1990s. Clarence D. Coleman, a retired educator and former staff member of the SRC, took over 
as the VEP’s executive director and only employee. “I was determined that this organization not 
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be allowed to just wither away and die,” he told a reporter at the VEP’s 25-year anniversary 
celebration in 1987.747 But the VEP did wither. In 1986, it was more than $160,000 in debt. The 
Ford Foundation provided some relief, and Coleman worked without a salary for much of his 
tenure. He moved the VEP to Atlanta University in 1987, where faculty members in political 
science provided some assistance. But Coleman could do little more than to keep the VEP from 
folding. In 1990, Ed Brown became the VEP’s final executive director, working largely without 
a salary. His stint was short, for by late 1991, it was clear to him that the VEP could no longer 
operate. He requested and won a grant worth $65,000 from the Ford Foundation for the “orderly 
closing down of the organization and disposition of its records” to Atlanta University’s 
archive.748 Quietly, the VEP shut its doors for good. 
 During the VEP’s 25-year anniversary celebration back in 1987, newly elected U.S. 
Congressman John Lewis told a reporter, “I think there's a feeling in America that voting is no 
longer the ‘in’ thing to do...[but] I think the Voter Education Project is needed now more than 
ever before.”749 His words echoed the sentiment he expressed on the tenth anniversary of the 
March on Washington 14 years earlier: hope combined with realism. Ever since the Tax Reform 
Act of 1969 destabilized the VEP’s finances, local movements organized around acquiring the 
ballot decreased, even as more African Americans registered and won political office. To some 
extent, the VEP was a victim of its own success. Civil rights had been won, spurred along by the 
VEP and the activists it supported during the 1960s. But the southwide movement that the VEP 
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helped tether together waned, and full social and political equality for African Americans 
remained elusive. The Tax Reform Act of 1969 undermined the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but 
few people outside the VEP, civil rights leaders, philanthropic supporters, and conservative 
legislators realized it.  
 With more limitations, the VEP continued through five more presidential administrations. 
The VEP funded grassroots registration campaigns, supported black candidates and 
officeholders, opposed conservative tactics to dilute the black vote, encouraged Latino voting 
power, and strove to realize the full potential of the civil rights revolution. With help from the 
VEP, black southerners moved from the fringes of political involvement to the center. In the 
process, American politics shifted—African Americans gained greater strength, the two major 
parties were transformed, and conservatives found new ways to hold onto power. Even though 
the VEP’s accomplishments were impressive, it could have done more had its funding not been 
attacked. The VEP tried taking the civil rights movement to its logical conclusion, but 



























 On June 25, 2013, the Supreme Court of the United States invalidated a key section 
within the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled in 
Shelby County v. Holder that Section Four (b), the coverage formula, was outdated, and 
therefore, unconstitutional. By striking down Section Four (b), the Supreme Court rendered 
Section Five moot, the foundation of the legislation that required counties and states to receive 
federal approval before changing local election laws. Chief Justice John Roberts, on behalf of the 
conservative majority, wrote, “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts that,” but 
defended their view that enough racial progress had occurred to warrant the decision.750 Justice 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg disagreed, and in her dissent, she opened by writing, “In the Court’s view, 
the very success of Section Five of the Voting Rights Act demands its dormancy.”751 The 
conservative Justices, according to Ginsburg, had destabilized the Voting Rights Act, blind to the 
possibility that the law had been the major reason why much racial progress had been 
accomplished since 1965, and why it remained necessary. States under the Voting Rights Act 
would no longer need federal approval before changing electoral laws, an open door to the return 
of voter suppression. 
 Within weeks of the Shelby County decision, Texas, North Carolina, and other states 
introduced legislation to amend elections laws—the kind which the Department of Justice would 
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have likely rejected under an unaltered Voting Rights Act. Republican-dominated state 
legislatures quickly passed election laws with the pretext of preventing voter fraud, but with the 
implicit aim to make it more difficult for people of color, low-income citizens, and students to 
vote. In North Carolina, the Legislature passed restrictions on early voting, same-day 
registration, out-of-precinct voting, and pre-registration for 16 and 17-year-olds. The law also 
required voters to present a form of photo identification to election officials, a constraint that 
barred hundreds of thousands who have no driver’s license or similar credentials. Conservatives 
defended these measures as bulwarks against fraud, but just as segregationists defended the poll 
tax and literacy test during the Jim Crow era, the reason was to dilute the electoral power of 
black and liberal voters.752 
 Today, voting restrictions appear more common than in the recent past, but the history of 
the Voter Education Project demonstrates that the right to vote for southern African Americans 
has never been simple. Obstacles to full citizenship have been numerous, and for 30 years, the 
VEP worked to make it easier for African Americans to vote and compete for political power. 
Drawing on philanthropic foundation money, the VEP financed hundreds of local registration 
campaigns, empowering communities with the funds to orchestrate sustained movements for the 
ballot. Between 1962 and 1964, VEP efforts led to nearly 700,000 African Americans registering 
in the South—the groundswell that precipitated the Voting Rights Act. During the late 1960s, 
with federal protections won, the VEP helped increase black political power, but conservatives 
undermined this approach through the Tax Reform Act of 1969 by compromising the VEP’s 
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philanthropic support. As a result, the VEP’s finances became unsteady, and while it endured 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the VEP was unable to maintain the pace for black political 
empowerment. Not every goal of the civil rights movement came to fruition, but because of the 
VEP, hundreds of grassroots campaigns had money to launch registration campaigns. The VEP 
helped upend the Jim Crow system and reshaped American politics. 
Looking around today, one might question the results of the civil rights movement. 
Conservatives gerrymander seemingly without restraint, condensing black voters into disfigured 
districts and isolating their political influence. Police brutality against African Americans 
persists, prompting massive demonstrations in places like Ferguson, Baltimore, and Chicago. 
Economic inequality grows ever sharper, deepening racial injustice as poverty affects African 
Americans at higher rates. Mass incarceration, proclaimed journalist and activist Michelle 
Alexander, is the latest form of Jim Crow. Even with President Obama in the White House, a 
post-racial society has not come close to emerging.  
If so many problems endure, what did the VEP accomplish? Not all is lost, for the VEP 
has echoes today. The national eligible black voting population stood at 27,908,000 in 2014, with 
17,700,000 registered—over 63 percent.753 In the 11 states where the VEP operated, 9,044,000 
African Americans are registered to vote.754 Thousands of southern African Americans have 
served in local, state, and federal elected positions since 1965. While SNCC is gone, the 
NAACP, CORE, NUL, and SCLC continue, each devoted to black voter registration and 
political activism. The NAACP in particular has thrived, and in states like North Carolina, it 
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leads the charge against voter suppression. Other movements have formed, including Black 
Lives Matter in 2013. Organized online and without a hierarchal structure, Black Lives Matter 
activists have started to enter the political arena, such as DeRay McKesson running for mayor of 
Baltimore.755 Civil rights activism combined with the pursuit of black political power—the 
VEP’s legacy remains today.  
 As the right to vote faces new attacks, one can imagine what impact the VEP could have 
if it were still around today. Vernon Jordan wondered about the possibilities, less than one month 
after the Shelby County decision. “The VEP should be alive and well right now…It faded, and it 
never should have. And it faded in part on the theory that our work was done. It is very clear now 
that our work is not done. And were it still in existence as it was under Wiley [Branton], me, and 
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APPENDIX 1: BLACK VOTER REGISTRATION BY STATE, 1962-1970 
(% = Registered Out of Total Black Voting Age Population) 
Sources: Appendix II in Pat Watters and Reese Cleghorn, Climbing Jacob’s Ladder: The Arrival of Negroes in 
Southern Politics (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967); Voter Registration in the South, Summer 1966, 
Box 563, Folder 3, SCLC Papers, MARBL, Emory University; Voter Registration in the South, Summer 1968, 
Folder 7607, NCF Papers; and VEP Annual Report, 1970, Reel 177, SRC Papers. Total population figures for 


























 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 
Alabama 68,317 (13.4%) 110,000 (22.8%) 246,396 (51.2%) 273,000 (56.7%) 315,000 (65.4%) 
Arkansas 68,970 (34%) 80,000 (41.5%) 115,000 (59.7%) 130,000 (67.5%) 153,000 (79.4%) 
Florida 182,456 (36.8%) 299,960 (63.8%) 286,446 (60.9%) 292,000 (62.1%) 302,000 (64.2%) 
Georgia 175,573 (26.7%) 270,000 (44.1%) 289,545 (47.2%) 344,000 (56.1%) 395,000 (64.4%) 
Louisiana 151,663 (27.8) 163,041 (31.7%) 242,130 (47.1%) 305,000 (59.3%) 319,000 (62%) 
Mississippi 23,920 (5.3%) 28,500 (6.7%) 139,099 (32.9%) 251,000 (59.4%) 286,000 (67.7%) 
North 
Carolina 
210,450 (35.8%) 258,000 (46.8%) 281,134 (51%) 305,000 (55.3%) 305,000 (55.3%) 
South 
Carolina 
90,901 (22.9%) 144,000 (38.8%) 190,609 (51.4%) 189,000 (50.8%) 221,000 (59.6%) 
Tennessee 150,869 (49.8%) 218,000 (69.4%) 225,000 (71.7%) 228,000 (72.6%) 242,000 (77.1%) 
Texas 111,014 (26.7%) 375,000 (57.7%) 400,000 (61.6%) 540,000 (83.1%) 550,000 (84.7%) 
Virginia 110,113 (24%) 127,000 (29.1%) 205,000 (46.9%) 255,000 (58.4%) 269,000 (61.6%) 
      




3,112,000 (62%) 3,357,000 (66.9%) 
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APPENDIX 2: TOTAL VEP FINANCES, 1962 – MAY 1, 1965 































Sponsor Total to VEP  VEP Expenditures Total Dispensed by 
VEP 
 
Taconic Foundation $339,000  Grants-in-Aid $633,943.41  
Field Foundation $225,000  SRC Overhead $27,200.52  
Stern Family Fund $219,000  Operating Costs $194,692.66  
Organizations and 
Churches 
$9,686.98     
Individuals $16,561.85     
Foundation Share of 
Internship Program 
$2,500     
Interest on Treasury 
Bills 
$438.57     
Refund from Bail $500     
 Total - $888,237.40   Total - $855,836.59  
     VEP Bank Balance as of 
May 1, 1965 - $32,400.81 
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APPENDIX 3: VEP SUMMER CRASH PROGRAM, MAY – JULY 1962 
Source: Leslie W. Dunbar and Wiley A. Branton, “First Annual Report of the Voter Education 
Project of the Southern Regional Council, Inc. for the Fiscal Year April 1, 1962 through March 










Organization Place(s) Grant Amount 
from VEP 
People Registered 
All Citizens Registration 
Committee  
Atlanta, GA $3,600 
 
5,015 
Durham Committee on Negro 
Affairs 
Durham, NC $2,500 3,700 
CORE Baton Rouge, LA; 
Jackson, MS; 
Clarendon, Sumter, & York County, 
SC 
$8,625 1,557 
SCLC Waycross, Liberty County, Macon, & 
Washington County, GA; Shreveport, 
LA; Chowan County & Elizabeth City, 
NC; Charleston, SC; Knoxville & 




SNCC Jackson, Hattiesburg, Marshall County, 
3rd & 4th Congressional Districts, MS; 
Orangeburg County, SC 
$6,375 41 
NAACP Shreveport, Baton Rouge, Lake 
Charles, & Monroe, LA; Jackson, MS; 
High Point, Fayetteville, Charlotte, 
Rocky Mount, Wilmington, & Edenton, 
NC; Beaufort, Columbia, Greenville, & 
Charleston, SC; Memphis, Knoxville, 
Chattanooga, Clarksville, Fayette 
County, & Haywood County, TN 
$17,250 7,436 
NUL Winston-Salem, NC; Richmond, VA $5,750 147 
Davidson County Independent 
Political Council 
Davidson County, TN $3,000 N/A 
National Student Association Raleigh, NC $1,140 1,641 
American Friends Service 
Committee 
Jackson, TN $2,000 969 
Federated Organization for the 
Cause of Unlimited Self-
Development  
Baton Rouge, LA $1,000 297 
Alabama State Coordinating 
Association for Registration and 
Voting 
Alabama (statewide) $1,500 1,742 
  Total - $64,240 Total – 27,839 
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APPENDIX 4: VEP GRANTEES, AUGUST 1962 – MARCH 1963 
Organization Total 
Grant 
Grant by State County  People Registered 
CORE $13,800 Florida - $2,800 Dade 3,078 
  Louisiana - $4,500 Pointe Coupe 92 
   St. Helena 131 
   Iberville 126 
   W. Feliciana 0 
   E. Feliciana 0 
   E. Baton Rouge 65 
   Tangipahoa 5 
   Washington N/A 
   W. Baton Rouge N/A 
  South Carolina - $6,500 Marlboro 12 
   Georgetown 30 
   Lee 62 
   Florence 433 
   Dillon 18 
   Sumter 73 
   York 467 
   Horry 67 
   Williamsburg 148 
   Darlington 510 
   Spartanburg 47 
   Fairfield 6 
   Marion 18 
   Clarendon N/A 
   Hinds 8 
NAACP $22,000 Florida - $6,000 Duval N/A 
   Escambia 126 
   Bay N/A 
   Alachua 1,076 
   Broward N/A 
   Columbia N/A 
   Dade N/A 
   Hillsborough N/A 
   Leon N/A 
   Orange 1,450 
   Polk 442 
   Pinellas 169 
   Volusia 660 
  Georgia - $ N/A Richmond 1,947 
  North Carolina - $4,000 Mecklenburg N/A 
   Edgecombe/Nash N/A 
   New Hanover N/A 
  South Carolina - $1,000 Richland N/A 
  Tennessee - $5,000 Shelby 1,472 
   Fayette 8 
   Montgomery 158 
   Lauderdale N/A 
   Tipton 25 
   Knox 795 
   Bolivar 27 
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   Hardemon 14 
   Haywood 92 
  Mississippi - $ N/A Jackson 41 
   Harrison 180 
   Hinds 112 
   Jones 157 
  Louisiana - $3,000 Lincoln 16 
   E. Carroll 40 
   Madison 115 
   Ouachita 34 
   Morehouse 10 
   Tensas N/A 
   Richland 10 
   Bienville 8 
   Jackson 16 
  Texas - $ N/A Bowie 2,531 
   Smith 8,680 
  Virginia – $ N/A Fredericksburg 
(city) 
N/A 
   Lynchburg (city) N/A 
   Roanoke (city) N/A 
   Portsmouth (city) N/A 
   Buckingham N/A 
   Cumberland N/A 
   Greensville N/A 
   Isle of Wight N/A 
   Surry N/A 
   Sussex N/A 
   Nansemond N/A 
   Prince Edward N/A 
   Suffolk (city) N/A 
NUL $ N/A Texas Tarrant 5,832 
  North Carolina Forsyth 147 
  Virginia Richmond (city) N/A 
SCLC $15,700 Louisiana - $3,400 Caddo N/A 
   Claiborne N/A 
   Desoto N/A 
   Bienville N/A 
   Webster N/A 
  Alabama - $2,000 Etowah N/A 
   Calhoun N/A 
   Montgomery N/A 
  Florida - $600 Leon N/A 
  Tennessee - $700 Hamilton N/A 
  North Carolina - $2,000 Chowan N/A 
   Pasquotank N/A 
   Northampton N/A 
   Bertie N/A 
   Hertford N/A 
  Virginia - $ N/A Amelia N/A 
   Appomattox N/A 
   Brunswick N/A 
   Dinwiddie N/A 
   Lunenburg N/A 
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   Mecklenburg N/A 
   Nottoway N/A 
   Powhatan N/A 
   Prince George N/A 
   Southampton N/A 
   Petersburg (city) N/A 
   Hopewell (city) N/A 
  Georgia - $4,000 Mitchell 200 
   Sumter 0 
   Spalding 90 
   DeKalb 0 
   Rockdale 15 
   Telfair 15 
   Hall 150 
   Greene 200 
   Morgan 40 
   Wilkes 40 
   Muscogee 950 
   Ware 200 
   Floyd 85 
SNCC $8,254 Alabama - $1,500 Dallas N/A 
  Georgia - $6,054 Baker N/A 
   Calhoun N/A 
   Early N/A 
   Lee N/A 
   Marion N/A 
   Peach N/A 
   Randolph N/A 
   Terrell N/A 
   Worth N/A 
  South Carolina - $700 Orangeburg N/A 
Council of Federated 
Organizations (COFO)  
$23,000 Mississippi - $23,000 Bolivar N/A 
   Coahoma N/A 
   Leflore N/A 
   Marshall N/A 
   Sunflower N/A 
   Washington N/A 
Jefferson County Voter 
Registration Campaign 
$9,000 Alabama - $9,000 Jefferson 957 
Madison County Coordinating 
Committee 
$1,200 Alabama - $1,200 Madison 752 
Southeastern Georgia Crusade 
for Voters 
$4,000 Georgia - $4,000 Chatham 2,800 
   Liberty N/A 
   Screven N/A 
   Tattnall 123 
   Bullock N/A 
   Emanuel N/A 
   Bryan N/A 
Warren County Citizens 
Improvement League  
$150 Mississippi - $150 Warren N/A 
Womanpower Unlimited $1,000 Mississippi - $1,000 Hinds N/A 
All Citizens Registration $200 Virginia - $200  N/A 
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Source: Leslie W. Dunbar and Wiley A. Branton, “First Annual Report of the Voter Education Project of the 
Southern Regional Council, Inc. for the Fiscal Year April 1, 1962 through March 31, 1963,” Box 1, Folder 1, 


































Committee of Northern 
Virginia (canceled) 
Bibb County Coordinating 
Committee 
$750 Georgia - $750 Bibb 99 




Arkansas - $1,511.60 Pulaski 3,742 
Middle Tennessee Voter 
Registration Project 
$ - N/A $ - N/A Davidson and 
adjacent counties 
3,407 
Dougherty City Voter 
Education League  
$4,000 Georgia - $4,000 Dougherty 1,000 
 Total – 
$111,787
.60 
  Total – 51,165 
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Source: Financial Summary of the Voter Education Project,  
January 7, 1964, Folder “Southern Regional Council: Voter  

























Organization Operating States Grant Total 
CORE Florida, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, & South 
Carolina 
$51,425 





Texas, & Virginia 
$75,830 
NUL Winston-Salem, NC; 
Forth Worth, TX; & 
Richmond, VA 
$15,960.98 
SCLC Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, North 
Carolina, & Virginia 
$32,700 
SNCC Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, 
Mississippi, North 
Carolina, & South 
Carolina 
$23,844 
  Total - $199,799.98 
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APPENDIX 6: INDEPENDENT ORGANIZATIONS RECEIVING VEP GRANTS  
THROUGH DECEMBER 1963 
State Organization  Grant Amount 
Alabama Madison County Coordinating 
Committee 
$2,700 ($1,200 of total before April 
1963) 
 Jefferson County Voter Registration 
Committee 
$20,999.26 ($9,000 of total before April 
1963)  
 Alabama Coordinating Association 
(certain rural counties) 
$3,779.05 
 Tuskegee Civic Association $3,000 
 Montgomery Voter Education Project $1,712 
 Colbert County Voters League $500 
 Mobile County Voter Education Project $2,250 
 Citizens’ Improvement League 
(Gadsden) 
$300 
Arkansas Greater Little Rock Voter Registration 
Movement 
$1,511.60 (all before April 1963) 
 Pine Bluff Council on Community 
Affairs 
$270 
Georgia Dougherty County Voters League  $4,000 (all before April 1963) 
 Bibb County Coordinating Committee $3,750 ($750 of total before April 1963) 
 All Citizens Registration Committee 
(Fulton County) 
$14,995 
 Southeastern Georgia Crusade for 
Voters  
$4,577.35 ($4,000 of total before April 
1963) 
Louisiana Federated Organizations for the Cause 
of Unlimited Self-Development (Baton 
Rouge) 
$1,000 (all during Summer 1962 Crash 
Program) 
 Coordinating Council of Greater New 
Orleans 
$7,500 
 The Grail (Lafayette Parish) $200 
Mississippi Council of Federated Organizations 
(COFO) 
$18,000 
 Mississippi VEP (affiliated with 
COFO) 
$21,000 ($23,000 before April 1963, 
combined with COFO grant) 
 Warren County Citizens Improvement 
League  
$150 (all before April 1963) 
 Womanpower Unlimited $1,000 (all before April 1963) 
 Mississippi Human Rights $2,500 
North Carolina National Student Association (Raleigh) $1,140 (all during Summer 1962 Crash 
Program) 
 Durham Committee on Negro Affairs  $2,500 (all during Summer 1962 Crash 
Program) 
 American Friends Service Committee 
(Guilford County) 
$952.74 
 Non-Partisan Voting Project (Charlotte) $2,000 
 Voter Registration Project of Winston-
Salem 
$1,500 
South Carolina VEP of Charleston County $2,802 
 South Carolina VEP (Second 
Congressional District) 
$5,000 





Source: Financial Summary of the Voter Education Project, 
January 7, 1964, Folder “Southern Regional Council: Voter  






























Tennessee YWCA-National Student Christian 
Federation-VEP (Nashville) 
$1,519.23 
 American Friends Service Committee 
(Jackson) 
$2,000 (all during Summer 1962 Crash 
Program) 
 Middle Tennessee Voter Registration 
Project 
$3,000 
Texas Voters of Texas Enlist (VOTE) $40,400 
Virginia All Citizens Registration Committee of 
Virginia 
$400 - Cancelled 
 Virginia Voters League $500 
 Peninsula Coordinating Committee 
(Newport News) 
$1,800 
 Tidewater Voter Registration Project 
(Norfolk) 
$3,280 
   
  Total - $186,023.23 
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APPENDIX 7: VEP GRANTEES IN 1964 
Project Number Organization Place(s) 
4-1 Virginia Voters League  Richmond, VA 
4-2 Citizens Committee of Wilson and Wilson County Wilson, NC 
4-3 Middle Tennessee Voter Registration Project Nashville, TN 
4-4 SNCC Lee, Sumter, and Terrell 
Counties, GA 
4-5 Alabama State Coordinating Association for 
Registration and Voting 
Montgomery, AL 
4-6 Educational Film Associates Madison, WI 
4-7 All-Citizens Registration Committee and SCLC Atlanta, GA 
4-8 Crusade for Voters Richmond, VA 
4-9 SCLC Albany, GA & Montgomery, 
AL 
4-10 CORE Louisiana and South Carolina 
4-11 NAACP Lake Charles, LA 
4-12 6th Congressional District VEP South Carolina 
4-13 5th Congressional District VEP South Carolina 
4-14 Halifax Voter Education Project Enfield, NC 
4-15 Warren County Voter Registration Project Warrenton, NC 
4-16 SCLC Eastern NC 
4-17 College Park Voter Registration Committee College Park, GA 
4-18 Asheville-Buncombe Voter Project Asheville, NC 
4-19 Nansemond Voter Project Suffolk, VA 
4-20 3rd Congressional District VEP South Carolina 
4-21 Madison County Coordinating Committee Huntsville, AL 
4-22 NAACP Tennessee 
4-23 Coordinating Council of Greater New Orleans New Orleans, LA 
4-24 The Grail Lafayette, LA 
4-25 4th Congressional District VEP South Carolina 
4-26 NAACP Florida 
4-27 SCLC Tuscaloosa, AL 
4-28 All-Citizens Registration Committee Atlanta, GA 
4-29 NAACP Georgia 
4-30 United Church Board for Homeland Ministries New York, New York 
4-31 SCLC Georgia 
4-32 Arkansas Voter Project Little Rock, AR 
4-33 SCLC Petersburg, VA 
4-34 SNCC Panola & Tallahatchie 
Counties, MS 
4-35 SCLC St. Augustine, FL 
4-36 Dallas County Voters’ Project Selma, AL 
4-37 NAACP Greensboro, NC 
4-38 Louisville Urban League Louisville, KY 
4-39 CORE Arlington, VA 
4-40 Bibb County Coordinating Committee Macon, GA 
4-41 Peach County Political Action Committee Fort Valley, GA 
4-42 Central Civic Voter Project Portsmouth, VA 
4-43 Lynchburg Voters League  Lynchburg, VA 
4-44 Crusade for Voters Richmond, VA 
4-45 South Carolina VEP Columbia, SC 
4-46 NAACP Virginia 
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Source: Mitchell F. Ducey, ed., The Southern Regional Council Papers, 
1944-1968: A Guide to the Microfilm Edition (Ann Arbor: University  
Microfilms International, 1984), 151-154. For this table, I arranged  
projects according to the VEP’s classification number. The first digit in  
each, 4, represents the year, 1964. The second digit is the project number, 
assigned to each new grantee once the VEP approved the application.  
Some projects overlap with previous projects between 1962-1963, but no 


































4-47 Virginia Voter’s Registration League Richmond, VA 
4-48 NAACP North Carolina VEP North Carolina 
4-49 Unknown  
4-50 Calhoun County Improvement Association Anniston, AL 
4-51 Lee County Voters League  Marianna, AR 
4-52 Durham Committee on Negro Affairs Durham, NC 
4-53 Jefferson County Voters League  Pine Bluff, AR 
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APPENDIX 8: VEP GRANTS, 1966-1968 
Year State Organization Grant Amount Registration Results 
(1966 only) 
1966 Alabama Hale County Improvement $715 134 
  Tuscaloosa Citizens for Action Committee $710 700 
  Lee County Voters League  $1,200 N/A 
  NAACP (under W.C. Patton) $5,240 N/A 
  Auburn League of Women Voters $975 2,500 
  Tuskegee Civic Association $2,675  
  Conecuh County Improvement Association $652.50 298 
  Marengo County VEP-SCLC $490 243 
  Perry County VEP-SCLC $490 195 
  Barbour County VEP-SCLC $490 146 
  Sumter County VEP-SCLC $490 250 
  Jefferson County VEP-SCLC $720 298 
  Choctaw County VEP-SCLC $490 600 
  Rural Advancement Project $1,650  
 Arkansas Operation Registration Clean Up Drive $1,500 2,940 
  Phillip County NAACP $1,000 2,500 
  Arkansas Council on Human Relations (16 
counties) 
$8,500 4,035 
 Florida Opa-locka NAACP $250 200 
  Pensacola Improvement Association $1,925 590 
  Big Bend (12 counties) $6,000 521 
  Sarasota NAACP $1,200 183 
  Jacksonville NAACP $2,240 1,907 
  St. Petersburg NAACP $1,805 125 
 Georgia Bibb County Coordinating Committee $1,975 1,010 
  Griffin NAACP $1,047.50 342 
  Augusta-Richmond County VEP $2,195 4,367 
  All-Citizens Registration Committee $4,775 7,682 
  Savannah NAACP $2,500 3,704 
  Brunswick NAACP $1,420 1,120 
  Houston County Voters Committee $1,350 1,892 
  Non-Partisan Voters League  $1,524.30 575 
  Thomasville NAACP $1,500 1,572 
  Hancock County Democratic Club $905 406 
  Fort Valley Citizens Education Commission $1,000 305 
  Keystone Voters League $1,000 322 
  Dougherty County Resources Development $3,700 479 
  Dublin NAACP $500 789 
  Valdosta & Laurens County Voters League  $500 175 
  Bullock County NAACP $1,400 464 
  NUL $5,000 N/A 
  Georgia Council on Human Relations $465 224 
 Mississippi Coahoma County NAACP $3,745 856 
  Forrest County NAACP $900 $2,500 
  Issaquena County Improvement League $2,770 128 
  Washington County Voters League $1,320 299 
  Warren County Improvement League  $1,280 152 
  Laurel Cooperative Voter Registration 
Committee 
$1,530 360 
  Madison County Movement $2,000 936 
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  Sharkey County Improvement Association $1,375 331 
  Brookhaven NAACP $950 381 
  Gulfport NAACP $1,275 194 
  Leake County NAACP $1,000 824 
  Marion County NAACP $1,000 656 
  Marshall-Benton County NAACP $1,300 538 
  Lauderdale County NAACP $1,300 1,079 
  Jackson NAACP $3,000 1,698 
  Walthall NAACP $950 106 
 North 
Carolina 
Mr. & Mrs. Joseph Tieger $600 148 
  Longhill Linden NAACP $795 550 
  Durham Council on Negro Affairs $2,765 350 
  Greensboro NAACP $1,350 395 
  Asheville-Buncombe County $850 1,701 
 South 
Carolina 
South Carolina VEP $5,503 N/A 
  Aiken County Registration Committee $900 183 
  Beaufort County Voters League $400 251 
  Sumter County Voters League $250 985 
  Richland County Voters League  $600 728 
  Citizens Committee of Charleston $720 783 
  Williamsburg County Voters League $400 863 
  Clarendon County Voters League $500 281 
  Calhoun County Voters League  $250 268 
  Florence County VEP $1,120 376 
  Laurens County VEP $400 150 
  American Friends Service Committee $750 1,531 
 Tennessee Memphis NAACP $2,930 4,037 
  Jackson NAACP $1,200 1,798 
  West Tennessee VEP (19 counties) $5,000 2,818 
  Knoxville Council on Human Relations $2,635 1,194 
 Virginia Richmond NAACP $2,495 1,253 
  Northern Virginia VEP (cancelled on August 
2, 1966) 
$8,420 400 
  Lynchburg Voters League  $2,475 1,376 
  Norfolk NAACP $2,575 1,927 
  Hampton NAACP $1,700 1,165 
  Virginia Students Civil Rights Committee $3,000 1,189 
  Lunenburg NAACP $800 205 
  Caroline County NAACP $800 195 
  Powhatan County NAACP $800 250 
  Fredericksburg NAACP $545 190 
 Special National YWCA $500 1,490 
  Student Internship Program in Atlanta $375 N/A 
  Scholarship and Education Fund for Racial 
Equality (CORE) 
$750 1,797 
   1966 Total - 
$170,787.30 
1966 Total – 93,655 
     
1967 Alabama NAACP Regional Office, Birmingham $3,460  
  Auburn League of Women Voters $200  
  Russell County VEP $500  
  Pike County Voters League $500  
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  Talladega Improvement Association $2,321  
  Madison County Voters League  $2,000  
  Greene County Civic Association $1,500  
 Arkansas Arkansas VEP $10,140  
  Arkansas VEP Statewide Meeting in Camden $1,549  
 Florida Fort Lauderdale NAACP $2,500  
  Marion County Voters League  $1,820  
 Georgia YWCA Atlanta – Student Interns $3,027  
  Screven County VEP $1,500  
  Terrell County VEP $1,000  
  Richmond County VEP $500  
  Houston County SCLC $1,800  
  All-Citizens Registration Committee $3,500  
  Burke County Improvement Association $2,663  
  Toombs County VEP $1,000  
  B.R. Brazeal (research) $1,201.25  
  Crisp County VEP $1,000  
  Urban League Regional Office - Atlanta $6,600  
  Dublin NAACP $950  
  Douglas County NAACP $2,000  
  Ben Hill County VEP $1,000  
  Grady County VEP $1,000  
  American Friends Service Committee - Atlanta $250  
  Lee County VEP $1,000  
 Louisiana Mansfield NAACP $1,410  
  Caddo Parish VEP $3,590.37  
  New Iberia NAACP $1,000  
  St. John the Baptist Parish Organization $2,200  
  New Orleans Youth Council NAACP $1,750  
  Community League for Citizenship Education 
and Voter Registration – New Orleans 
$2,000  
  Four Parish VEP (Iberville) $3,500  
  East Baton Rouge Parish VEP $2,000  
  Madison Parish Voters League  $1,000  
  East Carroll Branch NAACP $750  
  Louisiana Workshop for Candidates $1,000  
 Mississippi Bolivar County VEP $1,920  
  Holmes County VEP $1,985  
  Quitman County VEP $1,830  
  Sunflower County VEP $2,100.44  
  Tallahatchie County VEP $1,790  
  Yazoo County VEP $1,000  
  Amite County VEP $1,200  
  Issaquena County Voters League  $2,000  
  Holmes County NAACP $750  
  Coahoma County NAACP 2,500  
  Clay County Community Association $1,001.85  
  Carroll County Improvement Association $1,020  
  Pike County NAACP $1,000  
  Grenada County Voters League  $2,200  
  Warren County Improvement League  $1,200  
  Civic League of Simpson County $2,000  
  Sharkey County Improvement Association $1,500  
  Voters League of Jefferson Davis County $2,050  
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  Wilkerson County Voter Education League  $2,200  
  Hinds County Registration League $3,500  
  Rankin County Movement $2,000  
  Lawrence County Civic League  $1,000  
  Leake County NAACP $1,000  
  Lauderdale County VEP $1,500  
  Forrest County NAACP $1,500  
  North Gulfport Political Action Committee  $1,000  
  Mississippi Council on Human Relations $600  
  Dave Emmons (research) $250  
 North 
Carolina 
Lumbee Citizens Council $4,150  
  Charlotte Area Fund $2,000  
  Greensboro NAACP $1,000  
  Halifax County Voters Movement $1,500  
  North Carolina VEP $13,000  
  North Carolina Leadership Training Program 
Statewide Meeting in Durham 
$2,000  
  Citizens Voter Registration Project – Rocky 
Mount 
$2,000  
  Martin County VEP $1,500  
  Goldsboro NAACP $1,200  
  Bertie County VEP $2,000  
 South 
Carolina 
South Carolina VEP $13,000  
  Lee County VEP $850  
  Sumter County VEP $1,000  
  Greenville County VEP $2,000  
  Orangeburg County VEP $2,050  
  Laurens County VEP $1,500  
  Clarendon County VEP $2,000  
  Allendale County VEP $750  
  Anderson County VEP $1,000  
  Darlington County VEP $1,000  
  South Carolina VEP Leadership Conference $3,095.60  
  Richland County VEP $2,000  
  Charleston NAACP $2,000  
  Newberry County VEP $1,000  
  Hampton County NAACP $1,000  
  Williamsburg County Voters League  $2,000  
 Tennessee Nashville NAACP $2,592  
  A.L. Robinson (student intern in Memphis) $500  
  Ripley NAACP $2,000  
  Memphis NAACP $2,565  
 Texas Texas Leadership Conference in San Marcos $5,000  
 Virginia Virginia State Conference NAACP $200  
  Danville VEP - SCLC $3,300  
  Lynchburg Voters League  $1,000  
  Galax NAACP $1,110  
  Petersburg Improvement Association - SCLC $3,000  
  New Kent County VEP $1,050  
  Amelia County NAACP $1,000  
  Brunswick County League for Progress $1,175  
  Richmond NAACP $3,495  
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  Powhatan County NAACP $820  
  Greensville County NAACP $1,750  
 Special Scholarship and Education Fund for Racial 
Equality (CORE) 
$2,000  
  Law Students Research Council of Mississippi $2,500  
   Total - 
$222.331.51 
 
     
1968 Alabama West Macon County Improvement Association $2,200  
  Bullock County Improvement Association $2,200  
  Montgomery County NAACP $1,500  
  Ad Hoc Committee for Voter Education $1,000  
 Arkansas Lee County NAACP $1,500  
  Phillips County NAACP $1,500  
 Florida Palm Beach County Voters League  $2,200  
  Lee County NAACP $1,500  
  St. Petersburg NAACP $1,400  
  Volusia County NAACP $1,800  
  Greater Miami Council on Human Relations $1,000  
  Liberty City Community Council $1,000  
  National Council of Negro Women $800  
  South Dade County Community Action $1,200  
 Georgia Hancock County Democratic Club $1,000  
  Clay County Voter Education Program $1,500  
  Calhoun County VEP $1,500  
  Emory Conference $500  
  Houston County Voters Committee $1,000  
  Community Organization for Progress and 
Education 
$2,000  
  Savannah NAACP $2,200  
  Rising Star Voters League (Flovilla) $1,000  
  Houston County Development Committee $1,250  
  Taliaferro County Voters League  $1,200  
  Columbus Council on Human Relations $2,000  
  Floyd County VEP $1,600  
  Wayne County NAACP $1,500  
  Dougherty Council Voter Registration $2,500  
  Dodge Council NAACP $675  
  Bibb-Jones County VEP $2,500  
  Burke County Improvement Association $2,000  
  Milledgeville NAACP $1,125  
  All Citizens Registration Committee $2,500  
 Louisiana Mansfield NAACP $1,000  
  Louisiana VEP $13,000  
  Bossier Parish VEP $1,500  
  Louisiana Institute, New Orleans $4,198.92  
  Alexandria NAACP $2,200  
  The Louisiana Rights Organization to Sustain 
Equality 
$1,000  
  Second Ward Voters (Baton Rouge) $1,500  
  East Carroll Branch NAACP-VEP $1,500  
  New Roads NAACP-VEP $1,200  
  West Feliciana Voters League  $2,000  
  Ringgold NAACP $1,800  
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 Mississippi Humphrey County VEP $200  
  Bolivar County NAACP $1,000  
  Glen Allan Improvement Association $1,200  
  Meridian NAACP $2,000  
  Amite County VEP $800  
 North 
Carolina 
Raleigh NAACP $2,500  
  Northampton County Voters Movement $1,450  
  Nash County VEP $1,520  
  Burlington NAACP $1,400  
  Hoke County VEP $1,400  
  Southport NAACP $630  
  Iredell County Voters League  $1,385  
  Citizens League of Wilson County  $850  
  Person County Voters League  $880  
  Green County VEP $495  
  Warren County NAACP $1,200  
  Pitt County NAACP $1,000  
  Rockingham NAACP $1,000  
  Fayetteville Area Poor People $478  
  Asheville-Buncombe County Citizens 
Organization 
$1,300  
  Halifax County Voters Movement $1,000  
  Herford County VEP $1,350  
  Bertie County VEP $1,150  
  Vance County Voters League $1,200  
  Edgecombe County VEP $760  
  Greensboro Students VEP $200  
  Durham Committee on Negro Affairs $2,500  
  North Carolina VEP Meeting $1,000  
  North Carolina VEP Developmental Project $1,600  
  Chapel Hill Students, VEP $100  
 South 
Carolina 
Progressive Democrats (Georgetown) $1,200  
  Richland County Voters League $1,500  
  Orangeburg County VEP $3,000  
  Beaufort County VEP $1,500  
  Berkeley County Citizens $750  
  Westside Improvement League (West 
Columbia) 
$1,000  
  Sumter County Voters League  $1,500  
  Clarendon County Voters League  $1,000  
  Williamsburg County Voters League  $800  
  South Carolina VEP Candidate Workshop $800  
 Tennessee Lincoln County Voter Registration Project $1,600  
  Knoxville NAACP $2,500  
  Giles and Lawrence Counties, VEP (Pulaski) $3,000  
  Bedford County Voter Education Council $1,500  
  Memphis NAACP $3,500  
  Franklin County VEP $1,500  
  Chattanooga NAACP $2,000  
  West Tennessee Self-Help Development 
Corporation  
$10,750  
  Maury VEP $1,600  
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Sources: Statistical Summary, Voter Education Project, January-October, 1966, Box 2T25, Folder “SRC Inc. (VEP) 
Fall 1966,” Field Foundation Archives; A Report on the Voter Education Project, October 19, 1967, Box 2T79, 
Folder “SRC (VEP) Fall 1967,” Field Foundation Archives; Voter Education Projects, State-by-State Distribution, 
1968, Box 43, Folder 4, Office Files, VEP Records; for 1969, no record for each, but SRC Annual Report 1969 
counted 98 projects: Annual Report of the Executive Director of the Southern Regional Council for 1969, January 
1970, Box 2S415, Folder “SRC General 1971,” Field Foundation Archives. Registration results were only tallied by 


























 Virginia Lynchburg Voters League  $1,500  
  Danville Voters League  $1,000  
  Pittsylvania County Voters League  $1,000  
  Halifax County Voters League  $1,000  
  Mecklenburg County Voters League  $1,000  
  Galax NAACP $1,000  
  Richmond NAACP $1,500  
  Lunenburg County NAACP $1,000  
  Charlottesville NAACP $1,250  
  Martinsville County Voter Registration 
Council  
$1,000  
 Special National YWCA $1,500  
   Total - 
$186,946.92 
 
     











































Source: Contributions to the Voter Education Project of the Southern Regional Council, Inc.,  














Year Sponsor Total to VEP  
1966 Field Foundation $100,000  
 Taconic Foundation $150,000  
 Rockefeller Brothers Fund $50,000  
 Ford Foundation $24,000  
 Marion Ascoli Fund $1,000  
    
  Total - $280,000  
    
1967 Field Foundation $150,000  
 Rockefeller Brothers Fund $50,000  
 Mary Reynolds Babcock 
Foundation 
$50,000  
 New World Foundation $25,000  
 Ford Foundation $24,000  
 New York Foundation $10,000  
 John Heyman $1,045  
 Anonymous $500  
    
  Total - $310,545  
    
1968 Field Foundation $375,000  
 Ford Foundation $24,000  
 New York Foundation $10,000  
 North Carolina Fund $4,000  
 Taconic Foundation $5,000  
 Mary Reynolds Babcock 
Foundation 
$15,000  
 The Abelard Foundation $2,500  
 Philip M. Weightman $1,000  
 Joseph D. Sapp $1,000  
    
  Total - $437,500  
   Total - $1,028,045 
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APPENDIX 10: FOUNDATION GRANTS TO VEP, 1970  



















Source: John Lewis to Thomas W. Wahman, March 23, 1971, Box 1078, Folder 6579,  





























Sponsor Grant Total Percentage of Total Income 
Ford Foundation $73,000 24.9985% 
Field Foundation $72,920 24.9711% 
Carnegie Corporation $55,703 19.0753% 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund $50,000 17.1223% 
Irwin-Sweeney-Miller Foundation $16,000 5.4791% 
New World Foundation $10,000 3.4245% 
Aaron E. Newman Foundation $7,000 2.3971% 
Board of Social Ministry, Lutheran 
Church of America 
$4,400 1.5068% 
Metropolitan Women’s Democratic Club $2,000 .6849% 
Sales of Literature $569 .1948% 
Broadway United Church of Christ $250 .0856% 
Southern Education Foundation $150 .0514% 
National Council, Churches of Christ $25 .0086% 
Total $292,017 100% 
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APPENDIX 11: VEP GRANTEES, 1970 
State Organization Grant Amount  
Alabama Alabama Center for Elected Officials  $24,200 
 Bessemer Voters League  $650 
 Greene County Voter Registration Committee $500 
 Barbour County Registration Committee $500 
 Marengo County Voter Registration Committee $500 
 Lowndes County Voter Registration Committee $500 
 Dallas County Voter Registration Committee $500 
 Perry County Voter Registration Committee $500 
 Sumter County SCLC $500 
 Wilcox County SCLC $585 
 Hale County Progressive Organization $500 
 Morgan County Organization for Voter Education $150 
 All-Macon County Voter Registration Committee $150 
 Concerned Citizens for Voter Education (Greensboro) $500 
 Bullock County Improvement Association $250 
 Marengo County Coordination Association $100 
 Alabama Christian Movement for Human Rights $250 
 Alabama State Coordinating Association for Registration and Voting $150 
 Clarks County Civic Association $100 
 Neighborhood Organized Workers (Mobile) $250 
 Pickens County NAACP $100 
 Alabama Training Program – Sheriffs (Hayneville) $400 
Arkansas Arkansas Council on Human Relations VEP $13,971.07 
Florida Citizens Coordinating Committee of Daytona Beach $1,200 
 Seminole VEP $1,000 
 Voter Registration and Citizenship Education Inter-Civic Council of SCLC 
(Tallahassee) 
$1,000 
 Clearwater NAACP $500 
Georgia Georgia Center for Elected Officials  $19,300 
 Title I Conference (Atlanta) $328.68 
 Black Citizens Organization of Crawford County $500 
 Houston County Voters Committee $500 
 Stewart County Voter Registration Workers $500 
 Citizenship Education Commission (Fort Valley) $500 
 Coweta County VEP $500 
 Rising Star Voters League (Indian Springs) $500 
 Citizens Participation Council for Action (Athens) $500 
 United Association for Progress (Milledgeville) $500 
 John Hope University Homes Registration Committee (Atlanta) $432 
 Heeman E. Perry Homes Registration Committee (Atlanta) $400 
 Webster County VEP  $500 
 Black United Group of Griffin $500 
 Burke County VEP  $600 
 Eleanor Crittenden (Morgan) $500 
 Meriwether County VEP $500 
 Pike County VEP $500 
 Crisp County VEP $500 
 Warner County VEP $500 
 Taliaferro County VEP $200 
 Washington County VEP $1,320 
 Jefferson County VEP $500 
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Sources: VEP Annual Report, 1970, Reel 177, SRC Papers; and VEP  
Annual Report, 1971, Reel 177, SRC Papers. 
 Southwest Georgia VEP $1,800 
 YWCA’s Youth Voter Education Action Project (Atlanta) $1,000 
Louisiana Public Affairs Service Center, Southern University  $23,810 
Mississippi Mississippi Center for Elected Officials $19,750 
 Coahoma County Youth Council NAACP $1,250 
 Washington County Improvement Association $1,285 
 Humphreys County Union for Progress  $1,700 
 Sharkey County VEP $1,640 
 Sunflower County Voters League  $2,500 
 Greater Jackson Area Committee  $1,950 
 Yazoo County Voter League  $1,500 
 Tunica County Union for Progress $1,440 
 Holmes County United for Progress  $1,500 
 Madison County Union for Progress $1,000 
North 
Carolina 
North Carolina VEP $23,213.46 
 Wilson Community Improvement Association $700 
 Wayne County VEP $800 
 Citizens Committee for Increased Voter Registration and Participation (Charlotte) $1,000 
 Greensboro NAACP $1,000 
South 
Carolina 
South Carolina VEP (2 projects) $15,580.80 
 Florence County Voter Registration $1,000 
 Charleston County VEP $1,200 
 Laurens County VEP $1,000 
 Edgefield County VEP $1,000 
 Greenville VEP $1,000 
 Sumter County Voter Registration Committee $1,000 
 Richland County Voter Registration Council $1,000 
Tennessee Maury County VEP $1,000 
 West Tennessee Self-Help Development Corporation $1,000 
 Knoxville NAACP $2,000 
 Nashville Frontlash $1,515 
 Wilson County Council on Human Relations $500 
Texas Young Minds in Action (San Antonio) $2,000 
 Houston West End Development Cooperation Voter Registration Fund  $2,000 
 Project Voter Registration and Education (Houston) $1,000 
 San Patricio and Bee County Voter Registration Council $1,500 
Virginia Isle of Wight Committee $582 
 Southampton Committee $582 
 Southside Portsmouth Committee $582 
 Amelia Committee $582 
 Prince Edward Committee $582 
 Charles City Committee $582 
 Lunenburg NAACP $500 
 Cumberland County Voter Registration Committee Unclear 
 Hopewell Improvement Association - SCLC  $500 
 Dinwiddie County Civic League  $500 
 Greenville County Citizens Group $500 
 Sussex Improvement Association $500 
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